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Consideration of  t he de mocratic qua lities of  s upranational i nstitutions—specifically t he 
European Union (EU)—consistently display a reliance upon principles of democracy as they are 
found i n na tion-states. While t here i s co nsiderable di scussion a bout t he pr oblems t hat t his 
reliance poses, finding strategies for avoiding that reliance, especially in the case of the EU, has 
proven di fficult. T his s tudy e xamines t he w ay i n w hich E uropean i nstitutions a re j udged b y 
democratic cr iteria, and de monstrates the  pr oblems tha t c ome with replicating state-bound 
principles of  de mocracy a s i f t hey s ay s omething a bout a  p erceived de ficit i n E uropean-level 
democracy. I nstead of r igidity in principles, what i s ne eded to examine de mocracy at t he 
supranational level is a fluid and flexible approach that still provides a robust understanding of 
what is happening (and not happening) democratically in the institutions of focus. The adaptive 
approach to democracy, using a framework that distinguishes between first-order principles and 
second-order principles of democracy, is a tool that provides this flexible yet robust perspective. 
This appr oach views d emocracy as  cl usters of  di fferent pr inciples at  w ork in a va riety o f 
institutions, rather than as a specific set “laundry list” of principles that must be included for a 
system to be judged democratic or not. This approach is particularly valuable for supranational 
institutions, where assumptions about democracy make a rigid lens for analysis. This rigidity can 
 v 
cause descriptions of supranational institutions to either miss new ways of democracy being met 
or to result in excessive reliance upon a defined set of democratic principles that are misfit to the 
institution in question. This s tudy lays out  the adaptive approach, based upon the central f irst-
order principles of freedom and equality. Then through three case studies of EU institutions the 
method is employed: focus is upon the European Parliament (the traditional spot for democratic 
hopes t o be  hun g), t he European C ourt o f J ustice ( an i nstitution of ten c onsidered t o h ave t he 
most undemocratic f eatures in the EU), and Daphne, a  Commission program against gendered 
violence ( an unde r-explored l ocation w here de mocratic pr inciples can be  f ound w orking i n 
unexpected ways).  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION: FROM THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT TO AN ADAPTIVE 
SOLUTION 
Of t he m any di fficulties pos ed b y pol itical i nquiry, one  ha s r emained c onstant t hrough t ime: 
change. From Athens to Sparta, monarchy to democracy, and  campaigns by train to the era o f 
televised debate, study of the political has always occurred over a landscape of change. One of 
the m ore recently recognized f actors which c hanges pol itical i nquiry i s t he phe nomenon of  
globalization.1
The work that follows i s an a ttempt t o focus on t he way in which w e, a s s cholars and 
thinkers a bout pol itical que stions, c an c hange t he pr ocesses, pa radigms, a nd c oncepts i n our  
minds to adjust to change—in particular, the change that political organization and governance 
 While the same process may have ex isted long before being assigned the name 
“globalization”, m odern s cholars a nd pol icymakers ha ve be come i ncreasingly s ensitive t o t he 
ways in which globalization affects our  pol itical a nalysis. Like a ll c hange, c onsciousness of  
globalization a s a  ph enomenon r equired a  s hift i n t he w ay i n w hich r esearchers a nd pol icy 
makers t hought a bout p olitics. Y et w hile t here i s consciousness t hat g lobalization r equires 
altering our  t hinking a bout i ssues, successful na vigation of cha nging t he w ay we as  s cholars 
think is not always an easy task.  
                                                 
1 Here I use the term globalization in the manner of Held et. al. (1999), pg. 16: “a process (or set of processes)  
which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms 
of their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks 
of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.” 
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above the le vel of  the  n ation-state ( the supranational) br ings. Danger resides pr ecisely at  t he 
moment where our concepts and paradigms are not keeping pace with the changing reality of the 
topics we study, where the old institutions and ideas are evolving, mutating, re-arranging due to 
the phenomenon of globalization. Many issues can draw our focus here, between changes to the 
state system itself, to the international system and transnational political life.  
Theorization on global democracy has been one area particularly good about addressing 
the effects of  globalization on our  consideration of  familiar and new s tructures of  governance. 
Yet gaps exist, most notably with a  s ystem of  supranational governance that i s pot entially t he 
most s tate-like a nd/or f ederal i n composure amongst t he f ield o f s upranational governance 
structures: the European Union (EU). While global democracy literature is just now beginning to 
consider t he E U i n de pth, pr evious a nd c ontinued he sitancy to c onsider t he E U i s at l east 
explainable.2
 Yet two initial observations are important here. First, the field of work on the democratic 
deficit in the EU was n ot i n s ync w ith t he growth i ndustry of  pol itical t heory t reatments of  
democracy at  t he global l evel. S econd, theorists w e mig ht c onsider a s global de mocrats a re 
surprisingly quiet about the way that the EU may or may not fit the points that they raise about 
supranational institutions. The EU, as one of the most institutionalized supranational governance 
structures i n hi story, s eemed r ipe f or c omparison t o t he c oncerns o f global democracy. T he 
puzzle is not simply why these two literatures remain so isolated, but also how to bridge the gap 
between the two in a world where our paradigms and concepts must cope with the changes that 
globalization brings. 
 Factors such as its complexity or its unique contextual development (the EU as sui 
generis) may leave it somewhat unappealing to the political theorists and global democrats. 
                                                 
2 For an example of the emerging global democracy theory treatments of the EU, see Goodhart (2007).   
 3 
This dissertation considers w hether the p ractices of  t he EU can be a s tarting poi nt f or 
creating a m ore a ppropriate c onception of  w hat s upranational and non -sovereign democracy 
looks like. Existing literature on global democracy has a significant blind spot that obscures such 
considerations of t he EU. G lobal de mocrats s eek t o de fine s upranational de mocracy w hile 
sometimes paying little heed to a significant institution that may already contain answers about 
the na ture and qua lity o f supranational democracy. Cases f rom the EU context can be  used to 
specify a new understanding of what democracy above the nation-state might be. 
However, reaching that new notion means changing the very way in which we as scholars 
approach our  t hinking a bout democracy. Current democratic t heory approaches fail t o provide 
the sort of traction that is desirable to make connections between democracy in the supranational 
and t he s pecifics o f t he EU. Democratic t heory ca n p rove t o b e t oo r igid, i n w hich c ase t he 
specifics of institutions can fail to meet their requirements. The tendency toward rigidity leads us 
to rule out  n ew d emocratic phenomena s imply b ecause t hey do  not  f it t he pre-formed not ions 
that w e ar e c arrying. Conversely, our  p rinciples of  de mocracy can be  s o s implistic—in t he 
interest of applying to multiple cases—that their very broadness causes problems in judgment. If 
we r estrict de mocracy as a  concept s o m uch that i t be comes vot ing and vot ing a lone ( for 
instance), it may become too applicable. We would not want a theory so thin that the electoral 
process a nd t elephone voting f or c ontestants on r eality t elevision ge t t reated a s s imilar 
phenomena (let alone b oth i ndicators of  de mocracy). Given t hese di fficulties, s cholarship on 
democracy, the supranational, and the EU needs a fresh approach. 
  I argue t hat m y adaptive approach provides an initial account  of  de mocracy t hat ca n 
allow for creative interrogation of supranational institutions. In this way, the EU serves as a case 
which can tell us something new about the nature and democratic possibilities of supranational 
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institutions. The adaptive approach provides a  means to avoid a central problem of democratic 
theory, namely needing to choose between a specific account that lacks applicability or a general 
account that may travel well yet provides insufficient insight into democratic principles.  
It is important to be clear about what questions I am not trying to answer in my research. 
I am not  saying that certain practices in the EU can be viewed as democratic in reference to a 
particular t heory of  d emocracy. Instead, I w ill be  e xploring how  an adaptable d efinition of  
democracy can be crafted to facilitate the type of inductive theorizing about democracy that this 
research envisions. I do  not want to s take out  a detailed normative democratic theory pos ition 
then systematically compare the institutions and practices of the EU to that position, essentially 
labeling each case as democratic or not. That is a different project. Instead, what I develop is a 
preferable va riation of  m inimal or  t hin de finitions of  de mocracy, w hich I call t he adaptive 
approach to democracy. When a pplied t o t he w ays i n w hich t he E U acts a t t he s upranational 
level, the adaptive approach forms a lens for viewing particular institutions and practices that can 
allow greater insight (via the EU as one example) into what our judgments about democracy at 
the supranational level should look like.  
Through t he a daptive a pproach, w e c an r eformat t he w ay i n w hich w e t hink a bout t he 
principles of  de mocracy t o a llow f or a f lexible yet robust c onception of  de mocracy, w hich i s 
suited to political inquiry in an era of globalization—as chapter two will explain in full depth. 
However, in order to proceed with the project at hand, there are three important literatures which 
must be addressed before getting to the adaptive approach. The following three sections review 
the critical literatures that form the background from which the adaptive approach stands out in 
sharp relief. I review them with the purpose of demonstrating why adaptive democracy applied 
to the EU is a more useful approach than much of the literature on the EU and global democracy. 
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The first section deals with the continuously-referenced topic of the democratic deficit of the EU, 
showing t he s tatist l imitations of  m uch of  t hat bod y of  l iterature. T he second s ection br iefly 
considers the usefulness of inquiry into theories of integration for my project. The third section 
explores the way in which global democracy has previously been theorized, and considers why 
the EU has received undue neglect in that literature.  
Through the exploration of these preliminary matters, I hope to show that there is a gap in 
scholarship between the ideas of  the EU and the ins ights that global democracy theory brings. 
This sets up the meat of my theoretical argument (which appears in chapter two) where I show 
how my adaptive approach generates progress toward closing that gap—providing a perspective 
for r esearchers t hat al lows us  t o e valuate s upranational s tructures, bot h i deal a nd e xisting, 
without be ing m ired in old state-constrained not ions of  de mocracy. Following t he r eview of  
relevant l iteratures in the next three sections, I l ay out  a  br ief overview of the s tructure of  the 
dissertation that follows.  
1.1 DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
There is a great deal of literature on democracy and the EU, most of it focusing upon a so-called 
democratic deficit. While there is some debate about who coined the term “democratic deficit”, it 
surfaced in the late 1970’s and mid-1980’s in reports and pamphlets about the democratic and 
quasi-federal s ituation of  E urope. T he t erm gained s alience among E U s cholars, w ith a  
consensus app earing that t he EU l acks ce rtain democratic components usually associated w ith 
national democracies.  
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From these studies, an interesting set of opinions emerge. Despite differences, a common 
perception of t he s ource of  t he E U's de ficient de mocratic ch aracter emerges.3 The nove l 
institutions of  the  EU have be en judged b y some as not  democratic, be cause t he EU do es not  
possess the democratic legitimacy of the sovereign nation-state.4 Some thinkers suggest that the 
EU lacks “traditional” forms of democratic legitimacy that originate from state-based democratic 
notions like representation and electoral accountability.5 A number of democratic deficit studies 
center on i nstitution-focused c onceptions of  l egitimacy.6 Often t hese considerations i nvolve 
procedural le gitimacy stemming f rom ma joritarian institutions—“political de cisions a nd 
outcomes are legitimate because they are taken by elected officials.”7
Recommendations f or fixing the  de mocratic de ficit a lso reflect a  bi as tow ard the 
characteristics of nation-state, sovereignty-infused, electoral conceptions of democracy. Despite 
the di fferent character of  the EU as  a s upranational governance regime rather than a sovereign 
state, many suggest that the same democratic legitimacy of the nation-state should be realized at 
the EU level,. This means a need for representative institutions to secure the “core attribute of  
democratic governance”: public control.
  
8  Often this takes its cues off of the role that parliaments 
play at the nation-state level; the single defining item is the accountability of government to the 
parliament.9
                                                 
3 Alternatively, Andreas Føllesdal (2006) suggests that the democratic deficit literature contains multiple mutually 
incompatible views of democracy. As this section will demonstrate, his read is entirely correct. Yet it is useful to 
point out, as I strive to do, some key areas where consensus seems to be reached if not between all scholars, at least 
among a sizeable segment of them.  
 In this view, democracy requires popular representation through elected officials in 
the pol icy-making process. Stronger de mocratic institutions pr ovide t he m eans t o de mocratic 
4 Cowles and Risse (2001). pg. 223. 
5 Peterson and Bomberg (1999). pg. 256. 
6 Newman (2001); Rothschild (1997); Scharpf (1991); Sjursen (2002); Weiler et. al. (1995). 
7 Rittberger (2003). pg. 205.  
8 Lord and Beetham (2001). pg. 458. 
9 Siaroff (2003). pg. 446. 
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controls ove r pol icy, which i n t urn a re l inked t o a  s ense of  popul ar l egitimacy.10
Others raise notions of identity as important to consider when discussing the democratic 
deficit, though these views often invoke a definition of democracy that is tied to the experience 
of t he na tion-state. Their f ocus i s on the le vels of  le gitimacy individuals perceive w ithin 
supranational institutions, and how that legitimacy is expressed. Examples include community, 
identity, scope of  EU governance, levels of  regime support, and individual pol icy performance 
judgments.
 Again, t he 
common element i s that the features of  ex isting s tate democracy are being used as  a guide for 
thinking about the EU. 
11 These t ypes of s tudies e xamine not ion of  E uropean i dentity, a nd ho w l evels of  
national pride, belonging, and attachment are linked to system support (legitimacy) for the EU.12
There is also some literature on the democratic deficit in the EU that seeks to justify the 
EU without explicitly requiring EU institutions to look like democratic institutions of states. This 
subset of  s cholars s uggests t hat t he E U ha s ot her w ays of  m eeting e xpectations t hat i t be  
democratic. One s et o f s tudies tha t move  in this di rection a re t hose that focus on i ndirect 
representation. The basis of this argument is that with the integration of the union, the legitimacy 
that national governments enjoy is transferred to the institutions of the EU.
 
13 The institutions of 
the EU are considered representative because they are accountable to member state governments, 
which are in turn democratically elected.14
                                                 
10 Dahl (1994). pg. 25, 33. 
 This indirect representation relies upon the executives 
of m ember s tate governments ha ving p re-existing claims to democratic le gitimacy cemented 
11 Schmitt and Thomassen (1999). 
12 Duchesne and Froginer (1995). 
13 Newman (2001).  
14 Moravcsik (2002). pg. 611. The executive governments of many European states are legitimate to their 
constituents but also participate directly in guiding EU policy through the Council of Ministers. Thus, the Council 
can be considered “at least formally subject to [national] parliamentary accountability.” J.H.H. Weiler (1999). pg. 
265. 
 8 
through support from national parliaments and electoral systems.15 This mode of legitimization 
has be en a pplied t o ot her i nternational or ganizations a nd i s a rgued t o s upport t he E U c ase a s 
well.16
Other studies search beyond the actions of states in the system, focusing on other sources 
of de mocracy. These s tudies c ommonly explore f actors s uch as i nstitutional pe rformance, 
effectiveness, and European identity as ways to lessen concerns about a deficit of democracy at 
the supranational level.
 The pr oblem f aced b y this s et o f arguments i s t hat i t c arries a  n otable s ubtext: tha t 
democracy at the international level requires that the international be composed by a collection 
of c ooperating, s emi-sovereign states. This pe rsistence of  t he s tate as t he f oundation of  
democracy c an pos e pr oblems f or how  the c oncept of  de mocracy i s a pplied t o s upranational 
systems.  
17 The idea here is that these factors matter to state democracy, but may 
look different when realized at the EU level. Some move toward a linkage of legitimacy as the 
primary component of democracy, and pose new modes of legitimating the supranational space. 
Verhoeven ( 2002) pr esents a  di fferent t ake on t he m ixed a pproach, a rguing t hat f ormal 
legitimacy (juridical) and social legitimacy (system support) work side-by-side to legitimate the 
EU. 18 Advocates of  “n ew g overnance” s tress f unctional ( output) l egitimacy r ather t han 
representative le gitimacy.19 Finally, allocation legitimacy is  a nother la bel a pplied to the E U 
because of its quasi-federal nature, drawn from principle-agent theories.20
                                                 
15 Benz (2004). pg. 875-876. 
 Legitimacy, however, 
continues to be tightly entwined with the nature of state level democracy. Legitimacy implies the 
16 “Traditionally the democratic legitimacy of international agreements and organizations is thought to derive from 
the mutual consent of the contracting party governments, which are, in turn, elected domestically.” Bignami and 
Charnovitz (2001). pg. 279.  
17 Lord and Beetham (2001). pgs. 23, 26-28, 33-39. 
18 Verhoeven (2002).  
19 Peterson and Bomberg (1999). pg. 256. See also Rittberger (2003). pg. 205. 
20 Coglianese and Nicolaïdis (2001). pg. 280. 
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same f undamental c orrelation be tween t he s overeign citizen a nd c odes of  r ight be havior a nd 
responsiveness from the institutions that represent them. With legitimacy, we gain a host of other 
concerns about the nature and origin of the relationship between state and individual. With the 
role of the state so prominent, moving this concern outside the state brings rather than reduces 
complications. 
A minor ity of  E U s cholars int erpret le gitimacy di fferently, leading to alternative 
judgments about  t he pr imacy conc ern for eva luating t he democratic ch aracter o f supranational 
institutions. Arguments highlighting discursive role of the Council, with its associated norms of 
trust, collective act ion, agreement, and m utuality ar e on e of  t hese s trategies.21 Likewise, other 
authors f ocus on  t he de mocratic i mplications of  pa rticipation i n a  m ulti-level ci vic s pace.22 
Finally, some authors l ook at s eparate va lues t hat can  a ct as  surrogates for t he us ual ne ed for 
popular legitimacy. These include accountability, participation, transparency, and independence, 
among ot hers.23
This review has touched on a  number of  di fferent “camps” of scholarship, and i t could 
continue indefinitely given the number of forays into thinking about the democratic deficit. The 
following graphic displays what I take to be the major camps of scholarship on t he democratic 
deficit. 
 While i ncluded t o de monstrate t he br eadth of  i deas t hat com pose d emocratic 
judgments, not ions l ike pa rticipation, a ccountability, and di scourse t oo e asily f eed ba ck i nto 
similar tr aps: our  obs ervations of  s tates inf orm t he pr inciples th at w e a re br inging to bear on  
supranational institutions.   
                                                 
21 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997). pg. 275-276. 
22 Chryssochoou (2002). pg. 756. 
23 Zweifel (2003). pg. 541, 545-547. 
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Figure 1. Democratic credentials applied to the European Union by the democratic deficit literature 
 
The f irst thi ng to note is tha t thi s de piction is not  s ensitive to whether a  p articular 
argument holds that a deficit exists or not. Instead, it relates judgments pro and con in terms of 
the evidence that they consider in the EU case. The prior review developed four main types of  
criteria for d emocracy: legitimacy in all of  its  f orms, institutional s imilarity ( or f unctional 
similarity) to democracy at state level, nationalism-spawned notions of collective civic identity, 
and the simple transfer of democracy from members to organization. What I find most notable, 
however, i s t hat a ll of  the i deas I’ve di scussed a bove fall i nto t he c amp of  c oncerns t hat 
 11 
developed f rom the historical experience of  democracy in the nation-state.24
My preliminary judgment is that the democratic deficit literature remains too thoroughly 
wedded to state-centric versions of democracy. This is perpetuated by the “somewhat idealized 
image of  r epresentative de mocracy i n terms of  account ability or  r esponsiveness of  de cision-
makers” that exists in  the literature.
 My argument and 
the construction of adaptive democracy is a means to populate the right side of the graphic that 
has been largely ignored by democratic deficit scholars.  
25
1.2 INTEGRATION THEORY 
 Mythical vi sions of  what s tate democracy looks l ike get 
conflated with considerations of how the supranational institutions realize (or fail to realize) the 
principles of  democracy. Another branch of  scholarship addresses the concerns of s tate-centric 
democracy, and how the shape of a more global or supranational democracy might be described.  
It is the industry standard of EU studies to address the broad literature on integration and to work 
out t he ni che of  i ntegration t heory where one ’s work f its be st. Integration theories a ttempt to 
explain how and why the EU was constructed, as well as theorizing the fundamental nature of a 
political regime like the EU. This is a generalization of course, as integration theory is a broad 
descriptor. Intergovernmentalist theory, neofunctionalist theory, and constructivist approaches all 
vie for students of the EU to choose their story for European integration. 
                                                 
24 Admittedly, the treatment presented here is brief. City states, federal arrangements, and local government all 
complicate matters. However, I maintain that the basics which are most frequently applied to the EU and other 
supranational structures are colored primarily with vestigial notions drawn from the nation-state experience of 
government.  
25 Papadopoulos (2003). pg. 473, 492. 
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Integration theories are crucial for comparative political inquiry into the EU for a specific 
reason. T he w ay we t heorize t he c reation a nd e xpansion i nstitutions ( the i ntegration pr ocess) 
explains how  one  m ight c lassify a nd c ompare t hose ve ry i nstitutions w ith r egard t o existing 
political categorizations. The creation and interpretation of the institution can matter as much as 
the content and actions of the institution. The rub of integration theory is that different theories 
suggest ve ry di fferent s tories a nd i nterpretations of  E U i nstitutions, w hich i n t urn a ffect w hat 
lessons a bout s upranational de mocracy c an be  dr awn f rom t hem. T he s tory of  i ntegration 
accepted b y a t heorist w ill ha ve c onsequences on t he l essons f or de mocracy d rawn f rom a ny 
consideration of EU institutions.  
The di fficulty is  tha t the  s tory tol d of how  E U ins titutions be came w hat the y are 
determines how we describe the crucial nature of those EU institutions. Those descriptions of EU 
institutions in turn prejudice our standards by which we judge those institutions. The genealogy 
of t he i nstitution becomes i ts ontology, which t hen be comes i ts epistemology. Put s imply, the  
story we tell of the history of integration informs our definitions of the institutions, which in turn 
bias what we know about those institutions according to the story we told from the start. Thus, 
any meaningful consideration of what we make normatively of a given EU institution has already 
been determined by the story we told of how that institution developed in the first place.  
For t he pur poses o f m y a rgument, I e xplicitly choose not  t o a lign m yself w ith a ny of  
these theoretical camps. Allowing my argument to get caught up in the integration debate would 
lead to an inability to fully explore the types of question that I am interested in. By choosing a 
specific s tory of  i ntegration, t he a nswers t o que stions of  de mocracy a nd the na ture of  t he E U 
become pr e-ordained. So instead of  pi cking s ides or  even engaging the debate, m y pos ition i s 
that t he de bate s imply i sn’t w orth ha ving f or my t ype of  a rgument. T his i s not  t o s ay t hat 
 13 
integration theory isn’t a valuable tool to many comparative studies. Rather, these questions are 
simply not the questions that motivate my inquiry. 
1.3 GLOBAL DEMOCRACY 
The literature on global democracy is a primary location where the consideration of the unique 
nature o f supranational democracy i s found. While there is  little  examination of the  European 
Union directly, t he arguments do ha ve b earing on how  t he s hape of  s upranational de mocracy 
might look—an important resource for EU-based considerations of democracy. The critical point 
of this literature is that democracy at the supranational level may simply not look like democracy 
at the  na tional level.26
The e xisting l iterature on g lobal de mocracy—political t heory t hat f ocuses on 
supranational organization, norms, and identity. These theorists—including Carol Gould (2004), 
Charles Beitz (1999), Onora O’Neill (2000), David Held (2004), Andrew Kuper (2004), Michael 
Goodhart (2005), and others—have reached a number of interesting insights about the normative 
foundations and possible organization of supranational democracy or justice regimes. However, 
they r eference i n passing ( or ex clude ent irely) the f acts and history of  t he EU—an existing 
supranational governance r egime. What al l of  t hese di sparate t heorists share i s an absence of  
discussion of the EU.  
 As s uch, t he e xtent t o w hich t he de mocratic de ficit de bate i s ba sed on 
comparisons t o na tional-level de mocracy ( where legitimacy a nd pop ular c ontrol are ke y 
assumptions) is problematic.  
                                                 
26 See Goodhart (2005), Goodhart (2005a), Gould (2004). Note that these theorists tend to discuss democracy in a 
different way, focusing less on institutions and legitimacy. Instead, the key is understanding democracy as a 
commitment to equality and human rights.  
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Other s upranational in stitutions ha ve s erved a s r eferences in this lite rature: the  
International Criminal Court, other international legal regimes, the United Nations, and national 
models of  social a rrangement such as Held’s (2004) use of  na tional social democracy models. 
Yet t he EU has be en unde r-explored.  A  f ew global de mocracy and j ustice t heorists ha ve 
addressed the EU, particularly Thomas Pogge’s (1997) consideration and the recent essay work 
of J urgen Habermas. Yet t hese w orks ar e ex plicitly E U-focused a nd r esponding t o s pecific 
debates about the nature and purpose of the EU. Their interest is a step in the right direction, but 
yet t hey f ail t o pr oduce full l inkages be tween t heories of  global de mocracy a nd t he E U c ase. 
Only more recent work, typified by Michael Goodhart (2007) begins to do this in any meaningful 
way. By taking the example of the EU seriously, and trying to show how insights about the EU 
can enrich theorizing about the supranational, I hope to provide a critical element of the global 
justice and democracy debate that is only now starting to emerge. 
The sui generis description of  the EU weighs heavily here. Many authors have defined 
the EU as an entity that shares similarities to other institutions and regimes, but is fundamentally 
a uni que oc currence. T he e xclusion of  t he E U f rom t he g lobal de mocracy l iterature m ay b e a  
product of  t hat t reatment. In t his w ay, t he E U may be  a voided b y t heorists f or t he ve ry s ame 
reasons that comparative literature on the EU hesitates to generalize from it. 
Yet the evidence that the EU is a good candidate for consideration by global democrats is 
apparent. It is  a t le ast on the s ame le vel of  s upranational ins titutions th at g lobal de mocratic 
theorists s eek t o t arget. B oth E U s tudies a nd g lobal d emocracy grapple w ith t he s ame 
fundamental concern: ho w w e d eal w ith the s ometimes r igid categories o f w hat governments, 
institutions, and governance should resemble. The sui generis nature of the EU should show that 
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it de fies the se r igid classifications, making it an exceptional case f or g lobal de mocrats to  
consider.  
Having developed a s ense for the global democracy l iterature, we can now locate their 
thoughts on the prior figure. 
 
  
Figure 2. Democratic credentials examined in supranational governance by the democratic deficit literature 
and theories of global democracy 
 
The notable element here is that global democracy has defined some notions of how we 
might j udge s upranational phe nomena as de mocratic or  not . Y et, t he a rrow between those 
judgments and the EU is incomplete at best—although recent work by Michael Goodhart (2007) 
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and others has begun to fill that line in. Furthermore, the horizons for what new democratic ideas 
can appear in the supranational context remains open (the dashed oval). It is the remaining space 
on the right-hand side of the chart that this project seeks to fill.  
It attempts to do so with an adaptive democracy account of the EU in a way that is also 
directionally different from other approaches. The dashed arrow in the chart above is indicative 
of this. My approach starts with the institutions of the EU, using adaptive democracy to generate 
arguments about the nature of supranational democracy from the experiences of the EU. In this 
way, m y adaptive a pproach pr oceeds i n a  di fferent m anner t han ot her t heories of  global 
democracy—it be gins w ith onl y a  m odified t hin t heory of  d emocracy and builds f rom c ase 
examples, rather than fully specifying global democracy in the abstract and then comparing that 
to existing cases.  
Looking at the practices of the EU can be a starting point for creating a more appropriate 
conception of  w hat s upranational a nd non -sovereign d emocracy s hould r esemble. T he pr ior 
comments have served both as a review of the relevant literatures to my question, as well as the 
limitations of those l iteratures. The contribution of this project will be a means of easing those 
limitations. My argument will show that existing institutions in the EU provide excellent cases 
for reconsidering the foundational principles of democracy at work in institutions. By using the 
EU case to train the adaptive method, scholars can better apply the logic of adaptation to other 
contexts and principles. In doing so, the democratic deficit l iterature and the global democracy 
literature would gain a  crucial foothold on r ealizing how we can understand democracy in the 
supranational space.  
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1.4 TOWARD AN ADAPTIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Given these background l iteratures, the s tage i s set for m y presentation of the adaptive 
approach: both its theoretical foundations and a series of applied case chapters where the unique 
insights of  the approach are displayed. By the concluding chapter, the nuances of  the adaptive 
approach and i ts unique method of  shaping our  methods of  investigation should be  c lear. This 
section provides a brief road-map of the argument to come.   
Chapter two i s the meat of  my argument, where I map out  my concept of the adaptive 
approach. I demonstrate where it comes from and the value-added it provides over conventional 
thin/thick versions of democratic theory. Given the ease with which democratic theorization slips 
into the thin/thick mindset, the adaptive method is correctly situated as an approach. It is not a 
specific theory o f democracy, but  rather a method of  us ing (and changing and losing) s econd-
order principles of democracy given the case at hand and the way in which that case accesses the 
two first-order principles of democracy: freedom and equality. The adaptive approach works to 
free the mind of  the researcher f rom patterned assumptions and problematic defaults, in a  way 
that enables a flexible yet robust inquiry of both theory and the case at hand.  
The remaining chapters in the project come in the form of  paired sets. Each paired set 
explores a different institutional case in the EU, thereby raising different insights into democratic 
theory through the adaptive approach lens. The three cases are the European Parliament (chapters 
three and four), the European Court of Justice (chapters five and six), and the Daphne program, a 
particular Commission initiative to combat gendered violence (chapter seven).27
                                                 
27 Daphne is the exception to the paired set formula for the case chapters, for good reason. With Daphne, there is no 
existing treatment of the program from a strictly democracy-thinking lens. Instead, my cut is the first and thus the 
need for a paired structure, with its “first other approaches, now my approach” logic is inapposite.  
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The selection of these cases w as b ased upon the ir ability to  be  illus trative of  the  thr ee 
general s ituations of  democratic consideration. The European Parliament i s the t raditional spot 
for democratic hopes to be hung (a most likely case). The European Court of Justice, on the other 
hand, i s a n i nstitution of ten c onsidered t o ha ve t oo m any und emocratic f eatures t o f igure i nto 
democratic considerations of  EU institutions (a most unl ikely case). And the Daphne program, 
while e xtensively c onsidered f rom t he s tandpoint of  i ts ope ration a nd i mpact, ha s r eceived 
minimal exploration through the democratic lens—thus providing a new space where democratic 
principles can be found working in unexpected ways.  
The paired structure allows the argument to proceed in orderly fashion. The first chapter 
of each pair lays out the basics of the institution in question, and addresses both the failures of 
existing democratic inquiries into the topic and the democratic questions or concerns that remain 
unsolved. T hen, t he s econd c hapter of  e ach pa ired s et a pplies t he adaptive a pproach t o 
democracy. It l ocates w hat s econd-order pr inciples a re ( and a re not ) p resent i n t he i nstitution, 
and demonstrates how those potentially new second-order principles not only connect to basis of 
democracy but also allow for a different and fresh view of the institutions at hand. The Daphne 
chapter, which di verts from t his f orm, serves as  a m odel of  t he ada ptive appr oach, worrying 
more about the way democratic principles are found in the institution rather than starting with a 
pre-formed set of expectations about democracy’s appearance.  
The final chapter groups the findings from developing the adaptive approach to the three 
cases and uses those findings to answer the remaining questions of the project. First, it gives a 
response to the lingering concern about the EU being democratic as a whole. As I have pointed 
out here, and will continue to illustrate, a pressing question for many EU scholars is “Is the EU 
democratic?” I suggest that a ch ange in question is  the essential s tarting point—instead asking 
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“How is the EU democratic?” The conclusion lays out the way in which the adaptive approach to 
democracy is particularly useful in giving answers to the latter question, providing insight into 
how va rious pr inciples of  de mocracy are c aptured i n di fferent w ays a cross t he m yriad of  
institutions t hat c ompose t he E U. T he a daptive a pproach do es not  e ndeavor t o a nswer t he 
question of  “ Is t he E U democratic?” W hile a daptive de mocracy’s i nsights c ould be  us eful t o 
those m aking s uch b road j udgments, I a rgue t hat c onsiderably m ore i s gained b y focusing on  
mapping various ways “how” the institutions of the EU display democratic characteristics.  
The conclusion also examines how the insights of the adaptive approach can travel from 
the EU context to the broader field of global democratic questions and supranational institutions. 
It argues tha t w ith increasing tr ends of  globalization, the tr aditional bounda ries o f s tates 
themselves can become problematic. Thus, the case of  the EU—where the ex isting theories of  
democracy c ome f rom s tates not  s upranational s tructures like  its elf—can he lp us  t hink a bout 
both global democratic theory and the specific patterns other supranational governance structures 
(WTO, IMF, or  t ransnational pol itical a ssociations, f or i nstance). In t his w ay, t he a daptive 
approach to democracy is able to fill the empty spaces in theory and the charts presented above, 
to better as sist s cholars and researchers unde rstand the ef fects of  t heir pa radigms and  
conceptions about political life as they are applied to new, different spaces of political behavior.  
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2.0  THE ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY 
The pr evious c hapter de monstrated t he s hortcomings of  current ev aluations of  t he de mocratic 
character of the European Union. Yet from the wealth of attempts, it seems clear that scholars, 
policy-makers, and European citizens continue to think that quantifying the democratic character 
of the EU is important. Comparisons and judgments of democracy are an attractive enterprise—
from Freedom House rankings to detailed case studies of democratic character, scholars want to 
be a ble t o s ay w hether a  g overnment i s de mocratic or  not . H owever, t he pr ior c hapter 
demonstrated t hat m ost of  our  current t ools f or m aking s uch j udgments f ail t o evaluate a  
supranational body like the EU properly.  
In response, it is essential to consider the pressing follow-up question to the prior chapter: 
How should we go about evaluating the character of democracy in the EU? If we cannot do s o 
with not ions of  de mocracy gleaned from s tate e xperience, w hat do w e t urn t o? What s ort of  
theory can tell us  s omething m eaningful about t he cas e o f t he E U yet allow us  t o effectively 
compare the EU to other governance structures? 
There are at least two approaches that one may try to escape the dilemmas presented in 
chapter one. The first response could be to build an explicit theory of democracy in the EU. This 
inductive a pproach would be gin w ith a  de tailed analysis of  how  t he E U i s doi ng ne w t hings 
democratically. It would construct an argument from the richness of the case, showing in the end 
that a n i n-depth vi ew of  t he E U can tell us tha t it is  de mocratic or  not  on its ow n particular 
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merits. The dr awback o f t his a pproach i s i ts inability t o be  c omparative. T he E U, a s t he sui 
generis case du jour, would provide decidedly particularistic insights that could only allow us to 
discuss it as a single case. Any comparisons with other supranational bodies (states, IOs, NGOs, 
etc.) would be difficult from this vantage point to say the least.  
A second response to the dilemma of chapter one takes the opposite approach. Instead of 
starting from a fully-specified model of what democracy should be in the EU, we could start with 
a minimalist account of democracy. From this, a central theme or focus can be delineated. Then 
we w ould s cour t he E U f or examples of  t his c entral not ion a cross i nstitutions. Democratic 
judgments could then be drawn from presence or absence of the idea, and compared to all sorts 
of other institutions and locations where the central components we choose for democracy can be 
found. This response makes us lose sight of the variety that makes the EU an interesting case for 
democracy in the f irst place, a  s ignificant dr awback. As d etailed in the pr ior c hapter, it is  
difficult to escape reliance upon prior notions of democracy, which may apply incorrectly to the 
EU. Likewise, we may get a very weak evaluation if our thinking remains at the most maximum 
range of observation.28
Both of  t hese vi ewpoints ha ve i mportant e lements, but I w ill a lso show tha t e ach is 
ultimately inadequate for treatments of the EU as a democratic entity. Neither the first “thick” 
paradigm of  de mocratic m odel s pecific t o t he E U a lone, nor  a  s econd “ thin” pa radigm of  
applying a watered down version of democracy seems ideal for solving the problems presented. 
So t he que stion l eft b y t he f irst c hapter r emains: how  s hould w e g o a bout e valuating t he 
character of democracy in the EU? 
  
                                                 
28 Consider participation, for instance. If we boil democracy down to simply the need to see “enough” participation 
in the institutions of the EU, then our judgments about democracy would be entirely based upon rates of voters or 
counts of contact between officials and citizens, whether or not other democratic essentials were being met.  
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In chapter one, we were left with this puzzle; in this chapter I will try to solve it. In doing 
so, I will a ddress t he t wo seemingly incompatible pa radigms ( thick a nd t hin) t hat I br iefly 
sketched above. I will consider each in turn. While both have merits and e lements that can be 
deemed essential to thinking about the EU democratically, in the end we need to escape the thick 
versus t hin pa radigm. Democratic t heorization ne ed not  be  either-or when c onducted i n a  
comparative setting as long as we can develop a new approach that transcends the dichotomous 
tendencies outlined above.  
My answer is  a  s hift in  de mocratic thi nking, a pa radigm I call adaptive democracy. 
Understanding de mocracy i n s upranational i nstitutions doe s not  ne ed a  n ew t heory of  
democracy. A new theory would simply add one more to the pile of transient and over-specified 
theories about  democracy. Theories of  democracy are the one  thing we have. What i s needed, 
and what adaptive democracy supplies, is an approach to thinking about principles of democracy. 
Or better put , an approach that can evaluate and incorporate the m yriad of di fferent ways that 
democracy can be expressed in every context (including the supranational). Adaptive democracy 
attempts to split the difference of the two insufficient responses above. It is simultaneously thick 
and thin, and through a bit of work, manages to preserve the benefits of  both paradigms while 
removing their flaws. Adaptive democracy allows the researcher to draw from multiple existing 
theories of democracy, rather than trying to build its own unique theory. 
In this chapter I will show that adaptive democracy is desperately needed in the case of 
supranational institutions, and demonstrate how it succeeds in giving political thinkers a new tool 
for m aking d emocratic evaluations. T o t hat e nd, m y argument f or adaptive de mocracy w ill 
proceed as follows. First, I will explore the genealogy of scholarship that spread thick versus thin 
paradigms i n t he f irst pl ace. T his di chotomous t hinking, dr awn f rom c ertain s trands of  
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democratic t heory and  f rom com parative r esearch methods, finds its elf mired in a s et o f ba d 
trade-offs that limit our ability to make desirable democratic inquiry. I argue that instead of the 
dichotomization inherent to the thick versus thin approach, a desirable alternative of adaptability 
is pr eferable. The adaptive a pproach r ecognizes t hat t he l imitations of  thick versus thin are a  
tension that comes from desired qualities falling on both sides of the dichotomy. Thus, it chooses 
to simultaneously exercise thi ck and thin methodology b y a llowing f lexibility o f indi cators 
within target institutions. The advantage the adaptive democracy approach provides is that it is 
both f lexible and robust. After expanding on t he approach’s particulars and why i t i s di fferent 
from thick versus thin theorization, I w ill t hen show w hy adaptive de mocracy i s pa rticularly 
useful for  h ard-fit c ases s uch a s t he E U. I will e nd w ith a n examination of  how  a daptive 
democracy can be employed—a process that later chapters will demonstrate.  
2.1 THICK VERSUS THIN PARADIGMS 
In the prior section, I sketched the bare bones of two potential responses to the puzzle of chapter 
one: how do we apply democratic theory correctly to the EU in a way that both says something 
meaningful yet allows for comparisons to other institutions?  These two responses (a close-fitting 
inductive democratic account of  t he EU or  a  broad and generalized democratic ac count of  t he 
EU) represent a  common paradigm in political theorization: a  thick versus thin approach. This 
section will look more specifically at the nature of this approach and how it has appeared in other 
works. The choices of thick and thin have been used with different emphasis by certain scholars. 
I will illus trate the  di fferences br iefly, and then demonstrate tha t thick versus thin becomes a  
viewpoint t hat s hapes t heorization a bout de mocracy. T he nua nces f rom scholar t o s cholar a re 
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interesting, but ul timately the usefulness of  thick versus thin for my argument comes f rom the 
patterns that this approach to theorizing yields.  
The usage of  thick and thin in the social sciences s tems from the insights of Gilbert Ryle 
(1950) and Clifford Geertz (1974). Initially drawn by Ryle to discuss cultural interpretations of 
eye movements (a wink as the movement of the muscles of the eyelid or a meaning-laden symbol 
of c ommunication), G eertz ut ilized t hick a nd t hin t o t alk a bout di fferences i n e thnographic 
research. F or G eertz, a coherent s tudy of cont ext w as ne cessarily a  “t hick” de scription.29
Additional examples of the appearance of the thick versus thin approach to theorization are 
plentiful. A  full catalog of  such examples i s not  necessary for m y purposes. Instead, I pr esent 
two ideal t ypes t hat ar e central t o the analytic a pproach of  thick versus thin thinking. What i s 
important i s t hat two di fferent us ages c an be  di stilled. F irst, t hin c an m ean a bstract and non -
controversial, while thick can mean embedded and r ich in detail. Both o f these take thick and 
thin as descriptors of the level of theory. I term these usages specification descriptors: thick and 
thin are used by authors to convey the level at which their theory is pointed (akin to the initial 
formulation of  G eertz). In t his c ase, t hin is a  d eliberately minimal not ion. T he virtue is the 
flexibility o f the  the ory, w hich allows f or appl icability and comparability ac ross cas es. Thick 
theories, on t he other hand, are employed to describe a fully-specified normative statement of a 
particular cont ext—a t heorization that r eaches a nor mative th eory f rom the  pa rticulars of  a 
case—and what principles are included and realized in that context. They build theorization upon 
the specifics of the case, describing (for instance) Swedish democracy or bargaining space in the 
 The 
term spread through the social s ciences, taking root particularly in comparative lite ratures an d 
political philosophy. 
                                                 
29 Geertz (1974). pg. 14.  
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IMF. This leaves thick theories with less ability to be universally applicable. Instead, their pallet 
is one  of  qua lification, c ompromise, c omplexity, a nd di sagreement.30
I ch aracterize t he s econd usage of  t he thick versus thin paradigm as  motivating accounts, 
typified b y J ohn R awls (1999). R awls de scribes a  t hin conception of  t he good as on e t hat i s 
intentionally minimal for purposes of theory building. Again, a minimal nature appears, but with 
a different goal. In this case, the minimal is intended to provide a baseline of goods that motivate 
his argument. This motivation is the essential component to generating the normative account, in 
this c ase. B y c hoosing thin, or  t he pa rticular t hin s et of  g oods, R awls’ a rgument dr aws i ts 
normative power—as it establishes a thin set of goods that should be provided by a satisfactory 
account of justice. 
 Thick de mocracy i s 
purposefully particular, applying to a specific set of circumstances or cases. This usage of thick 
and thin is essentially an expression of the trade-offs of the comparative method: either we can 
include a lot of cases along broad issues, or we gain depth on a single case without applicability 
to many others.  
Rawls c hooses a  t hin t heory ove r a t hick t heory be cause i t f its w ith l iberal a ssumptions 
about the differential prioritization of goods from individual to individual. However, motivating 
accounts can also be thick. A perfect example is Benjamin Barber’s (1984) preference for thick 
(“strong”) de mocracy over t hin de mocracy s hows t his w ell. For Barber, t hick i s t he “ most 
vigorous” r esponse t o d emocracy.31
                                                 
30 Walzer (1994). pg 6.  
 The the ory will not  be  r estricted to a mini mal ba seline. 
Rather, the moniker thick tells us that the theory’s motives include a large list of outcomes that 
are valued. Barber criticizes the liberalism-inspired thin accounts of democracy, suggesting that 
31 Barber (1984). pg. 118. 
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their “values are prudential and thus provisional, optional, and conditional.”32
Again, the account is motivational: thick is shorthand for a need to include many theoretical 
features i nto a pr actice. Exploring t his dua lism, Michael W alzer s uggests t hat t hinkers t ake a 
“(thin) set of universal principles adapted (thickly) to these or those historical circumstances.”
 The notion is that 
only thick accounts are able to force thinkers into including all of the important components of 
democracy.  
33
                                                 
32 Ibid. pg. 4. 
 
While his notion shows some working together, his maximal versus minimal categories retain a 
distinctive dual nature of holding one set of benefits over another. The emphasis here is still in 
familiar te rritory: t he f ocus r emains on t he vi rtues of  m inimal m otivation ve rsus a  r ich a nd 
specified motivation.  
33 Walzer (1994). pg. 4. 
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Figure 3. Typologies of thick and thin 
 
Despite t he t wo m ain u sages of  t hick v ersus t hin t erminology, a  uni fied not ion c an be  
constructed—the shared section of the Venn diagram in the figure above. Both the specification 
descriptor approach and t he m otivating a ccounts a pproach s hare f eatures. T he cent ral et hic 
which i s s hared b y bot h i s a n i ntuition of  di chotomization. F rom di chotomization, a n i nitial 
trade-off of minimal versus robust focus appears which in turn determines whether the argument 
will be perceived as flexible or contextual. 
The fundamental perspective of  scholars working under the thick versus thin viewpoint is 
that the labels thick and thin categorize a divide that is roughly dichotomous. This is especially 
true when the terms are used as specification descriptors, as there is an implied trade-off to be 
had: you get the benefits of one but not the other. The utility of a thin theory is balanced by what 
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is l ost f or not  ha ving a t hick t heory. Both s pecification de scriptors a nd m otivating a ccounts 
display this treatment. While scholars may not actively label their accounts as thick or thin, we 
can recognize the impact of which side of the paradigm the author falls.  
From this account, the intuition is that thin theories are fundamentally minimal while thick 
theories ar e f undamentally r obust—two qualities w hich are tr eated as mutually inc ompatible 
under the paradigm. The minimal/robust nature may affect different parts of the theory, but the 
distinction remains. The vi rtue of  the  thin theory is  the  same in specification descriptors as in  
motivational a ccounts. We g ain a  l ow t hreshold t hat f acilitates c omparison a nd t heorization. 
Minimal affords a high degree of generalization for the argument. In the motivational account, 
minimal assumptions are included as a means of allowing the theory to fit multiple places—the 
pressure to be a specific way is limited, giving the theorist more space to design their account to 
include other factors that they deem important. The minimization allows for wiggle room, in a 
way t hat a  r obust a ccount doe s not . T he i ssue i s m uch t he s ame f or s pecification de scriptors. 
Robustness limi ts the  r ange of  the  the orization in a w ay tha t mini mizing e nables. While the  
theorizing that is done is different, the intent carried by the terminology is the same.  
The de rivative component of  t he thick versus thin paradigm is  tha t it de scribes a  f lexible 
versus c ontextual s ituation. I d escribe thi s a s d erivative b ecause it s tems di rectly f rom the  
minimal versus robust construction—as indicated by the  arrows in Figure 2.2.a. The choice o f 
minimal or robust determines whether the theory will be flexible or contextual. Flexibility is the 
dividend of the minimal ingredients that compose thin theories. Thin theory gains its flexibility 
because of its lack of content. These approaches equate an empty theory with the ability to apply 
to multiple c ontexts. L ikewise, it is  a ssumed that a  thi ck theory d erives its  c ontextual nua nce 
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from i ts logic of  robustness. The thinking is predicated on t he belief that a nuanced, particular 
view that desires to understand a case in depth is handicapped when applied to other situations.  
The uni fied not ion of  thin ve rsus t hick t hat I ha ve de veloped he re is not  a  pe rfect 
classification of a ll vi ews, but it is  indi cative that a  general pa radigm o f t hick v ersus t hin 
thinking doe s i ndeed exist. T he pur pose of  t his s ection i s not  t o establish a n e xhaustive 
genealogy or  t axonomy of every account t hat uses t hick and thin t erminology. Instead, I have 
developed an ideal type of the thick versus thin paradigm, and considered how this perspective 
molds the choices and claims that the scholar employing it can make.  
2.2 FAILURES OF THE THICK VERSUS THIN PARADIGM 
The problem with the thick versus thin paradigm is that it leaves us with an undesirable choice 
for making evaluative and normative judgments. We are presented with a choice that necessarily 
implies drawbacks. A thin theory is set up to always fail to reach the level of specification that 
we might really want. Our accounts will be too general, too sweeping, and too minimalistic to 
give real purchase on the case. Likewise, a thick theory is set up to always provide substandard 
applicability a cross m ultiple cas es. We m ay ha ve a great d escription, but our  cas es cannot  b e 
placed in comparison to other similar units due to the level of detail alone. The dichotomization 
of t he t erms l eaves us  stranded w ith t he t raditional e asy escape r oute for bot h c omparative 
research and normative theorization: we speak clearly about the limitations of the approach and 
justify whatever ens uing t rade-offs ar e m ade, as  i f t hat t rading off i s a n ecessary evil.  
Dichotomization i s t he r oot of  t his pr oblem. T he thick versus thin approach is t reated as i f i t 
provides c ontrasting ut ilities t o t he r esearcher. A t hin t heory p rovides utility X applicability but 
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removes the possibility of utility Ydepth. And thick theory is capable of giving us utility Ydepth, but 
cannot provide utility Xapplicability. In the choosing of one, we somehow cannot get both.  
This t ype o f dichotomous thinking i s a f allacy. This i s not  a z ero-sum s ituation: with my 
adaptive a pproach, w e can ha ve our  c ake a nd e at i t t oo. It i s not  ne cessarily t he c ase t hat a 
flexible theory mus t in clude minimal content. Walzer suggests tha t mini mal isn’t shallow ( for 
morality) but rather is “close to the bone” in its ability to be vigorous yet applicable.34
2.3 SYNTHESIS: ADAPTIVE THEORIZATION 
 While his 
analysis goes ba ck i nto c ontrasting t hick a nd t hin, t hat ne ed not  be  t he case. W e c an ha ve a  
flexible treatment of a concept that allows for multiplicity of realizations. Democracy serves as a 
particularly useful example here. A flexible notion of democracy can include various principles 
such a s fundamental be lief i n hum an rights, e qualitarian out looks, no rms of  t olerance, a nd 
notions of  pa rticipation a nd r esponsiveness o f government. B ecause these pr inciples can be  
realized in different ways by different institutions, we might suggest that democracy can adapt to 
a s ituation where t here are m ultiple s paces and sources of  f ulfilling de mocratic r equirements, 
such as a com plex supranational g overnance s tructure. The following section e xplains how  
theoretical flexibility—when not treated as dichotomous to contextual depth—generates a means 
for achieving the goals of both thin and thick theorization methods with a single approach.  
The overarching goal of this chapter is to salvage the utility of both thick and thin views within a 
single a pproach. I argue t hat i t i s pos sible to d o s o w ith c ertain c oncepts—particularly w ith 
                                                 
34 Walzer (1994). pg. 6.  
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democracy. The theoretical outlook that I call the adaptive approach to democracy is the means 
that can realize this goal of capturing the best of both: providing us with a democratic theory that 
is s imultaneously r obust a nd f lexible, a ble t o s atisfy c oncerns a bout c omparability w hile 
retaining a meaningful normative and descriptive basis. 
The fundamental way to escape from the dichotomous trap of the thick versus thin paradigm 
is to expect and relish the variety of l ife. The complexity of  pol itical systems produces a great 
variety of difference among them. Yet we can also realize that there are some core components 
to anything that w e w ant t o theorize about ( i.e. democracy). These “co re” el ements ar e 
definitional in nature—the root of what defines that we are talking about democracy instead of 
autocracy, a Danish Red cow, or the starting line of the ’86 Philadelphia Flyers. Assuming that 
we are interested in our political concept (democracy), we can come to terms with the variety of 
ways in which that c oncept is  r ealized in the pol itical r ealm. We s tart w ith a s et of  c ore 
principles, and then must move to the ways in which those principles are realized in the world 
through institutions and practices.  
I argue that we can use a strategy of adaptation to capture the benefits of flexibility without 
losing the robustness of our insights. An approach does not need to be minimal, just adaptable. 
Theorists must recognize that the core principles of the concepts we like to define can be met in 
multiple f ashions f rom s ystem to system ( and even within systems). This is  a kin to a f amily 
resemblances a pproach, but  e ven m ore adaptable a cross uni ts t han t he r esemblances not ion 
explained by David Collier and James Mahon (1993) and others. Like family resemblances, we 
need not obs erve t he ex act s ame s et of  qua lities i n everything w e de em “com parable”. The 
family r esemblances mo del r eminds us , simplistically, that the  tr aits of  r elated things a re not  
always completely shared. We do not rule two siblings with the same eye color but different hair 
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colors i ncomparable—despite t he di fferences, we r ecognize t hem as belonging t o t he s ame 
family. I a rgue t hat t he s ame hol ds t rue f or de mocratic i nstitutions, which a ccess di fferent 
components of  de mocracy. Both ove r t ime, and f rom pl ace t o pl ace, t he c omponents of  
democracy have varied (in theory and practice)—and thus why would we want to limit ourselves 
to a  s ingle, s ituated description of  the concept? In fact, the adaptive approach goes far beyond 
family r esemblances, b y a llowing us  t o s ee t hat e ven s haring none  of  t he s ame t raits, t wo 
institutions can still be democratic.35
                                                 
35 Skeptical readers be assured, this ability is explained fully in section 2.3 below, where radial categorization and 
family resemblances are considered and applied to democratic principles.  
 Theory needs to be able to recognize the core components 
of i ts f ocus at w ork i n i nstitutions, a nd be  a ble t o c ope w ith s ituations w here t hose core 
components are realized in different ways. The alternative to the thick versus thin approach is a 
way of working diagonally across the dichotomous divides that are usually upheld.  
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Figure 4. Thinking diagonally means adaptability 
 
An a pproach t hat i s c apable of  pr oviding t he focus of  t he da rk ova l a bove i s t he i deal 
solution t o br eak t he ba d thick versus thin trade-offs t hat ha ve l ong pl agued de mocratic 
treatments of the EU. To think diagonally in this way is an exercise in breaking the assumptions 
of dichotomy that plague thick versus thin. It is about generating an approach that is flexible and 
robust, not  m erely on e or  t he ot her. In s hort, i t i s a n a nalytical pe rspective t hat a sks t he 
researcher to be adaptable in her thought processes. The following sections explore this response 
of being adaptive and how it manages to break from the limitations of the world of thick versus 
thin.   
 34 
2.4 ADAPTIVE DEMOCRACY: ATTENTIVENESS TO THE SECOND-ORDER 
An idea that helps break the dichotomy problems of thick and thin theory is adaptability. That is 
why my approach is labeled adaptive. The prior section made room for breaking with dichotomy 
and thinking in a more open and variable manner. This mindset can be applied to various types 
of political phenomena. Yet as the first chapter suggested, my argument cares about one specific 
political concept: democracy. Thus, the main focus of my argument here is a particular form of 
adaptive t hinking: adaptive democracy. While t his cha pter s ketches t he ada ptive appr oach 
relatively abstractly, I will develop the idea in the following chapters through the application of 
the adaptive approach to democracy in the particularized case of the EU. 
The hi story o f de mocracy as a  concept i s our  f irst c lue t o w hy a  v aried a nd f lexible 
approach to the concept is needed. As discussed earlier in this chapter and in chapter one, any 
sort of  r igidity to one specific historicized set of  principles ( i.e. those drawn from an idealized 
“nation-state experience”) pr oves pr oblematic. Defining an ex plicit s et of  pa rticular qu alities 
runs t he da nger of  b ecoming t oo s pecific t o t heir c ases or  t he da nger t hat t he c oncept i s s o 
watered down that it can apply to multiple different institutions and systems of governance. Any 
particularized account or  theory of democracy suffers these problems. Instead, the f irst s tep in 
adaptive thinking is releasing the need to do this.  
A m oment t o c onsider how  w e f orm conceptualizations of  i deas i s e ssential he re. In 
particular, tw o forms of  c onceptualization—radial cat egories and family r esemblances—prove 
useful i n he lping or ient our  t hinking a way from the  di fficulties of  r igid accounts a nd their 
associated t hick v ersus t hin pa radigm. In t he p rior s ection, I m entioned the not ion of  f amily 
resemblances to argue that not  al l principles of  democracy need be present in every case, or in 
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every c omponent pa rt o f a de mocratic s ystem. That s ense of  va riable c omponent at tributes i s 
explained by Collier and Mahon (1993) as:  
“a pr inciple of  category m embership… there m ay be no  s ingle at tribute t hat c ategory 
members a ll s hare. T he label f or t his t ype of  category de rives from the f act that w e can  
recognize the members of a human genetic family be observing attributes that they share to 
varying de grees, as c ontrasted t o nonf amily m embers w ho m ay s hare few of  t hem. T he 
commonalities a re qui te e vident, e ven t hought the re ma y b e no trait tha t a ll f amily 
members, as family members, have in common.”36
 
  
However, it is unclear just how useful the family resemblances categorization is with normative 
principles—we may demand more of normative principles than we do from means of sorting sea 
shells or other empirical classification questions.  
Thus w e m ight c onsider a  di fferent approach t o c oncepts with va rious attributes: r adial 
categories. Again, Collier and Mahon (1993) put the idea most simply: 
“As with family resemblance, with radial categories it is  possible that two members of the 
category will not  s hare all of  w hat m ay be  s een a s de fining attributes. In c ontrast t o t he 
family resemblance pa ttern, with radial categories t he ov erall m eaning of a  cat egory i s 
anchored in a “central subcategory”, which corresponds to the “best” case or prototype of 
the category.”37
 
   
By t his, they mean t hat r adial con ceptualization defines a central notion (the “ central 
subcategory”) of the idea, to which other features—not always present in every case—are linked. 
Instead, the central core is what makes things similar, despite the appearance of  a m ultitude of  
other yet linked features. Here we reach a conceptualization that starts to embrace the adaptive 
ethos that is more desirable in thinking about democracy.38
                                                 
36 Collier and Mahon (1993). pg. 847. 
 The idea is that for complex notions, 
37 Ibid. pg. 848. 
38 In fact, Collier and Mahon (1993) reference democracy as their example of a radial category when explaining the 
notion. Pg. 848.  
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like democracy, there are a variety of traits that compose the concept. Furthermore, appearance 
of those traits in cases need not be identical in presence.  
The question becomes: what principles are central to democracy if we are to treat it with 
the insights of radial and familial categorization? And what effect does that treatment have upon 
our employment of democratic theories? I argue that democracy has two shared central notions 
that form a basis similar to a “central subcategory”: freedom and equality. These two principles, 
which I w ill r efer to as the  f irst-order pr inciples of  de mocracy, form t he c entral e thic of  
democracy from which all other expressions have been drawn. Despite alterations to the notion 
of democracy that have occurred as both history and theory changed and developed, freedom and 
equality remain two central portions of the idea. What is changing is not freedom and equality, 
but the ways in which freedom and equality are reached. Other principles, which link to freedom 
and e quality, a re t he o nes t hat g o i n a nd out  of  f ashion a mong de mocratic t hinkers a nd 
practitioners. These ot her, c ompeting pr inciples of de mocracy, I w ill r efer t o a s s econd-order 
principles. They become a  part of  the democratic picture for two main reasons. First, f reedom 
and e quality a re di fficult t o m easure on t heir ow n a ccord. W e c annot s imply s ay “add m ore 
freedom to that ins titution, and it w ill be  de mocratic”. Instead, we s ay things like  “increased 
participation makes it de mocratic”, where pa rticipation is a  me ans of  r eaching the  f irst or der 
principle of freedom—for instance. In this way, we see a radial-like categorization of the concept 
of democracy being useful. 
I us e bot h the f amily r esemblances and t he r adial c ategories de pictions of  de mocracy 
purposefully—as the adaptive approach treats the concept of democracy as a hybrid of the two. 
As models for the way we think of  concepts, they a re helpful for be ing suggestive of  how we 
think as r esearchers. A nd w hile t he r adial s tructure f its w ith the f irst a nd s econd pr inciples 
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notion, the adaptive approach recognizes that rarely (if ever) do we observe freedom and equality 
being directly applied to any case. Thus, maintaining both methods of conceptualization seems 
useful, given t hat w hen l ooking at a  pa rticular pol itical i nstitution, a nd i dentifying w hat 
principles ar e at w ork t here, we generate s olely a l ist of  s econd-order pr inciples ( which are 
explored as to their link to our first-orders). Thus, while democracy itself may be radial in terms 
of a central set of ideas and associated principles to that central notion, our observations of it in 
cases ne ed to draw i n the r adial l inkages ( as t he cent ral el ements of  f reedom and equality a re 
difficult to perceive independently of their linked second-orders), and therefore begin in a more 
family resemblances-type situation.  In this way, democracy is somewhat differently treated—the 
notion of “core” that comes from the radial conception fits with our first-order notions, and the 
constellations of  obs ervable s econd-orders appear i n the f amily resemblances p attern. It i s 
important to note, however, that this core is not some essential or  best prototype, to revisit the 
phrasing o f C ollier a nd M ahon ( 1993). Instead, I us e t he not ion of  “core” to r ecognize that 
theoretically, there are two principles that all democratic systems possess (freedom and equality), 
albeit in varied modes of expression. Thus the adaptive approach, while possessing similarities to 
radial and family resemblances categorization, is not reducible to either.  
Given that ada ptive d emocracy (like thick versus thin theories be fore i t) s eeks t o s ay 
something about real world political arrangements, it is important to establish the types of thing 
that adaptive democracy looks for when evaluating the democratic character of a system. I argue 
that adaptive democracy works by identifying second-order principles of democracy that link to 
the more central first-order principles of freedom and equality that lie at the heart of democratic 
intentions. It pays attention to one second-order principle at a time, and need not be concerned 
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with ensuring that a specific set of second-order principles is always present or always realized in 
the same ways to recognize democracy.  
Instead, as I s uggested before, de mocracy i s a concept w ith core components t hat t ell us  
what i t i s w e a re t alking about. In t he c ase o f democracy, t hose core c omponents s eem t o b e 
freedom and equality. These a re the f irst-order p rinciples of  democracy—the elements without 
which a democracy cannot be composed. Any institution that leaves out or systematically treads 
upon one of these first principles seems to fail in qualification as a democracy.  
The hi tch t o t hese t wo first or der pr inciples i s that t hey are f irst o rder. T here ar e m any 
different w ays in which the se tw o principles c an be me t ins ide a given pol itical s ystem. The 
history of democratic theorization is the history of continual re-examining new ways that these 
two basic pr inciples ar e realized in political practice. They are f irst-order for this very reason. 
They spawn a number of secondary principles that do a ll the work in these varied cases. There 
are m any w ays o f achi eving f reedom or  equ ality, and these ar e t he p ractices t hat w e act ually 
observe being realized in institutions. Here I empathize with the intention of David Beetham’s 
(1999) a ttempts to define de mocracy w ithout be ing tie d to a pa rticular institutional f ormula. 
While I differ from Beetham on the content of first-order principles (his participation reads more 
as a s econd-order means of ensuring freedom under the system and equality of opportunities to 
influence it), the intention feels the same.39
                                                 
39 Other scholarship addresses this intention of finding overlapping consensuses from democratic theory, but with 
less of the dedicated thrust that Beetham (1999) provides. See also Føllesdal and Hix (2006) as an example of this 
intention to work from overlapping democratic basics with a direct application to democracy in the EU.  
 Adaptive democracy recognizes that there is a cor e 
ethic t o democracy, and s earches out  i nstitution and practices w here t hat cor e et hic i s be ing 
achieved through the related but more easily institutionalized goals of second-order principles.  
 39 
Securing f reedom and e quality as f irst-order pr inciples of  democracy i s not an easy t ask. 
Here I draw primarily from the democratic notions that came as part of Enlightenment thought. 
Democracy emerged in its modern turn as an escape from limitations and a de sire for self rule. 
Individuals chose democratic principles for the opportunities they brought, particularly in  their 
radical rejection of old hierarchies where the other was placed above the self. This stemmed from 
the recognition of the value of self in the first place—hence the Enlightenment l ink. From this 
point forward, criticisms and contrary ruling systems aside, the focus of political life shifted from 
the w ellness of  t he w hole, t o t he w ellness of  t he i ndividuals w ithin the whole ( which i n t urn, 
constituted the whole). This notion of citizen as constituting state leads to the primary foundation 
of freedom and equality in democracy.  
Democracy b egan a nd c ontinues a s t he s ystem by which these two central pr inciples are 
secured for each individual t hrough the a rrangement of  governance ov er t heir l ives. An initial 
concern in early democratic and enlightenment thought was the question of why individuals, i f 
allowed to pursue their own goals, would not  t rample over the freedom and r ights of  others—
John Locke’s essential concern. The answer from Locke and others was that a bounded l iberty 
was i deal, a b alance b etween maximum pe rsonal f reedom and the equality of  al l t o engage i n 
their own freedom—equality being a product of a) all being equally restricted and b) none being 
unfairly limited due to the desires of others. From these central points, the other accoutrements 
of democracy seem to flow. Our right to self governance clashing with our need to coexist with 
others i s t he cent ral t urmoil he re. Democracy e merges as  t he s ystem w hich best enables t hese 
two elements to be located. Like mathematical limits, Locke’s point reminds us that the system 
will never allow total freedom and total equality at the same point—each places a limit on the 
others’ expansion. Yet we can, and do, s ee systems that have more or  l ess of  each factor. The 
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goal of  democracy, broadly writ, seems to be a system of  maximizing freedom and equality at 
the same time—similar in turn to that of Rawls. All second-order principles seem to stem from 
this, as means of ensuring the two mutual goals of the actualized individual. Democracy is the 
catch-all name for our collection of various historical methods which do this task, and thus is the 
name for the pursuit of freedom and equality mutually. When found in combination, freedom and 
equality create democratic spaces.  
Now I turn my attention from the first-order principles to the second-orders that stem from 
them. Second-order principles of democracy are numerous and varied, and the temptation exists 
to make a full listing of all of them. I could identify the numerous second-order principles that 
have b een pa instakingly employed b y theorists of democracy, global j ustice, and the E U. The 
benefit of providing a full listing of all relevant second principles would be to demonstrate that 
some are m utually i ncompatible af ter a s ense—there i s no institution that could possess a ll of  
them at once. Exploration of difficulties stemming from the incompatibility of certain democratic 
principles ha s be en c arried out  e lsewhere ( see F øllesdal 2006) , r emoving t he ne ed f or s uch a  
proof here.   
Instead, w e reach a critical j unction of t his pr oject—demonstrating th e w ay in  w hich 
different s econd-order p rinciples ar e conn ected to the f irst-order pr inciples of  f reedom a nd 
equality. Principles s uch as  participation, accountability, contestation, a nd human rights have 
been explored many times as democratic components on their own. Here, I want to treat them as 
the s econd-order pr inciples t hat t hey a re, t o demonstrate j ust how pr inciples such as t hese a re 
plausibly linked to freedom and equality.40
                                                 
40 Here I am concerned only with the briefest of sketches connecting these second-order principles to the first-order 
principles of freedom and equality. I provide only a short treatment because I am concerned with the plausibility of 
the second-to-first-order connection, more than the details of any particular connection.  
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Participation may be the most commonly mentioned principle in democratic theories. It can 
go by many names and variations—responsiveness, contact, input, and access—yet with each the 
principle remains roughly the same. With each, the idea is that the people have some connection 
between their will and the actions of the government above them. And despite little differences, 
in each case pr inciples of  pa rticipation a re means of  ensuring the f reedom and equality of  t he 
person. The idea is that without participation, we lose our ability to voice and thus our control of 
the situation. Loss of control means a loss of freedom, as we are unable to guide the system to 
either achieve what we want it to achieve, or to ensure that it does not hinder actions in areas of 
behavior we wish to keep open. Likewise, given a system where there is more than one citizen, 
participation s imilarly realizes t he e quality o f the pr ocedure. S hould one  pe rson be  d enied 
participation, while others retain i t through formal or  informal means, our equal standing with 
others e rodes. In t his w ay, pa rticipation (and i ts va rious s imilar c oncepts) c an b e s een a s a  
second-order principle of freedom and equality. 
A s imilar s tory c an be  t old f or accountability. B y i tself, a ccountability doe s not  c reate a  
democracy, nor  do t he hos t of  s imilar c oncerns t hat ha ve appeared t hroughout d emocratic 
literature ( guarantee, a ssurance, f airness, c onsistency, and t ransparency, be ing onl y a  f ew 
examples). Rather, accountability as a principle is the idea that the system of governance should 
match the procedure and outcomes of its institutions to a pre-determined standard—in effect, that 
the governance produces w hat it pr omised without externalities that de tract f rom the  s ystem’s 
resources or  functioning (graft, nepotism, etc.). In democratic cases, that standard is where we 
find t he c onnection t o f reedom a nd equality. W hy do w e c are a bout a ccountability i n a  
democracy? Because it is our money spent and our goals pursued. The link between governance 
and t he pe ople i s e ssential he re. To the ex tent governance ope rates w ithout r eference t o the 
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people’s i nterests, it act s as  a r estraint on the f reedom of  i ts ci tizens. The di sparate n ature of  
outcomes in that case (pursuing the goals of some, not all), again violate notions of equality in 
the same manner as l ack of  participation did. Accountability, then, serves a  s imilar purpose to 
participation. W hile di fferent i n means of achievement, the goal of  s ecuring freedom and 
equality remains the same.  
Contestation forms a third example of a second-order principle of democracy. And again, a 
host of  r elated yet di fferent pr inciples c an be  s imilarly t reated ( discussion a nd di scourse, f or 
instance). The idea here is that a de mocratic system needs to have some form of contestation in 
order t o b e properly classified as d emocratic. Mexico’s years o f s ingle pa rty rule are of ten 
faulted a s non -democratic a ccording t o t his c oncern. S o w hy i s s ome f orm of  c ontestation or  
discussion of  va ried i deas a nd vi ewpoints i mportant f or de mocracy? S temming f rom J .S. Mill 
and ot hers, t he l ack o f c ontestation l eads t o s tagnation a nd l ack o f c hallenge. W ithout 
contestation of ideas, liberty is lost. Those who may think differently are tread upon, while those 
in the ma jority m ay f ind themselves hol ding an i ncorrect position which limits their f reedom. 
Likewise, without contestation of  pol itical agendas (whether they pe rsonal or  party-promoted), 
the out comes of  governance run t he r isk of  b eing t oo n arrowly guided: m inority r ights a nd 
preferences w ould qui ckly b e l ost. T hat los s of  t he minor ity vi ew limits  the f reedom of  those 
citizens, not to mention their equal standing amongst all citizens of the state. And again, we see 
that the pr inciple i s s imply one specified way of  reaching the real core of  democratic concern: 
freedom and equality.  
Finally, a  fourth second-order pr inciple to consider i s human rights. Often packaged with 
democracy, or even as democracy in the work of Michael Goodhart (2005a), recent democratic 
theory and global democratic thought has consistently relied upon hum an rights as an indicator 
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of democracy. And like the other sample principles I discussed above, human rights also fits well 
as a second-order principle that secures the first-order principles of freedom and equality. While 
conceptions of  human rights do vary, one critically impor tant vi ewpoint comes f rom Amartya 
Sen’s ( 2005) c apabilities de scription of  hum an r ights. T he i dea w ith t reating hum an r ights a s 
capabilities is t hat w ithout c ertain ba sic goods hum an be ings a re r estricted i n t heir r ange of 
actions and choices. Without the food and water we need to survive, we lost many l iberties of  
action that others with those goods possess—our capability to act in certain ways is limited. The 
same holds true for other, more intangible, basic goods that fill out  social, economic, and civil 
rights. Without a right to speak our mind, to assemble together, or even (in some formulations) 
guaranteed health care, a person is incapable of pursuing their will. This is where human rights 
links to freedom and equality most clearly. Without a set of human rights present, our range of 
actions (capabilities) is limited. Thus, with those limitations our freedom is constrained. And in 
any situation where there is variable distribution of those human rights, equality is sacrificed as 
some enjoy the capability to be free while others do not. 
The f our p rinciples I e xplored i n br ief above a re onl y a f ew out  of  m any s econd-order 
principles that realize the first-order principles of freedom and equality. Essential to notice is that 
with each of them, the means were different while the goal remained the same. This furthers the 
notion that democracy i s properly considered in t erms of  f irst-order p rinciples of  f reedom and 
equality m et b y a va riable hos t of  s econd-order pr inciples that f orm pa rticular me thods for 
assuring that the first are met in a given system of governance. I provide a more expansive listing 
of various second-order principles in the figure below. Some of these principles are commonly 
linked to democracy, and thus self-explanatory. Others may hold more tenuous links (federalism 
and subsidiarity, for instance, could be considered freedom and equality enhancing by some, yet 
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can c learly appear i n s ystems s upporting ot her f irst-order pr inciples s uch a s s ecurity or  
efficiency). As w ill be  ex plored, the ada ptive appr oach recognizes t hat al l s econd-order 
principles must be checked when found in an institution, to be certain that they are working to 
secure t he f irst-order pr inciples of  f reedom a nd equality i nstead o f a ny other c ompeting f irst-
order principles that can be a basis of governance that is not specifically democratic.  
 
Figure 5. First-order and suggestive second-order principles of democracy41
 
 
The l ist provided in t he f igure above i s i ntentionally suggestive rather t han exhaustive. 
Remember that the adaptive approach to democracy is not limited to prior conceptualizations of 
democracy. This is why it works so well to address the problem of the first chapter: the influence 
                                                 
41 Just as the list is suggestive rather than exhaustive, so are the cited proponents for each second order principle. 
The authors cited for each are not necessarily the definitive proponent of that principle, but rather a place where that 
principle receives treatment as a (at least partially) free-standing component of democracy.  
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of the  s tate-model on o ur de mocratic j udgments. A daptive d emocracy can w ork w ith bot h 
established and new not ions of  democracy a ll a t once. It i s r equired to c ope with t he existing 
variety of  democracy, both present and future. As such, i t cannot provide a  “definitive” l ist of  
second-order democratic principles. As the world changes and globalization alters the places and 
modes in which governance is occurring, adaptive democracy has the potential to discover more 
and m ore s econd-order va riations d esigned t o c apture f irst-order pr inciples. T his f ocus on 
multiple s econd-order pr inciples a llows t he a pproach t o a ttain i ts f lexible yet robust s tructure. 
We’re de aling w ith va ried pa thways t o de mocracy (flexibility), yet attention t o nua nce 
(robustness) r emains pr esent b y t he t reatment of t he s econd-order pr inciples t hat a ppear i n 
various institutions.42
While a  de finitive lis t of  s econd-order pr inciples w ould c ompromise t he a pproach, 
proceeding without some l isting would l imit the sort of conclusions that the adaptive approach 
can make about  the specific case that I t reat in this work: the EU. Part of this work intends to 
provide a  r eal e ngagement w ith t he de mocratic que stions of  t he U nion, questions t hat r equire 
some cluster of likely second-order principles in the EU case. For the purposes of my EU cases, I 
suggest t hat t he f ollowing pr ovisional l ist of  s econd-order pr inciples t hat c an be  us ed f or 
comparative and claim-supporting pur poses. N ot s urprisingly, t he f our e xample s econd-orders 
form t he b asis of  t his provisional l ist: pa rticipation, a ccountability, c ontestation, a nd hum an 
rights. This list is fully open to contestation and revision (much of what the following chapters 
  
                                                 
42 Adaptive democracy is neither a first- nor second-order principle of democracy. This is purposeful. Adaptive 
democracy as I have endeavored to present it here is not a principle of democracy, it is an approach to ordering and 
dealing with the principles of democracy that we have (and have yet to discover).  
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do is exactly that), yet it provides a sort of baseline when applying the adaptive approach to the 
cases.43
I s elect t hese pr inciples r ather t han ot hers f or t he pr ovisional l ist a s t hey combine i nto a  
rough caricature of  t he predominant vi ew o f de mocratic r equirements among current s cholars. 
Thus, these form the general expectations and likely places to begin inquiry when thinking about 
a g iven s upranational i nstitution. T he a daptive a pproach l ets us  be  f lexible a nd robust; this 
provisional list of the central second-orders that we would like to see at work in the EU enables 
us to actually make claims about the EU that benefit from that flexible and robust tempering. The 
tension, which is difficult to manage, is that such a list helps make the sort of grand claims that 
are desirable (i.e. so, on the whole do these institutions make the whole system democratic?) yet 
starts to impose structure that is not as comfortable with the open, flexible ethos of the adaptive 
approach. T hus t he l ist needs t o be  t aken as i t i s: a  pr ovisional l ist t hat g eneralizes a  s et of  
principles that are roughly consensus second-order principles of  democracy. The l ist cannot be 
our “laundry list” of what to look for in a given institution. Rather, it will serve its purpose most 
fully in the conclusion of this project. The adaptive approach gives researchers a p erspective to 
question their own assumptions and generate a more robust understanding of what principles are 
actually being met in a given institution. The question is less “how democratic is the EU” as is 
commonly a sked, but  “ how i s t he E U de mocratic”—which is w hat a daptive de mocracy will 
show us.  
  
With this s uggestive lis t of  s econd-order pr inciples, t he ne xt s tep i s t o unde rstand t he 
process by which adaptive democracy works. To that end, I offer the following set of guidelines 
                                                 
43 This list also recognizes a certain sort of endogeneity in democratic accounts of the EU. The EU was created by 
people working with certain principles about democracy, and thus the institutions should reflect those proclivities if 
the EU is indeed achieving any democratic goals that were intended for it. My provisional list is simply a cluster of 
the four most-likely candidates from that list.  
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that establish the nature and boundaries of adaptive democracy. It is in these guidelines that we 
move from thinking about the adaptive approach to the question of how the adaptive approach is 
actually employed.  
2.5 EMPLOYING THE ADAPTIVE APPROACH 
The a daptive a pproach to de mocracy f ocuses on c hanging t he vi ewpoint w e us e to a ddress 
questions of  democracy. Paradigm shifts a re of ten easier said than done. This section explores 
how one  us es t he a daptive a pproach, i n e ffect a  s et of  g uidelines f or t hinking a bout a n 
institution’s de mocratic c haracter t hat pus h t oward t he a daptive m indset a nd a way f rom 
dichotomization or  excessive use of  s tate-based expectations. In effect, t his section touches on 
the question of “how to do” the adaptive approach. By starting our analysis of an institution with 
the knowledge of  the pitfalls of other paradigms, and then do adaptive democracy by applying 
the g uidelines. Note, h owever, t hat t he a pproach i s s till a  vi ewpoint bundl ed w ith s ome 
guidelines that he lp ensure that we s tick to adaptive thinking rather than s traying into old and 
perhaps unw anted a pproaches de mocratic t hinking ( thick versus thin). The f ive g uidelines ar e 
presented in the graphic below: 
 48 
 
Figure 6. Guidelines for adaptive democracy44
 
 
The f irst guideline te lls us  w here to begin. Inquiry s tarts b y identifying a s econd-order 
principle a t w ork i n a  particular ins titution. This is  the  e ssential s tarting point of  the  adaptive 
approach. Make a l ist of  what the institution does, and what i t was intended to do ( noting that 
these two may not be the same). This lets us develop a list of principles that are at work within 
the ins titution. What are the  means the  ins titution is us ing to  reach its ends? Here attention to 
both the function of  the institution and the institution’s own rhetoric i s needed. Understanding 
what the institution “gains” from a particular second-order principle is the goal—since that will 
be t he e ssential consideration pa id a ttention t o by guideline t hree. As expressed i n t he pr ior 
section, second-order principles are the means to the ends of freedom and equality, as these two 
first-order principles are often not directly observable in an institution.  
                                                 
44 The order presented is the way that I conceive the adaptive approach working. Objections to the ordering should 
consider the context of the approach—the goal of these guidelines is to reinforce the adaptive viewpoint and to keep 
the researcher in the adaptive paradigm.  
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We s tart w ith this lis ting o f s econd-orders t o get a  ha ndle on w hat i s going on p rior t o 
making ou r d emocratic cl aims. The ad aptive approach doe s not  br ing a p articular l ist of 
democratic qualities to an institution—instead, it views what is  going on in the institution that 
may ha ve a  c onnection t o de mocracy, w hether f amiliar or  ne w. This interest i n second-order 
principles s tems f rom the ir r elationship to the f irst-order p rinciples t hat motivate t he r esearch. 
Again, f irst-order pr inciples g et realized i n practice t hrough ot her m eans ( second-order 
principles). T hus, t he c entral poi nts of  a ttention f or a daptive de mocracy are pl aces w here a  
practice or institution is realizing a second-order principle that follows from freedom or equality.  
It i s es sential t o recognize t hat ada ptive de mocracy doe s not require al l s econd-order 
principles to be present all at once, or even all within the same complex governmental structure. 
This is the essential reason why adaptive democracy is not merely a checklist. Democracy is not 
a state of degrees. Rather, it is an approach that can be realized in many different guises and in 
different c oncentrations ove r di fferent uni ts. A gain, t his i s w hy t he moniker “ad aptive” i s 
appropriate. Adaptive d emocracy c an b e r obust a nd flexible a t t he s ame t ime, b y analyzing 
specific descriptions of democracy without creating a taxonomy of which ones are “necessary”. 
Instead, adaptive democracy points toward democratic judgments based upon various and often-
overlapping qua lities, no pa rticular c ombination of  w hich ne eds t o be  present i n or der f or a  
system t o be d emocratic or  not . Adaptive de mocracy is s ecure on f irst-order p rinciples, but  
adaptive in its treatment of second-order principles.  
The s econd guideline c larifies t he w ay we t hink a bout t he m ultitude of  s econd-order 
principles—how w e or ganize t his l ist of  pr inciples t hat w e ha ve j ust dr awn up. T he s econd 
guideline reminds us that second-order principles are not lost, they merely lose their usefulness. 
This i s a  ke y difference be tween t he a daptive approach, w hich or ganizes our  t hinking a bout 
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democratic t heories, a nd a  pa rticular de mocratic t heory. W ith a  pa rticular t heory, t he t heorist 
chooses a  s et num ber of principles a nd articulates the m a s “ the” c ombination that me ans 
something i s de mocratic. T hus a ny t hat don’ t m ake t he l ist w ould be  “ lost” a s t he t heorist 
concludes that they are not a part of his or her model of democracy. The adaptive approach does 
not fall into this trap. When a second-order principle is not present in an institution, it does not 
mean t hat t he pr inciple is no l onger a s econd-order of  freedom or  e quality. Instead, i t i s not  
present at the given time, in the given institution—they lose their usefulness for that particular 
case.  
 Practitioners of  t he adaptive a pproach m ust d eal w ith a  great va riety of s econd-order 
principles. The pr ior guideline r eminded us  t hat not a ll of  t hese pr inciples a re necessary t o be  
realized in a s ystem f or tha t s ystem t o b e de mocratic. Yet t his l eads t o a  concern a bout t he 
constellation of second-order principles. As discussed in chapter one, this project is motivated by 
the r ecognition that s tate-based pr inciples of  d emocracy are i mproperly s uited t o t alk about 
systems of global governance. So what becomes of second-order principles that drew their main 
motivation from the history of democracy as it was realized in states?  
For the purposes of adaptive democracy, those principles should not be discarded. Instead, 
they s hould be  c onsidered a s l ess us eful f or t he pur pose a t ha nd. A daptive de mocracy i s not  
about t hrowing out  t he old not ions of  de mocracy f or ne w one s. R ather, i t e ncourages us  t o 
determine how new and old second-order pr inciples are realized by ex isting institutions. If the  
focus of  s tudy doe s not  i nclude c ertain s econd-order pr inciples, t hen we pl ace t hose “on t he 
shelf” f or t he t ime b eing. T hey l ose t heir us efulness f or t hat pa rticular c ase, but  adaptive 
democracy doe s not  c all f or di scarding t hat p rinciple be cause of  t hat fact. If di scourse ( for 
example) is simply not a second-order principle for realizing equality in the EU, it does not mean 
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that we must discard that principle. It only loses its usefulness for the case, institution, or practice 
at ha nd. Adaptive de mocracy is a bout r ecognizing s econd-order pr inciples a t work, not  a bout 
making claims about which ones are valuable or archaic.45
In the same way, if a principle does not show up on our list that we would have expected, it 
the r eaction s hould not  be  t o pr oclaim t hat t here i s a  de ficit. Instead, t he l ist s hould be  
interrogated further—seeing how the second-order pr inciples that are at  work in the institution 
access de mocracy. R emember t hat t here w ill be  m ore i nstitutions t o c onsider, a nd t hat 
democracy simply may mean something different in the supranational context than it does within 
states.  
  
A thi rd guideline a lso he lps c larify adaptive de mocracy’s t reatment of  s econd-order 
principles. A daptive de mocracy i s c oncerned with t he r easoning be hind t he s econd-order 
principles obs erved i n i nstitutions. T his a ttention t o t he s tory pol itical pr actitioners a nd t heir 
citizenry g ive f or an y second-order pr inciple c omes f rom a  pr inciple t ension i n t he a pproach. 
There a re second-order principles that can stem from multiple f irst-order principles. Efficiency 
serves as a good example. It can be derived from freedom and equality, but it can also be derived 
from other concerns that have nothing to do with democracy. This complexity is a difficult one, 
but not an obstacle for adaptive democracy.  
With each second-order principle, it can have one of three origins relative to our democratic 
first-order p rinciples of  interest. First, it c ould stem f rom both of  our  democratic f irst-order 
principles exclusively. S econd, i t c an s tem f rom a  c onjunction of  f irst-order pr inciples: it 
satisfies de mocratic pr inciples of f reedom a nd e quality as w ell a s ot her pr inciples t hat t hose 
                                                 
45 It may be the case that certain second-order principles do go out of style for long periods of time, leaving their 
loss of usefulness akin to a disappearance of the principle. The argument for the second guideline is focused on the 
fact that adaptive democracy doesn’t go about pronouncing certain second-order principles lost, even if certain 
principles become de facto lost because they simply cease appearing in modern political arrangements.  
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vested in the institution also care about. And third, it can stem from a non-democratic first-order 
principle yet t ake t he s ame f orm as  s econd-order pr inciples tha t c ome f rom de mocratic f irst-
order pr inciples. F or a daptive de mocracy, t he f irst hol ds no pr oblem—the s econd-order 
principle’s pe digree i s democratic a nd w e pr oceed with t he a pproach. T he s econd i s not  a 
problem f or a daptive de mocracy on i ts ow n. T he s econd-order pr inciple r emains focused on 
securing democracy. However, the difficulty of the second instance is the difficulty in discerning 
between it and the third instance—the two are easily confused. What is needed is a measure that 
can reliably di scern between a pr inciple dr awn f rom de mocracy and something el se and a 
principle dr awn from s omething e lse tha t ha ppens to resemble ot her f amiliar de mocratic 
principles. How do w e know if the designers of a central bank are concerned with transparency 
because of  de mocratic motivations or  be cause of e conomic r easons ( i.e. e ncouraging i nvestor 
confidence)? A ttention to t he r easoning be hind t he pr inciple i s t he way t o e scape t hese 
difficulties.  
Adaptive democracy cares about the story given for second-order principles in addition to 
the w ay t he pr inciples a re i nstitutionalized. T he adaptive a pproach r elies upon t he not ion t hat 
second-order pr inciples are i mplemented because we ca re about  f reedom and equality as f irst-
order principles in the first place. For complex situations or second-order principles that can be 
drawn from multiple first-order principles, learning the reasoning behind the principle can tell us 
whether democratic motivations are present or not. Later chapters will explore how this attention 
to r easoning i s m anaged, a nd how  w e c an di scern be tween r hetoric of  democracy and a ctual 
concern for democratic principles. While it is a nuanced procedure, this attention to reasoning is 
the means to escape problems of the sources of the principles we focus on.  
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The fourth guideline complements the ear lier guidelines. The onl y necessary element that 
adaptive de mocracy n eeds t o i dentify i s t hat t he institution of interest d oes not  s ystematically 
violate the first-order principles of democracy. While each institution may privilege freedom or 
equality s omewhat ove r t he ot her, the es sential conc ern is t hat ne ither i s cr itically abs ent (or 
purposefully restricted). Adaptive democracy can examine the second-order principle, as well as 
other outcomes of the institution or practice in question, and simply ensure that harm is not being 
done to the first principles. The democratic qualifier is then freed for discussion. This guideline 
allows us to also escape criticisms of the broadness of our first-order principles. While it is  true 
that some amount of  freedom and equality is present even in the most abusive of  regimes, our  
fourth guideline focuses on the extent to which freedom and equality are not
The final guideline, again building on the prior ones, is that no democratic judgment can be 
made w ith t he voi ce of  a n e nd-all a nalysis. T he j udgments t hat one  can make f rom ada ptive 
democracy are relational and complex. Adaptive democracy is about looking at the patterns and 
practices o f al l com ponents of  a s ystem and analyzing whether each part i s de mocratic. The 
 present. Calling the 
equalization of citizens under dictatorial tyranny equality (i.e. all are equally repressed) would be 
captured by this guideline, and the institution rejected as democratic accordingly. Note that this 
step comes later in the list on purpose. If we started with this step, things might get tossed out too 
early—before we have a chance to understand the story of the second-order practice and consider 
any potential new ways that it accesses freedom and equality. Front-loading this guideline would 
act as a screen, and might save a bit of wasted consideration. But by leaving it until later in the 
process we can keep options open—which matches the flexible nature of the adaptive approach. 
The goal of changing paradigms is to be able to find democracy in unexpected and new places. 
Excessive rejection of principles early on might compromise that. 
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complexity of  pol itical s ystems w ill ma ke s uch an enterprise a d ense and multi-form t ask. It 
enables us to say whether a practice is democratic or not, and may allow for “on the whole” type 
judgments of a regime. What i t does not enable is a definitive dichotomous democratic or not-
democratic judgment. This enterprise is one of normative inquiry, designed to look at complex 
institutions and demonstrate the similar-yet-changing face of democracy in practice.  
It is important to recognize one particular danger at this point: fallacies of composition. One 
could be  t empted to suggest t hat with enough m icro-level d emocratic pr actices t hat t he whole 
institution i s de mocratic. A f ederal ex ample s erves w ell: i f t he G erman Länder cont ained 
millions of  de mocratic mic ro-processes, but  t he F ederal R epublic w as a  be nevolent y et 
authoritarian rule, the danger would be calling the system democratic because of the multitude of 
lower-level democratic processes. This is why any “on the whole” judgments stemming from the 
adaptive democracy approach must be tempered with the fourth guideline. Concern that the first-
order principles are not violated serves as the primary break for any claims that can be made.  
Adaptive de mocracy a llows f or nua nce i n our  de mocratic j udgments, w hich c ouples 
perfectly w ith approaches t o democracy that mus t de al w ith the r eality of  g lobalization. As 
governance i s s plit ove r di fferent l ayers, i nstitutions, a nd pr actices, adaptive de mocracy gains 
strength as a  m ode f or t hinking about di sparate s econd-order r ealizations of  de mocratic 
principles that are not required to be unanimously present in a unified political regime. Adaptive 
democracy a llows f or a pplicability a nd de pth of inqui ry ( substance) w hile s till be ing able to  
judge a variety of disparate situations with their own contexts along the same mode of normative 
inquiry. All told, it solves the difficulties of the thick and thin dichotomy while simultaneously 
providing an approach that can better de al w ith t he cha nging f ace o f d emocratic governance 
today.  
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2.6 FROM APPROACH TO CASES 
Early on I s aid t hat a daptive de mocracy i s a  t ool f or i nquiry i nto t he de mocratic na ture of  
systems. I characterize i t a s a  tool  be cause it is  f undamentally a me ans to make judg ments. 
Adaptive de mocracy al lows us  t o m ake analytic claims about  w hether an  
institution/practice/system is  de mocratic or  not  without be ing r ooted to a  pa rticular hi storical 
trajectory (such as democracy learned from the nation state). These analytic claims will be made 
within a normative framework. These arguments are of normative interest, but they yield analytic 
claims about how principles of democracy are specified.   
Adaptive de mocracy i s a t ool be cause i t i s a n a pproach t hat c an b e us ed. It’s not  onl y a 
philosophical attitude, theoretical lens, or a new paradigm for the same old thinking. Instead, it 
provides t raction for di scussing t he de mocratic qua lities of  r eal cas es of  de mocratic conc ern. 
This is the reason why I developed the set of guidelines in the prior section. Adaptive democracy 
is meant to be employed, and the chapters that follow this one are attempts to utilize it. 
The process of working with adaptive democracy, as I envision it employed, is particularly 
suited t o f inding likely principles at w ork i n unlikely practices. A t t he out set, t he a daptive 
approach begins with a simple set of existing principles. In addition to the first-order principles 
of f reedom and equality, we have a  number of  “off-the-shelf” second-order pr inciples. Inquiry 
begins by looking for the existing second-order principles in the usual places. Where the existing 
universe of second-order principles fails, only then do w e begin looking for additional second-
order principles that are realizing freedom and equality in new ways. Thus, our focus is on seeing 
where t he l ikely pr inciples a re pr esent or  a bsent. F ollowing t hat t he f ocus t urns t o w hether 
democracy is present in those moments of absence through other second-order principles.  
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With a s tarting poi nt o f like ly p rinciples a lso comes a n ethic of  loo king a t unl ikely 
practices. Looking in the likely places for likely principles will not be difficult work. Adaptive 
democracy gives a vehicle that can cope with both the likely institutions and unlikely practices. 
There is a growing literature on new institutional practices. Some of these practices are likely to 
contain second-order principles at some point, especially when they are taking place in societies 
where de mocracy i s a  p rior va lue ( thus t he f irst-order pr inciples are br oadly agreed upon  b y 
citizens and politicians). This also applies to new practices in old institutions, or  practices that 
take on  a  n ew s ignificance w hen the ba sics of  their ins titution change. Q uestion time in  the  
European Parliament has a different focus than question time in national parliaments because the 
different situation of a parliament at the supranational level: it serves as a more direct mode of 
policy control through discourse as opposed to working strictly to ensure accountability  (a case I 
will explore in depth in later chapters). The essential ethic here is that di fferent circumstances, 
such as those of supranational institutions, can lead to unlikely practices that promote democracy 
both in familiar and new ways.  
The pr ocess of  us ing adaptive de mocracy i s t hen one s imilar t o R awlsian reflective 
equilibrium. We take our principles to the world, and see if they are met by existing second-order 
principles. If they are met in new ways (why we start looking at unlikely practices first) then we 
can work out what second-order principles those practices are meeting. This allows two benefits. 
First, w e m ay di scover br and ne w s econd-order pr inciples tha t mig ht e xist: ne w w ays of  
realizing t he core p rinciples de mocracy c ares a bout ( freedom a nd e quality). S econd, we c an 
make our  democratic judgment cal ls i f we are so inclined. Thus we can point at  a practice and 
say: “Yes, this is a de mocratic practice,” which in the case of the EU can help to balance latent 
worries of non-democratic governance that motivate the democratic deficit debate.  
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The ada ptive de mocracy appr oach is es pecially useful f or pr oblem ar eas s uch as t he E U. 
The supranational space is one where we don’t have the usual mapping to a set of second-order 
principles. All we have is the kind of second-order principles that seem to support freedom and 
equality in  the  s tate context. Our s tate experience gives us  on e l ong list of  s econd or der 
principles, but  ones t hat a re not  a lways r eflected or  possible a t di fferent l evels of  governance. 
Scholarship about democracy in the EU needs an approach that can be flexible in its analysis yet 
speak robustly a bout t he r ealized na ture of  t he i nstitutions: a daptive de mocracy. T hus, t he 
following c hapters b egin exploring the  ne w po ssibilities tha t c ombining a daptive de mocracy 
methods with the case of the EU can bring to the field of democratic theory.  
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3.0  THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: INSTITUTION OF FIRST RESORT 
Imagine a child growing up in a family that owns a number of dogs. As she grows up, she learns 
that t here m ay be  m any di fferent br eeds, b e i t English m astiff, G erman s hepherd, or  Italian 
greyhound. Yet each behaves in comparable manner. The dogs are kind, friendly, and socialized. 
They fill a  c ertain r ole i n t he hom e ( companionship), a nd r equire c ertain c ircumstances t o 
flourish (food, water, security). The child becomes accustomed to the nature (concept) of “dog”.  
Now c onsider w hen t he c hild m oves be yond t he de fined bounda ries of  t he hom e—
perhaps a woods far behind the house. It seems similar enough here, as there are trees and grass 
just like the backyard where the child played with her dogs many times. Yet here in the forest, 
the only animal is a wolf. The child observes the wolf, which matches her conception of “dog”. 
If t he c hild w ere t o t heorize a bout t he be havior t his ne w “ dog” w ere about t o di splay, h er 
predictions would be dangerous to say the least. And when she was being chewed upon b y the 
wolf, she might well think: “this is not how a dog should act.”  
That example is a simplistic version of the problem that this chapter focuses upon: how 
do w e di sassociate t he a ssumptions t hat c ome w ith a  c oncept, i dea, or  na me f rom our  
scholarship? While our theories may not worry about dogs, they do focus on particular concepts 
such a s pa rliament, pr esident, de mos, a nd de mocracy. W hat ha ppens w hen w e c arry w hat w e 
know about those concepts to a new place? What happens when we consider a f amiliar-looking 
political ins titution in a new context? Will it tur n and “bite”, s o to speak? T his concern is o f 
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particular impor tance to  c omparative pol itical a nalysis of  global ins titutions. A c ross-national 
assembly i s very di fferent tha n a pa rliament in a na tional s etting, e ven if the  na me a nd 
appearance of  the two seems the same. The case of  the European Parliament (EP) i s one  such 
instance.   
When scholars begin thinking about the question of democracy in the EU, often concerns 
about the EP are at the forefront. Issues of legitimacy, representation, and access drive much of 
the de mocratic de ficit d ebate, and m any s cholars f ocus upon  t he E P’s r elationship t o t hese 
factors. My inquiry here focuses upon not only the various studies about democracy and the EP, 
but also on the very question of why the EP is a focus area. The answer to this latter question is 
deceptively simple: because it is called
We look to the EP first because it is  parliamentary. It matches, in name and in manner, 
the site that is most often associated with democracy in the state context that we’re familiar with. 
Whether one  t hinks of  i t a s P arliament, Assembly, C ongress, D iet, o r K nesset, t his s ystem of  
elected representatives discussing a nd vot ing o n be half of  c itizens ha s l ong be en t he i conic 
symbol of a democratic state. Thus it seems entirely natural that the EP is the first institution that 
springs to mind when scholars want to examine democracy in the EU.  
 a Parliament.  
Yet it is  important to examine this tendency. I argue that it is  indicative of an attitude in 
research that ul timately leads to certain forms o f prejudice and bias. This chapter will explore 
existing work on t he EP, and see how both the t rends and arguments can be explained by this 
tendency of  l ooking at p arliaments a s t he pl ace where democracy h appens. Like t he wolf t hat 
bites us  w hen w e expect a  dog , our  ba se a ssumptions a bout pa rliaments m ay l ead us  t o m iss 
crucial changes that the supranational setting imposes on the EP. I will endeavor to show why 
this attitude is insufficient for scholarship of European supranational governance. Linking back 
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to the discussion in chapter two, any bias for “parliament is the site of democracy” is based upon 
pre-existing not ions dr awn f rom t he na tion s tate, w hich m ay not  a pply i n t he s upranational 
context. J ust as Giovanni Sartori ( 1970) poi nted out  t hat “ the pr e-1950 voc abulary of  pol itics 
was not  de vised for w orld-wide, c ross-area t ravelling,” I argue t hat t he pr e-globalization 
vocabulary of democratic government was not devised for spaces of supranational governance.46
This cha pter s ets t he s tage f or t he ada ptive ap proach treatment of  t he E P w hich can 
remedy t hese pr oblems. In or der t o do s o, i t f irst t akes s tock of  t he m ajor t rends i n current 
theorizing about the EP as a democratic (or not) component of the EU. It starts with the question 
of w hy t he E P r eceives particular attention w hen que stioning t he de mocratic character of  t he 
Union. It explores the familiarity that the name parliament brings, as well as assumptions about 
the character and design of the institution. It then turns to the existing work looking at the EP, 
detailing two main approaches in the literature that form two distinct groups of theories. The first 
group consists of theories that find the EP to be either sufficient or insufficient as the democratic 
backbone of the EU. The second group of theories contains those theories that find the EP to lack 
certain democratic characteristics, and thus turn to other places in the EU for bolstering of  the 
Union’s democratic credentials. Given that most of the first group find democracy to be lacking 
in the EU, the divide breaks down into not democratic enough versus democratic enough given 
the other elements of the system.  
 
Parliament is a word steeped in history, assumptions, and expectations—all things which hinder 
rather than help scholarship on the EU.  
I will go on to show the difference of the adaptive approach. There is a passing similarity 
between the adaptive ethos and some of the thinking in the second group, but ultimately group 
                                                 
46 Sartori (1970). pg. 1034. Note that the “supranational” period of EU operation is dated by Tsebelis and Garrett 
(2000) as beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing through today.  
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two makes moves that defy the adaptive standpoint. Both groups share a  commonality that the 
adaptive approach rejects: both begin with the burden of expectations about parliaments.  While 
each operates di fferently from t hat poi nt, bot h t oo e asily fall i nto r eliance on p re-existing 
assumptions a bout how  parliaments w ork i n s tates. F rom t his obs ervation, I bui ld a  not ion of  
how our scholarship gets prejudiced by both experience and language itself, and how that keeps 
us from evaluating an institution like the EP fully.  
I categorize this reliance upon t he word and notion of parliament a phenomenon I term 
the weight of association. By t his, I m ean t he w ay s cholarship c an be  bur dened w hen 
assumptions are l ifted unconsciously from a different case that happens to bear the same name 
and “feel”. I argue that the history of linkage of parliament with certain notions about democracy 
leads to the very name (not to mention a similar institutional make-up) carrying assumptions into 
our t reatment o f t he E P. T his a pplies our  ol d not ions a bout de mocracy t hat c ome bundl ed 
(associated) with the idea of parliament. Yet the EU is a f undamentally different thing from the 
states where our associations about parliaments are rooted.  
Exploring this notion, I argue that i t is symptomatic of  many approaches to the EP. By 
understanding the way in which the weight of associations skews research, it becomes clear that 
a new approach i s needed to remove these pre-existing not ions. My adaptive approach f its the 
bill nicely. The following chapter moves from this insight to showing how the adaptive approach 
to democracy is uniquely situated to better insulate against the difficulties caused by the weight 
of association. I examine and ul timately r eject a  few other opt ions for dealing with l inkage o f 
parliament t o certain state-based de mocratic i deas, and bui ld a  c ase f or us ing t he a daptive 
approach to democracy in the case of the EP.  
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3.1 THE TWO GROUPS OF PARLIAMENTARY PUNDITRY 
Scholarship on t he E uropean U nion ha s be come s omething of  a  c ottage i ndustry i n bot h 
comparative politics and international relations fields over the recent years. In this explosion of 
literature, every institution a nd p ractice ha s be en s crutinized t o s ome d egree. A s di scussed i n 
chapter on e, t he de mocratic de ficit ha s be en o ne pa rticularly a ctive c omponent of  t hinking, 
scholarship, and general hand-wringing among EU scholars and EU politicians alike.  
Within t he s cope of  w ork on t he de mocratic de ficit, t he E uropean P arliament i s 
consistently a c entral, if  not  the central, f ocus of  di scussion, t heorization, a nd w orry. T his 
institution’s prominence in the debate is entirely understandable, given the discussion from the 
introduction of this chapter. The very foundation of the democratic deficit claims stems largely 
from a sense of loss of national sovereignty paired with concerns about perceived defects of the 
EP. Among the hos t of  new supranational i nstitutions, t he EP has t he di stinction of  appearing 
most s imilar to the institutions of the s tate system where democracy is t raditionally thought to 
reside: parliaments and representative assemblies. In political thought, the history of democracy, 
and even life experience we learned what it meant to be democratic through the development of 
these i nstitutions. S o w e c an und erstand t he n atural pr ogression of  q uestions a bout t he E P 
leading to worries about democracy in the EU. While I will ultimately argue that this naturalness 
is a problem for scholarship, I do not  dispute the fact that the EP is likely the most frequent site 
of research, punditry, and worry about democracy in the EU.47
                                                 
47 I am fully aware that my own work starts in a manner that I seem to critique: starting with the European 
Parliament first. My reasoning for this is located somewhere between “because others pay such attention to it” and 
“it allows my project a starting point that is both the obvious case and a means to show the unique features of the 
adaptive approach.” And even when actively working to think democracy outside of the nation-state box, the EP has 
a strong draw as a natural starting point, because it does come into contact with many second-order principles we 
might care about.  
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A num ber of  e xcellent w orks l ay out  t he nuances of  functions, r ole, a nd i nstitutional 
character of the EP. Instead of an exhaustive, and perhaps excruciating, detailing of the history 
and nature of  the institution, I p rovide onl y the basic brush s trokes o f the EP as an institution 
below. For general and specific insights into the inner workings of the institution, readers should 
consult any of the works I reference. What is important here is less the workings of the EP than 
the exercise of scholarship about the EP.  
In brief, the EP is a directly elected body of representatives selected via a cross-nation-
state electoral contest. The history of the EP is one of transition and growth, arguably one of the 
institutions in t he E U t hat ha s c hanged t he m ost t hrough t ime. T he EP be gan a s a s imple 
assembly that was intended to provide a small measure of accountability to the High Authority 
that administered the European Coal and Steel Community. With successive European treaties, 
the EP has developed into a major policy actor within the EU in its own right.  
The exact moment of the EP’s emergence into a meaningful institution can be argued, but 
clearly the Treaty of Maastricht played a central role. With Maastricht, the EP was given powers 
of co -decision a long w ith t he E uropean C ouncil of  M inisters. W hile l imited in s cope t o 
economic m atters and monetary uni on—excluding s ecurity, j ustice, ho me a ffairs, and U nion 
foreign policy—this allowed the EP a measure of power in the European supranational system. 
In addition to co-decision, the EP had rights of consultation, which notably will prove central in 
chapter four. With the Treaty of  Amsterdam, the number of  areas where the EP possessed co-
decision power w as i ncreased. T his t rend of gradual i ncreases i n competence ha s continued 
through successive treaties.  
In terms of organization, the EP functions as a representative assembly. It relies heavily 
upon plenary discourse and a complex committee system to conduct its business. While turnout 
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for EP elections is low, and access to Members of European Parliament (MEPs) remains difficult 
for some across Europe, the institution has generally patterned i tself as providing many of  the 
same f unctions a s n ational pa rliaments: r epresentation, di scussion, a ccountability, and e ven a  
limited role in ombudsman-style representation.   
Having sketched a very brief overview of what the EP is, I now turn to the real action: 
scholarship about the democratic deficit that centers on the EP. The EP is consistently a concern 
for bot h s cholars a nd E uropeans a like w hen t hinking a bout t he U nion’s democratic ch aracter. 
The E uropean C ourt of  Justice ( ECJ) di rectly l inked t he E P to t he c ommunity’s de mocratic 
character, saying that expanding the role of the Parliament matched the “fundamental democratic 
principle that the people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a 
representative as sembly.”48
Beyond these general positions, I argue that the bulk of democratic thought regarding the 
EP c an be  c ategorized i nto t wo m ain c amps.
 Other s tatements a re e qually s traightforward with their democratic 
language and deployment of what the EP’s role should be.  
49
                                                 
48 Shackleton (2002). pg. 98. 
 The di viding l ine i s de ceptively s imple. S ome 
theories e xamine t he E P a nd c onclude t hat i t i s lacking. T hey t hen s uggest w ays t hat t he E P 
could be expanded, changed, or empowered in order to become what it should be. These types of 
theories hold that the EP is not democratic enough. For some the EP lacks some critical factor 
that is perceived to be a problem. For others the EP is plenty democratic in its internal workings, 
49 In the construction of two camps, some scholarly work necessarily fails to fit in either. In this case, much of the 
literature on the democratic deficit comes from quantitative and qualitative political science. Recently political 
theorists have begun taking a more sustained interest in the democratic character of the EU and supranational 
organizations in general. While my critique may be applicable to some of these works as well, their approach tends 
to lead away from easy classification into one of my two groups. The work of John Coultrap (1999), Daniel Wincott 
(1998), Christopher Lord (2001), and Michael Goodhart (2007)  tends to be harder to classify in these two groups 
and should be considered more in line with the ethos the adaptive approach is trying to define.  
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but is not empowered enough to color the entire system as democratic. In any case, for this first 
group, the EP is both the problem and the site for solution.   
The second group of theories gives a different read on the EP. They articulate that the EP 
is democratic enough, given other sources of democracy in the EU. These theories start from a 
notably similar point to the first group: that the EP is lacking something. However, they differ on 
diagnosis that the institutional reality of the EP is a problem. Instead, they proceed outward from 
the E P a nd l ook t o m any other i nstitutions a nd pr actices i n t he E U f or democratic p rocesses. 
While not all say that these other parts exist (or are as present as is  desirable), the emphasis is  
that the EP is not the sole container of democratic hopes for the EU. Instead they show how other 
institutions can or could provide the sorts of  democratic processes that the EP fails to provide. 
Thus the EP may be a problem, but the solution is an EU-wide one, not just a matter of the EP. 
Any shortcomings of  the EP can be made up t hrough other sources and in other, perhaps non-
traditional places.  
 
Group One: Not Democratic Enough. Much of the thinking in this grouping starts from 
an observed difference between parliamentary democracy at the national level and the manner in 
which the EP functions. In this way, the elements that parliaments were thought to provide are 
felt to be absent at the EU level. Expectations for the EP include it being a source of democracy 
through l egitimacy, accountability, openness, and representation in t he E U. 50 For some, t hese 
“traditional” f orms of  d emocracy, particularly e lectoral a ccountability o r r epresentation, are 
lacking the EP and therefore the EU by extension.51
                                                 
50 Lodge (1994). 
 Diagnosis of why this occurs is varied, but 
the t rend s eems t o be  a n unde rstanding t hat t he t ransfer of  s overeignty from na tion s tates t o 
51 Peterson and Bomberg (1999). pg. 256; Ericksen and Fossum (2002) pg. 401.  
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supranational caused a disjunction in familiar pathways of legitimacy. Empowerment of the EP 
is s een as a m eans of  generating i ncreased legitimacy f or t he s ystem, and i s t herefore w idely 
endorsed as the primary solution for democratic concerns.52
For m any ot hers i n t he debate, t he pr oblem of  the E P i s t hat i t doe s not  c apture t he 
relationship of representation that citizens in Europe have come to expect from a parliamentary 
body. For s ome, t he de mocratic de ficit i s a  f unction of  c itizens f eeling unde r-represented.
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Contact, pa rticipation, a nd e ven l imited om budsman r oles f or pa rliamentarians a re c onsidered 
essential goods t hat t he EP s hould pr ovide a s w ell. Likewise, m oments when E P s eems m ore 
interested i n s ecuring i ts ow n i nstitutional pow er t hrough d riving i ntegration a re c ritiqued as 
detractors of  d emocracy—when t he E P ope rates a long a ny lines ot her t han publ ic i nterest, 
democracy appears jeopardized. 54 The relationship with the European public plays an important 
role here. The EP is compared to national parliaments, and many of our measures for democracy 
in the national context are directly transferred. For instance, some scholars suggest that support 
levels for the EP are an indicator of its legitimacy, and thus of its democratic credentials. 55
These currents all feed into a central difficulty that group one scholars perceive in the EP: 
it s imply does not  function as the institution where the public feels it c ontrols government. As 
discussed i n c hapter one , t his not ion of  publ ic c ontrol i s be lieved t o be  the “ core a ttribute o f 
democratic g overnance” by many. 
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52 Rittberger (2002); Newman (2001); Rothschild (1997); Scharpf (1991); Sjursen (2002); Weiler et. al. (1995). 
 Through na tional pa rliaments, t he c itizens f eel t hat t hey 
have a  m eans of  s ecuring t he accountability of  g overnance t o t heir w ill. A t t he s tate l evel, 
53 Rohrschneider (2002). pg. 463. 
54 Hayward (1995). 
55 Gabel (2003).  
56 Lord and Beetham (2001). pg. 458. 
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parliaments are the primary (though not exclusive) loci where citizens feel they can achieve this 
accountability. 57
From these sorts of approaches, the answer to problems of democracy in the EU seems 
clear: increased role for the EP. The diagnosis determines the prescription. The problem is a lack 
of elements that have always come from parliaments, and thus the EP’s marginalization in the 
Union’s decision-making process i s questioned. Many s cholars doubt  t hat t he EP has any real 
ability to serve as a representative body through which the Europe-wide populace can influence 
the supranational decisions of EU institutions.
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Before w e l eave group one, t here i s a n i nteresting s ubset t o c onsider. T here a re s ome 
theories which find the EP to be democratic enough on its own terms without additional support 
from e lsewhere. I i nclude t hem i n g roup one  a s their a nswers t o E U de mocracy r eside s olely 
inside the EP. These tend to examine procedure and behavior more closely, such as the work of 
Noury a nd R oland (2002) w hich s uggests t hat unde r c o-decision, t he be havior of  t he E P 
dovetails closely with the behavior of national parliaments (along party lines). Thus they feel that 
the E P is  mor e r epresentative r ather tha n simply a di fferent looki ng f orum f or me mber s tate 
interests to clash. Similar r esults a re f ound i n t he w ork of  F ranklin a nd S carrow ( 1999), w ho 
conclude t hat s imilarities be tween M EPs a nd na tional M Ps in be havior de monstrate t he 
democratic “health” of the Union.
 Therefore, only expansions of the EP’s role and 
power i n de cision-making can guarantee an increase i n the cha racteristics of  pa rliamentary 
democracy. The f act t hat s uccessive t reaties ha ve cons istently w idened the abi lities of  t he E P 
serves as a reminder that this concern remains a pressing force on the part of many Europeans.  
59
                                                 
57 Siaroff (2003). pg. 446. 
  
58 Shackleton (2002). pg. 113.  
59 Franklin and Scarrow (1999). pg. 45.  
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In s hort, gr oup one  t ends t o i nclude s cholars who f eel t hat t he E P i s not  de mocratic 
enough, a nd t hat t he s olutions t o de mocracy in the U nion r eside w ithin t he E P i tself. T hose 
solutions ma y be  closer or  f urther f rom r eality, but  in all c ases, the E P r emains the  s ite of  
ensuring t hat t he f unctions of  de mocracy are m et. T hese f unctions, pr imarily le gitimacy, 
accountability, and publ ic control, f ind much of  their impetus f rom national understandings of  
parliamentary d emocracy. For group on e, w hat i s g ood f or t he goose i s g ood f or t he gander: 
ensuring that the European parliament guarantees the same qualities as the idea of parliament is 
paramount.  
 
Group Two: Democratic Enough, Given Other Sources of Democracy in the EU. For this 
group, analysis of ten s tarts i n a  s imilar pl ace. The E P ha s not able f laws t hat a re m otivating 
factors of  the democratic deficit discussion. Where group two differs from group one  is in the 
response t o t hose f laws. T he a nswer i s not  t ransforming t he E P t o l ook l ike pa rliamentary 
governance as we know it on the national level. Instead, the concern is in identifying what gaps 
in democracy are left by the EP and how other institutions in the EU provide traditional or novel 
sources of democracy that fill those gaps.  
For s ome, the pr ocess is  s imple. The E P ma y b e la cking, but the  e ssential e lement to 
remember is that the EU is a collection of legitimate, democratic states. As mentioned in chapter 
one, some thinkers suggest that all institutions of the EU can be considered to be representative 
because t hey a re accountable t o m ember s tate governments, w hich are i n t urn democratically 
elected.60
                                                 
60 Moravcsik (2002). pg. 611; J.H.H. Weiler (1999). pg. 265. 
 From this vantage point, the democratic qualities provided nationally simply transfer to 
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the E U, a s l ong a s t he member-states t hemselves ar e s ufficiently democratic.61 In t his w ay, 
national pa rliaments ar e a pa rt of  t he E U s tructure, a nd t hus t he p arts of  pa rliamentary 
democracy that are absent in the EP are simply filled indirectly through the member states.62
For others, the process is more complex and centers on exploring alternatives within the 
EU ins titutions the mselves. This s et of s cholarship i s m ore w idely di verse, c onsidering 
institutions r anging f rom t he m ajor t o m inor, o bvious t o obs cure. O ften t imes, t his pr ocedure 
involves searching out the functions we associate with parliaments located in other institutions. 
For i nstance, T sebelis a nd G arrett ( 2000) s uggest t hat t he E P i s s imply pa rt of  a n e volving 
bicameral s ystem i n t he E U. T hey argue t hat a  c ombination of  t he vot ing pr ocedures i n t he 
Council of Ministers combines with the EP to produce the sort of parliamentary process that is  
desired.
 
63 Others s uggest tha t the  pr ocedures within the C ouncil its elf di splay d esirable 
democratic norms: trust, collective action, agreement, and discourse. 64
While the Council is a popular location for consideration by scholars of group two, other 
institutions and practices are cer tainly analyzed as well. Given that a pe rceived problem i s the 
EP’s ina bility to transfer c itizen interest int o the E U, other s tructures tha t inj ect E uropean 
citizens’ w ill int o the  U nion’s de cision-making pr ocess be come at tractive t o scholars. One 
instance is the European Economic and Social Committee (ESC) treated as parallel to the EP in 
some w ays, and able to pr ovide t he c ritical t ransmission of  i nterests t hat t he r eductive 
parliamentary bod y c ould not .
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61 Newman (2001); Benz (2004).  
 The di fficulty h ere i s t hat t he ve ry not ion of  c itizenship, a nd 
therefore tr anslation of citizen interests, is pr oblematic in the E U. A djusting e xpectations f or 
62 Katz (1999). 
63 Tsebelis and Garrett (2000).  
64 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997). pg. 275-276. 
65 Smismans (2000). 
 70 
what c itizenship m eans in t he ne w c ontext pl ay a  r ole i n s ome group t wo s cholarship. If t he 
traditional links be tween t he ci tizen and governance a re ch anged, then n ew l inks be come t he 
focus. 66
Thus the final subset of group two looks for substitutes for the legitimacy that is provided 
through parliamentary representation in state systems. These sorts of approaches begin from the 
standpoint that legitimacy is the critical element seen in national systems, and thus democracy in 
the EU is about increasing the legitimacy of the system. However, legitimacy is both a broad and 
contested c oncept, a nd t his s pace g ives E U scholars r oom t o m aneuver. O ther f orms of  
legitimacy can c omplement the  tr aditional pa rliamentary on es, often b y adding new t ypes o f 
legitimacy (formal, social, output, behavioral) to the traditional representation-based notions of 
the term. 
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While c haracterizing gr oup t wo i s di fficult, a  c entral t heme e merges. T he i dea be gins 
with the notion that the democratic deficit stems from problems with the EP and failures of the 
system t o pr ovide t he s tandards of  pa rliamentary legitimacy, a ccountability, pa rticipation, a nd 
control. W hat s ets g roup t wo a part f rom g roup o ne i s t hat t he r emedy do es not  l ie i n the E P. 
Instead, mixed strategies of  democracy emerge through seeking the parts of  representation that 
are missing in the EP in other places. Where such supporting measures are found, scholars are 
lead to conclusions similar to that of Maccormick (1997): that there is “no absolute democratic 
deficit in the Commonwealth.”
 Even the EU itself consciously pursues this notion of multiple legitimacy.  
68
Examples of  theories i n bot h c amps c ould c ontinue i ndefinitely. H owever, t he 
distinctiveness of  t he t wo camps s hould be as  cl ear as  t heir ar eas of  similarity. The cent ral 
 
                                                 
66 Wiener and Della Sala (1997). 
67 Verhoeven (2002); Peterson and Bomberg (1999); Rittberger (2003).  
68 Maccormick (1997). 
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element t o not ice i s t he c ontinued r eliance b y both s ides upon  t he not ions of  r epresentative 
democracy and parliamentary governance. As suggested in chapter o ne, this s imilarity i s 
perpetuated by t he “somewhat i dealized image of  r epresentative de mocracy i n terms of  
accountability or responsiveness of decision-makers” that exists in the literature.69
3.2 PARLIAMENTS AND THE WEIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 
 The following 
section addresses this central flaw that is shared across both groups—the weight of association 
that the notion of parliament carries.  
The pitfall for both groups of scholarship addressed in the prior section is that each starts from a 
view that includes certain expectations for the EP. While cer tainly some do a much better job 
than others in relaxing those expectations in order to inquire into the EP, a consideration of the 
expectations is important. The difference in the two groups can all be expressed as a function of 
how the y cope w ith their pa rliamentary expectations c lashing w ith the muddy reality o f the  
European supranational system. Yet the similarity of the two groups is what I find most striking. 
With each, the baggage of parliament is clearly present. Group one finds the EP failing to meet 
parliamentary expectations. Thus they propose a change in the EP. Group two likewise views the 
EP a s f ailing expectations. T hey go out  l ooking f or t he a spects t hat a re m issing i n t he E P a s 
compared to parliaments, and seek to locate them elsewhere in the system.70
                                                 
69 Papadopoulos (2003). pg. 473, 492. 
 
70 It is important to note that group two is preferable from the vantage point of my adaptive approach to democracy. 
They demonstrate the sort of moves in thinking that are the staple of the adaptive approach: seeking democratic 
elements in new places when the traditional places fail. Their only drawback is that the taint of state-based 
parliamentary democracy remains too influential. Their search is for the same old elements that we learned are 
important through the parliamentary experience.  
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What I hope to reveal in this treatment of EP democratic scholarship is the way in which 
the idea of parliament has a distinct influence on the practice of theorizing about the EP. Central 
to this is  the power of the name parliament itself. When the architects of the EU solidified the 
common a ssembly o f the E uropean C oal a nd S teel C ommunity i nto t he E P, t he ve ry 
development of the name EP (and the notion of “assembly’ before it) was of crucial importance.  
The w ord parliament is a  w ord s eeped i n hi story, t radition, a nd m eaning. T he na me 
immediately a dds a  la yer of  a ssumptions a bout the  s tructure of  the  ins titution as w ell a s i ts 
normative role. A ll concepts carry m eaning in t his way, t hough not  ne cessarily with t he same 
importance to scholarship. When I utter the words dog, sidewalk, or player piano they call forth 
a set of assumptions, beliefs, and understandings in both me and the listener. This is the nature of 
language. Yet the re is  a  c ritical di stinction between player piano and parliament. T he 
assumptions that parliament carries with it are confined to a particular historical experience: the 
state. When the term is employed, it carries with it the state-based understandings, history, and 
normative r ole. The te rm pa rliament, like m ost conc epts i n social s cience, carries a he avier 
burden of social understandings than simple objects. It was generated in a particular context of 
history, t ime, and e vent. T hose pa rticulars are bound t o t he c oncept more c losely t han t he 
contexts of a general term. The concept is thereby heavier than other concepts. 
While s imilar not ions may e xist in critical la nguage the ory, I c onsider s ocial s cience 
concepts to carry a weight of association. When the researcher employs them, the heaviness of 
their social or igins i nfluences t heir us e, e ither consciously or  un consciously. A nd t his pr ocess 
occurs f rom t he ve ry i nstant of  s cholarship a bout s uch a  c oncept. A s G iovanni S artori ( 1970) 
points out  s o w ell: “ concept formation stands prior to quantification. The pr ocess of  t hinking 
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inevitably begins with a qualitative (natural) language.”71
Consider t he t wo groups of  s cholarship on t he E P. In bot h c ases, t he w eight o f 
association carried by the term parliament seems to leave its thumbprint on the scholarship. The 
central di fference between the groups as I have laid them out  i s not  their approach. Both s tart 
with the calcified notions of parliament learned from the state-origin model. Each group attempts 
to find parliament, and thus democracy, in the EU as they already know it. The only difference 
comes when they realize that the EP simply does not replicate what we expect from something 
called parliament. 
 Our language influences our thinking 
even pr ior t o our  a ctive w ork w ith t he c oncept. I a rgue t hat t he w eight of  a ssociation i s a  
particular problem with research on the supranational. A supranational organization such as the 
EU is recognized by many as sui generis, yet we continue to use concepts that are steeped in old 
meanings, different contexts, and potentially different norms.  
The first group responds to the difference between the EP and similarly named concept 
through attempting to reconcile the EP with its name. Their critique of the EP is it falling short of 
what its namesake bears, and their suggestions involve transforming the EP (perhaps radically) in 
order to make it more parliamentary, and by extension somehow more democratic. The focus is 
on trying to push the institution to work in a similar way, despite the different context. 
The s econd group, on t he ot her ha nd, recognizes t hat t he E P doe s not  m atch w hat a  
parliament seems to provide in the national context. In this way, I find the works in the second 
group m ore i nspirational. T hey r ecognize, e ither c onsciously o r unc onsciously, t hat t he E P i s 
unable t o replicate p arliamentary de mocracy as know n because o f i ts di fferent context. This 
move alone is a positive one, which gives both hope and inspiration to my adaptive approach. 
                                                 
71 Sartori (1970). pg. 1038.  
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Yet t he s econd gr oup s till doe s not  e ntirely br eak f rom t he w eight of  association carried by 
parliament. Far too often they accept that the EP is not  the whole picture of  democracy in the 
EU, and then go out looking for the components of parliament in other locations. So while they 
detach the E P f rom pa rliament, they a re s till convinced t hat t he c omponents of  t he s tate-born 
notion of parliament should be present in the supranational space. The fact that they reference the 
EP i n s howing t hat t he f unctions of  pa rliament are none theless s ecured (wholly or  pa rtially) 
shows the continued influence of the concept in the democratic thought.  
Is thi s a  pr oblem? T hat is  a  f air que stion to raise a t thi s poi nt. If pa rliamentary 
governance i s w hat w e col lectively associate with democracy, then why i s s eeking m ore 
parliamentary functions a problem? Why should we not identify what a parliament does, then put 
those functions into other institutions that we would like to democratize?  
I argue that the state-origin weight of assumption carried by parliament is a problem. It is 
not necessarily a problem for the EU, but rather is a problem for our scholarship about the EU. 
The difficulty of the weight of association is its influence on the research approach of some EU 
scholars. It provides yet another layer of difficulty to the concerns about escaping statist notions 
raised in chapter two. Language i tself becomes an obstacle that must be  dealt with in order to 
think a bout t his ne w no tion of  s upranational g overnance w ith a  c ompletely bl ank s late. T he 
problem i s one  of  pr ejudice a nd bi as on t he pa rt of  t he researcher. If w e go into our 
considerations of the EU with the hidden conception that the functions of a parliament must be 
present, we color our research with those assumptions from the beginning. It is no wonder, then, 
that the EP is the institution of first resort for so many democratic pundits of the EU. Our very 
language conspires to lead us to using the EP as the central democratic litmus test of the Union.  
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This l anguage-based t endency i s r einforced by  our m ethods a s pol itical s cientists. 
Comparative politics has made a science out of making comparisons across unlike structures. For 
many, the cautions against conceptual stretching and the travelling problem would suffice in the 
case of  d emocracy i n t he E U. Y et t hese cautions ha ve yet t o be  fully developed for cas es of  
comparison a cross uni ts s o ut terly unl ike a s s tates a nd t he s upranational. T he pr oblems of  
comparing an assembly in South America to a pa rliament in  Europe a re s imple c ompared t o 
those of crossing the national-supranational barrier. 
All of this is not to say that national parliaments and the EP are not comparable. Moves in 
the oppos ite di rection, s uch a s J ohn C oultrap’s ( 1999) a bsolute r ejection of  pa rliaments a s 
meaningful f or t he E U or f or qu estions of  s upranational de mocracy, may b e a dmirable f or 
escaping the prejudices that other works suffer from. Yet we cannot say that our national notions 
of parliamentary governance have no bearing. Rather, an approach is needed that can allow all 
scholars t o r ealize t he hi dden a ssumptions t hat c ome pa ckaged w ith ou r a pproaches. It i s t he 
notable similarity of the EP to the national parliament that makes the weight of association such 
a pernicious problem. The central danger is not that the EP is somehow not parliamentary, but 
rather that our focus as researchers can be artificially narrowed when the notion that “parliament 
equals democracy” is too deeply ingrained. It can lead to missing other components in both the 
EP and the EU as a whole that may contribute to democracy, but simply not in the nation-state 
parliament way.  
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3.3 LINGUISTIC GYMNASTICS OR THE ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO 
DEMOCRACY? 
The s tatus quo of  s cholarship on t he de mocratic de ficit a nd E uropean Parliament s ets up a n 
artificial either-or scenario for researchers. If we start with the preconception that parliamentary 
notions are the location of democracy in the supranational in the same way as the national, we 
come to the place where most current work on the EU resides. One option is that the EP must be 
altered or empowered to provide those functions that we have drawn from national parliaments. 
The other is that the EP may be fine as it is, as long as other parts of the Union are providing the 
same parliamentary functions, albeit in potentially different skins.  
The problem with this scholarship is that it l eads to the continual circling we see in the 
existing de bate. T he qu estion de volves f rom “ what i s de mocracy in European s upranational 
governance?” into “how can our t raditional parliamentary not ions be found in the EU?” While 
ultimately thi s m ay b e a  com fortable s witch in question for m any r esearchers, it can leave an  
uncomfortable gap in i dentifying what may b e n ew and di fferent about democracy in t he E U. 
While the second group (democratic enough given other parts of the EU) can have some success 
in identifying the new and the different, the weight of association with parliamentary democracy 
may still cause certain blind spots.  
This chapter ends by raising the question that will occupy the next chapter: how do w e 
escape the EP as an institution of first resort? Or more to the point, how can we get out of the bad 
habit of looking for what we expect to see, and then worrying when we do not see it? How can 
the w eight of  as sociation carried by pa rliament (as t he ex pression of na tional de mocracy for 
many) be dealt with, given its roots in language itself?  
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At this point I want to reject certain strategies for dealing with the problem. While the 
problem lies partially in the nature of language and conceptualization, the solution is not simple 
linguistic g ymnastics. It i s not  as  eas y as cha nging t he na me of  t he E P ( even from t he ve ry 
beginning). These habits are deeper than the language. They are reinforced by the institutional 
form. Had the name been left Common Assembly, the institution would still carry some weight 
of association thanks to i ts design and operation. Call i t the European Congress, the European 
Diet, or the European Toaster Oven, the institutional form’s similarity to the ones learned from 
states w ill s till ha ve a n impa ct. It’s not  t he w ord t hat ha s t he pow er, but  t he pr ocess o f 
association. We ide ntify what w e are looki ng at a s a  pa rliament, because it is  s imilar in 
appearance t o parliaments ( reinforced b y the  name its elf). And we t ake tha t s imilarity of  
appearance to be similarity in function. Thus our solution cannot be one of linguistic maneuvers 
alone.  
Instead the problem can only by solved by starting from a new vantage point. Instead of 
conducting political inquiry as normal, a new methodology of thinking needs to be conducted by 
researchers of  t he E U. As I w ill show in t he f ollowing c hapter, t he adaptive a pproach t o 
democracy can serve as this alternative perspective for scholarship. The critique in this chapter is 
admittedly extreme i n o ne s ense. It i s i mpossible t o br eak f rom l anguage, a nd c ertainly not  
desirable t o entirely br eak from al l t hat w e’ve l earned about de mocracy i n the cont ext of  
parliaments. Rather, we need a research approach that can accommodate t he r esearcher b eing 
conscious of  he r ow n a ssumptions a nd a ble t o i nclude bot h t he t raditionally i mportant 
components of democracy alongside any new ones that may only be found when starting from an 
emptier slate. As the following chapters demonstrate, the adaptive approach to democracy is the 
essential alternative.  
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4.0  DEMOCRATIC HORIZONS AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN 
POLICY 
As the prior chapter suggested, much of the problem that the European Parliament (EP) poses for 
democratic investigation of the European Union (EU) comes from problems ultimately bound up 
in its own name and idea as an institutional form. The two general trends in scholarship about the 
EP do show some promise, particularly from studies that try to consider functions outside the EP 
that parliaments normally bring. While it s eems like group two (democratic enough given other 
things in the EU) fared better than group one (not democratic), they remain burdened by existing 
assumptions a bout pa rliament. Both sides continue t o s truggle with e scaping t he weight of  
associations. “Parliament” carries a particular meaning, and despite the structural and contextual 
change of the EU, we continue to search about for the facets of that state-born meaning.  
The looming question then is: how do w e escape this weight of associations, especially 
when bot h i nstitutional e xperience a nd e ven l anguage i tself pus h us  t oward t he r esearch 
assumptions detailed in the prior chapter? Diminishing the weight of associations is not as easy 
as simply changing the name or  modifying institutional practices. How can scholars talk about 
democracy in the EP and not be overwhelmed by the search for comparisons? How do c an we 
successfully examine the EP as both something familiar to us and something that may hold the 
promise of new and different modes of democracy? 
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I argue t hat t he a daptive appr oach to democracy c reates a p athway t hrough these 
difficulties. By s tarting from f irst- and second-order p rinciples, r ather t han s tate-based 
assumptions a bout how particular pr inciples must be ins titutionalized, t he f irst bi g s tep away 
from the weight o f association that the moniker parliament carries can  be made. Searching for 
what second-order principles are present, and then inquiring how those link up t o the two first-
order principles of democracy (freedom and equality) provides a mechanism for thinking about 
the pa rliament tha t s tarts f rom a  di fferent angle. F rom thi s angle, the ne w and the ol d can be 
analyzed without prejudice from prior associations of the target studied.  
The adaptive approach turns the weight of association into a useful component of inquiry, 
by being clear about what baggage scholars tend to carry when looking at parliaments. We get a 
ready-made l ist of  s econd-order pr inciples tha t mig ht be  i mportant, but  t he i nquiry gains t wo 
distinct a dvantages. First, it is  not  l imited to o ur ini tial lis t of  pr inciples—there i s r oom f or 
exploring w hat t he E P actually do es, a nd what n ew a nd/or ol d p rinciples guide t hose a ctions. 
Second, being clear about the baggage that comes with our  associations gives us  the ability to 
watch how t hat b aggage i s ch anged i n a di fferent s etting. Perhaps t he s ame s econd-order 
principles a re c onnected i n a  di fferent pa thway t o t he f irst or der pr inciples of  f reedom a nd 
equality. The adaptive approach not only escapes the problems of associations connected to the 
word parliament, but  a llows us  to ga in a  better understanding of  those very pr inciples that we 
tied to the idea of parliament in the first place.  
The EP displays multi-faceted, evolving democratic potentials, and only an approach that 
can handle t hat complexity c an escape t he ol d l anguage and familiarity structures t hat pl ace 
limitations on our understanding of new phenomena that bear similarity to old associations. This 
focus has been on the most iconic of associative terms with democracy: parliament. This chapter 
 80 
demonstrates how the adaptive approach to democracy can enable us to say something new about 
the de mocratic c haracter of  a n institution tha t s eems s imilar to the most f amiliar f orm of  
democracy in history.  
To do s o, t his c hapter w ill be gin b y a pplying the a daptive a pproach t o t he E uropean 
Parliament, paying particular attention to the details of what parliaments do in principle. To do 
this, I briefly consider the way in which the parliament grew into the democratic lynchpin of the 
state.72
Then t he argument w ill tur n specifically to t he c ase of  t he E uropean Parliament. It 
examines t he E P’s r ole i n a n a rea t hat i s t ypically considered out side of  t he r ealm of  a  
parliament’s i nfluence: f oreign pol icy. G iven t he pa rticulars of  t he E U, t his s eems doubl y-
removed f rom t he E P. Y et i nstead of  a ccepting t he ol d a dages a bout parliamentary r oles i n 
foreign policy, the adaptive approach allows for a closer read on what the EP does, and how that 
may or may not be an expression of second-order principles that are directly linked to freedom 
 Parliaments w ere pa rt o f s ocieties be fore t hey reached t he p oint of  be ing fully 
democratic. Thus, w e s tart w ith what pr inciples were added to pa rliaments that made them so 
central t o de mocratic v isions t oday. This pr ocess a llows us  t o w ork out our  s econd-order 
principles first. Following the approach as laid out in chapter two, I demonstrate that our view of 
the EP’s democratic character grows even more flexible and robust than had we started from a 
set of current parliamentary assumptions alone. The adaptive approach allows us the freedom to 
draw from t he p ast of  parliaments yet add newly emerging d emocratic f actors f rom t he E P 
experience as well.  
                                                 
72 In this case, the historical development of the institution is important to the adaptive approach—because it is that 
weighty history that causes limitations to our thinking about the institution. One need not always do such historical 
work in the adaptive paradigm—many of the institutions considered may not have some state-bound historical 
precedents. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, the EP is consistently viewed through a lens that includes 
these historical attributes.  
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and equality. The adaptive approach allows us  to consider the EP and i ts influence on  foreign 
policy, though notably outside of any strict institutional controls, as a matter of democracy.  
The r oots o f t he E P’s unusual r ole i n f oreign pol icy lie along the  line s of  F rank 
Schimmelfennig’s (2001) w ork on rhetorical a ction. W hile S chimmelfennig f ocuses on ot her 
cases, the phenomenon he identifies (using rhetorical tools to exert influence) can also be seen in 
case of the EP. In foreign security policy, the EP has found an influential role simply through use 
of rhetorical action—particularly finding itself effective when basing that action on ideas that we 
can identify as  s econd-order pr inciples of  de mocracy. T his ha s pot ential a s a n innovative 
democratic practice, which becomes visible only when we start from a vantage point that is not 
laden with the w eight o f a ssociation that c omes f rom the  ide a of  pa rliaments be ing vi rtually 
isolated from security policy.  
Thus, t he a daptive a pproach a llows us  t o br eak w ith t he w eight o f a ssociations a nd 
demonstrate t he w ays i n w hich t he E P i s a  bl end of  familiar a nd innovative ins titutions f or 
realizing second-order principles, principles that may not be the ones we usually associated with 
parliaments. The w eight of  a ssociations i s w hat i s c ausing t he p roblems of  put ting a ll our  
democratic eggs in the EP basket. Adaptive democracy’s fluid approach gives us  the ability to 
talk about the EP without needing to feel that the entire democratic hopes of the Union reside in 
this one institution. Instead, the EP brings certain democratic elements—both familiar and new—
to the table in ways that are hopefully complemented by other parts of governance in the EU.  
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4.1 THE ADAPTIVE APPROACH:  ESCAPING THE WEIGHT OF ASSOCIATIONS 
OF “PARLIAMENT” 
Having explored the case and made preliminary points in chapter three, I want to now place the 
European P arliament i nto t he l arger a daptive a pproach m ethodology. T he c entral e thos o f t he 
adaptive approach to democracy is that it can be flexible and robust. In this section, I endeavor to 
demonstrate what an adaptive s tudy of the EP can provide for the democratic character of  the 
Union. It c an a void t he t rade-off of  s aying t hat E U i s w holly de mocratic or  e ntirely non -
democratic based upon the qualities of the EP alone. The adaptive approach provides a look that 
works flexibly with the unique nature of the EP yet manages to provide meaningful insight into 
how democracy is present in the system.  
This s ection be gins b y a pplying t he adaptive a pproach t o de mocracy in t he m anner 
developed i n c hapter t wo. The g oal of  t he a daptive a pproach i s t o consider second-order 
principles that are both present and absent in the EP. In order to do this, I begin by looking at the 
historical tr ajectory of  parliaments a nd how  t hey b ecame i ntertwined w ith our  not ions of  
democracy. Assembly s tructures e xisted f or c enturies be fore de mocracy in t he m odern f orm, 
with G reek a nd R oman s tructures be ing t he m ost r ecognizable. O ther pr e-parliamentary 
institutions included N orse a nd Germanic things or tings (leader and free ci tizens de ciding i n 
unison f or t heir l ocality), P olish sejms (meetings of  t he popul ace), A nglo-Saxon folk-moots 
(meetings of tribal freemen), and Indian samiti (gatherings of the male members of a kingdom). 
The m ore f amiliar pa rliament s tructure al so emerged prior t o the app earance o f de mocratic 
states, with the E nglish parliament’s or igin in the Magna Carta and t he evolving r elationship 
between king, lords, and people in the 13th Century.  
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Notably, all of  t hese earlier m odels—including t he English pa rliament—emerged prior t o 
moments of what would be considered reasonable democracy in their country. These parliaments 
differed in key ways from the modern democratic parliament. As one writer quipped about the 
English parliament: “The earliest form of National Assembly known to English History differed 
very considerably in character from the modern Talking Machine which fills so many columns of 
the daily papers with its proceedings.”73
There were s ome s imple el ements that early d emocratic s ystems di d not f ully r ealize: 
citizenship for all despite race, sex, and/or income, guarantees of some set of basic human rights, 
and a n ope n, equitable, a nd f air election s ystem.  T hus t he hi story of  pa rliament i nside 
democracy becomes one  partially of  social evolution and changing norms leading to increased 
suffrage as minorities, women, and the poor successfully argued for their equal inclusion in their 
political s ystems. And s adly, i n s ome c ases t he pa rliaments t hemselves w orked a gainst t hese 
notions of increased inclusion and voice.  
  While the warning of differences is indeed correct, the 
change from parliament to parliament within a democracy was a great one.   
More salient to the argument of this chapter is what principles emerged as the standards of 
reasonable democracy were met—not only what principles were added, but also how and why 
were th ey a dded. Three bi g pr inciples s eem to  lie  a t the  he art of  the  mode rn democratic 
parliament: legitimacy, public control, and discourse. While each could be argued to be present 
in t he e arlier f orms of  parliament, t hey do not  r each t heir full e xpression w ithout t he s ocial 
changes of suffrage, increased protection of rights, and ensured fair elections.   
Legitimacy is a difficult term to deal with simply, as many different qualified expressions 
legitimacy ( i.e. output legitimacy) h ave emerged ove r time .  Legitimacy is  s imply the  ide a of  
                                                 
73 Skottowe (1887). Pg. 1. 
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popular endorsement of the authority of an institution. Where the term diversifies is the manner 
in which that endor sement i s g enerated—be i t through l egal a rrangement, e lection, s ense of  
tradition, or identity to  name just a few. Earlier parliaments had fragments of this, but the true 
appearance of legitimacy stems from the early modern political thought of John Locke and other 
Enlightenment thinkers, where notions of the people needing to accept their system for it to have 
properly-situated authority emerged. 
Public control i s a  second principle that s tems from the development of  the parliament in  
democratic systems. Stemming from legitimacy concerns, the question of how the institution of 
parliament was legitimate was answered by notions of public control. To the extent the system 
was controlled b y the p eople, t hen i t s erved their ends and had its authority properly s ituated. 
The na ture a nd de velopment of  m odes o f publ ic c ontrol v aried f rom s ystem t o s ystem. T hree 
methods ( non-exhaustive) a re w orth m entioning here: r epresentation, pub lic i nvolvement, a nd 
access. All three access popular control of the institution in some way, though none are popular 
control in and of themselves.  
Representation i s t he most obvi ous pr inciple of  publ ic c ontrol t hat s eems t ied t o 
parliamentary governance. T he i dea t hat t he people a re t oo num erous t o c onduct di rect 
democracy led to the acceptance of representation as a democratic principle. While theorization 
about representation is varied, its links to public control seem secure. The spectrum ranges from 
the r epresentative be ing e mpowered t o m ake w hat s he j udges a re t he best de cisions f or he r 
people to be ing a  m ere a ggregator a nd di sseminator of  t he c ommon opi nion(s) of  t hose s he 
represents. D espite t hose di fferences i n not ion, t he l ink to publ ic c ontrol r emains t he s ame. 
Representation is the means of using fewer individuals to conduct the business that concerns the 
entire populace, on behalf of that populace. Through the history of parliaments, the way in which 
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that was done varied, but the principle remained the same: our freedom and equality is insured 
by having an agent who is accountable to our will (to some extent) within the political system. 
Certainly questions of the public can complicate things—prior to women (or any other excluded 
group through history) having a vote the parliament was woefully lacking in democracy. Yet the 
notion of  r epresentation a nd voi ce w as one  t hat c ontinued t o be  de mocratic i n na ture. T he 
excluded de manded i nclusion be cause t hey d emanded a ccountability t o t heir w ill i n or der t o 
insure their own freedom and equality.   
Public involvement plays a role in public control, simply by necessity. Without a marginally 
interested and active populace, public control is not realized. While some participatory theorists 
would suggest that this needs to be complete involvement, what seems salient about the principle 
is that the publ ic is  allowed equal involvement i f they wish. Declining involvement rates may 
suggest th at the  pe ople a re pr ioritizing ot her activities in their live s. W hat ma tters is  th e 
opportunity f or publ ic i nvolvement i s s ecure f or t hose who f eel t hat t heir s ense of  c ontrol 
requires it.  
Access is the principle where the notions of suffrage discussed before have the most impact. 
For public control to exist, the people must be able to access the system itself. This means formal 
inclusion ( i.e. universal suffrage) as well as procedural inclusion in the system—having a vote 
that c ounts, be ing a ble t o c ontact one ’s r epresentative, or  s imply know ing t he i ssues t hat a re 
being debated at a given time.  
Finally, discourse emerged as an important component of parliaments in democracy. As our 
notions of  pol itical behavior modernized, increasing concern was paid to the way in which we 
form our  publ ic de cisions. S temming ba ck t o J.S. M ill’s not ion of  pub lic di scourse a nd t he 
formulation of right ideas in On Liberty, and finding invigoration in participatory democracy and 
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critical l anguage t heory appr oaches, discourse increasingly be came a part of  m any m odern 
democratic notions. Thus, parliaments quickly became accorded with these principles. While not 
the pe ople t hemselves engaging i n di scourse, t he di scourse of  j ustly c hosen r epresentatives 
seemed to be a decent compromise for most.  
In each case, the democratic principles that we attribute to modern parliaments come from 
an i nterplay be tween ou r t heorization of  de mocracy and c hanges in the ins titution ( and social 
context around it) that move in democratic directions. I suggest that this process, when seen over 
time, can be thought s imilar to John Rawls’ r eflective equilibrium in a sense. Principles w ere 
brought to existing ins titutions, and the experience subtly (perhaps di alectically) changed both 
principles and the institution over time—developing into our current picture of parliaments with 
associated principles of democracy. Our ideas meet institutions, and they evolved in reflection of 
each other.  
With t his br ief hi storical s urvey, i n conjunction w ith t he analysis of  chapter t hree, we 
have a p reliminary lis t of  s econd-order p rinciples to c onsider w ith t he EP: le gitimacy, public 
control ( with i ts a ssociated not ions of  representation, a ccess, a nd pu blic i nvolvement), a nd 
discourse. Both groups of EP scholars discussed in chapter three consider these ideas, and place 
them to various degrees within the EP—though often accompanied by claims that they are sub-
optimally realized.  
The virtue of the adaptive approach is that it frees us from needing to have every possible 
second-order principle of democracy present in an institution like the EP at once. Examining the 
EP, the second-order principles of representation, access, public involvement, and discourse are 
met.  Some of  t he c entral el ements o f pa rliamentary de mocracy t hat many s cholars s eek to 
observe i n t he E P a re not pr esent, not ably: l egitimacy and publ ic c ontrol. Y et t he a daptive 
 87 
approach f rees us  f rom a larm a t t his poi nt. A s c hapter t wo de monstrated, t he l ack of  a ny 
particular second-order principles is both expected and acceptable in each institution or practice.  
I w ant to stress tha t le gitimacy a nd public c ontrol a re not  di scarded by the a daptive 
approach. Instead, they lose their realization in this case. These ideas are part of the democratic 
tradition, having been a part of  how states achieve the first pr inciples of  freedom and equality 
through electoral a ssembly ( parliamentary) f orm. Y et w hen we m ake t he m ove t o t he 
supranational arena, the circumstances changed. While still important ideas, they need no longer 
be required elements for the EP to possess if we wish to consider its democratic character. 
Continuing with the adaptive approach, the reasoning behind the second-order principles 
is a necessary step. The adaptive approach reminds us that the reason to care about representation 
(for instance) is not that it is what familiar forms of democracy have always included. That sort 
of t hinking i s a t t he f oundation of  pr oblems a ddressed i n c hapter t hree. I nstead, t he a daptive 
approach r eminds us  t o t hink c arefully about why representation came t o be  v alued as a  
democratic second-order principle present in parliamentary bodies.  
Through t he a daptive a pproach e xamination of  t he E P is f reed from an y ha nging 
assumptions that come with the nomenclature “parliament”, as they are merely second (or third) 
order pr inciples w hich need not  be  pr esent i n a ll e xpressions of  de mocracy. Freed f rom t he 
requirement o f looking just like  parliaments as we’ve al ready know n them, we can see where 
other elements such as rhetorical action based on democratic norms fit into analysis of the EP. 
The following graphic lays out the basics of what fits and what is missing in the EP.74
                                                 
74 Astute readers may note the addition of a second-order principle here that I have not discussed in depth: rhetorical 
action via democratic norms. The case for this “new” principle will be made in the following sections—I merely 
include the principle here for completeness.   
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Figure 7. Second-order principles and the European Parliament 
 
A graphical illustration of these principles may be of value in this case. The figure below 
shows the overlapping nature of  the pr inciples between the hi storical s tate model, the EP, and 
what will be the central subject of the remaining parts of this chapter: what other principles—not 
tied to the hi storical model—that c an be  f ound w hen w e a re f reed f rom t he w eight of  
associations.  
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Figure 8. Relationships of second-order principles and parliaments 
 
Note t hat t hese r ings o f pr inciples a re V enn i n na ture: t he E P c ontains pa rts of  t he 
historical m odel, but  l eaves out  ot her por tions. If w e w ere employing a t hick t heory of 
democracy to judge the EP, the fact that it misses certain principles would lead us to judge that it 
has failures in democratic character. Yet if we used a thin theory of democracy here, we would 
be left with a vehicle that looked at only one principle—leaving us with little traction to explore 
the ways in which the EP is set apart from the historical model. A thin democratic model would 
quickly find that the EP either has enough or not enough similarity to the state-bound historical 
model based upon its very basic features. Only the adaptive approach can navigate an institution 
like the EP in a manner that gives a flexible yet robust analysis.  
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Following the steps of the adaptive approach from chapter two, the final step is to ensure 
that t he E P doe s not  include a ny s econd-order principles t hat di rectly oppose t he f irst-order 
principles of  f reedom a nd e quality. T he E P m ay also ha ve s ome f unctions t hat a re not  t ied 
directly to freedom and equality, such as efficiency. The only qualification is that such principles 
do not violate freedom and equality. In the case of the EP, I can identify no competing second-
order principles that violate freedom or equality in a direct manner.  
While some locate a  democratic deficit in the EU s temming f rom the  E P, the adaptive 
approach allows us two considerable advancements. First, it shows that the EP does not possess 
the particular bounded set of democratic qualifiers drawn from the parliamentary experience that 
many authors seek. Yet this does not mean that the EP is non-democratic—that perception comes 
from the weight of association. Rather, it works in both familiar and novel ways to enhance the 
democratic character of the Union.  
4.2 PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN POLICY 
The preceding analysis has given us a sense of what second-order principles we may observe in 
the European Parliament. That list began the preliminary process of freeing us from the weight of 
association that comes with the concept of parliament. As suggested in the prior section, one area 
that could be obscured by the weight of association is the relationship between the EP and the 
foreign policy of the European Union. The example of the EP’s foreign policy role shows both 
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the way in which the weight of associations plays out, and leads to insights about a potential new 
democratic second-order principle present in the EP.75
Within the s upranational g overnance s tructure of t he E uropean U nion, t he E uropean 
Parliament’s role in foreign policy and security policy is  somewhat newly s ituated, yet c learly 
linked t o t he not ions a bout pa rliaments c arried b y t he a rchitects of  t he E U. T he r ole o f a 
parliament in the external relations of a government was fairly well established, both in political 
thought and historical example. Clashes between foreign pol icy and parliamentarianism can be 
seen back at the beginning of the early modern phase of political theory, notably among the ideas 
of T homas H obbes a nd B aron de  M ontesquieu. C entral t o t he a rgument f or e xcluding 
parliaments f rom m uch of t he f oreign pol icy pr ocess w as t heir c orporate s tructure. A ssembly 
structures ( like pa rliaments) w ere s een as t oo d iverse, t oo ope n, a nd t oo pr one t o f actional 
squabbles. S ecurity r equired s trong de cision-making pow er t hat c ould de cide qui ckly i n c risis 
rather than slowly in debate. Security and foreign policy required other practices that parliaments 
simply could not produce: an ability to act secretly and immunity from partisan clashes when the 
most e ssential is sue—the s tate’s s ecurity—was at  s take. These t rends were pi cked up by t he 
early thinkers o f the United States as  well, becoming cornerstones o f the separation of  powers 
notions that composed early federalist thought.  
  
These classical notions of the isolation of the parliamentary body from the foreign policy 
process be coming assumptions pa ckaged w ith t he i dea of  t he r epresentative bod y. T hey 
contrasted, t o be  sure, w ith other de mocratic pr inciples ove r time —accountability, voi ce, 
                                                 
75 This example of the EP’s dealings in foreign policy is actually the first example that started me thinking about 
what would eventually become the adaptive approach. I took a seminar on European foreign policy, which seemed 
to clash with a lot of the assumptions in democratic theory that I was consuming at the same time about the way that 
parliaments behave (i.e. early Enlightenment calls for the virtues of mixed government because foreign policy 
needed executive rather than legislative control). In the other cases, the adaptive approach is more in the fleshed out 
process from chapter two—yet here the choice of case might be viewed as a topic arrived at organically.  
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participation, and transparency have become second-order principles that pushed from then other 
side of parliamentary inclusion in foreign policy. Yet on  the main, oversight rather than direct 
policy i mplementation and ge neration ha s be en the r ole which t he a ssembly ha s f ound i tself 
fulfilling in the foreign security process.  
This displays the advantage that the adaptive approach brings. It pushes us toward f irst 
making sure where our  own assumptions are affecting our  choices in topic and pr inciple. This 
initial “self-screening” challenges the reasoning behind ignoring the EP’s involvement in foreign 
policy. An area that may have been discounted out of  habit ( i.e. “parliaments don’t do foreign 
policy”) is now fair game for exploration. To be sure, the one limitation is that the people who 
generated t he E P w orked unde r t he s ame a ssumptions a bout i solating a  pa rliament f rom t he 
business of security. Yet the EP’s unique position in a new system adapting to a supranational 
form of governance may provide space for innovation that solidified national systems may lack. 
The remainder of this section details the particulars of the EP’s situation with regards to foreign 
policy.  
From an institutional perspective, the EP appears to be extraneous to the security portion 
of foreign policy. The only real role it has is playing the role of ex post facto information-getter, 
receiving briefings and conducting inquiries after community programs are in place. A slightly 
more active role for the EP emerges when looking at the Community-based portions of foreign 
policy ( international de velopment a nd t rade), b ut tha t r ole is  s till tie d to notions of  how  a  
national parliament interacts with the foreign policy process. Before placing the EP as an actor, it 
is essential to consider the peculiarities of the EU system in foreign policy.  
Foreign pol icy i n t he E U i s not  e asily captured, g iven t he U nion’s t reaty ba sis. S ome 
parts of  foreign pol icy, most not ably i tems s uch a s de fense a nd s ecurity c oncerns, r emain i n 
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more intergovernmental forums where the ministers of the member states make the decisions in 
consultation. These f orums e volved from t he ha rmonizing efforts o f E uropean P olitical 
Cooperation (EPC) into the present Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) environment. 
Other por tions of  f oreign pol icy-making, s uch a s t rade a nd s ome de velopment pr ograms, a re 
situated elsewhere: within the competence of  the supranational institutions of  the Commission, 
the C ouncil of  M inisters, a nd t he E uropean P arliament. B ecause of  t his dua l-nature of  t he 
Union’s f oreign pol icy, i t i s not  s urprising t hat a n a nalysis of  how  t he E P a cts w ithin that 
structure must consider each policy area distinctly.  I treat each in turn.  
The E P’s r ole i n t he Common F oreign S ecurity P olicy ( CFSP) i s fundamentally 
“limited.”76 On other matters of  external pol icy, the EP does play a role. But in CFSP, the EP 
plays a minimally involved role—most notably as a body informed by the Council Presidency of 
developments a nd i nitiatives i n C FSP, a nd given a  c hance t o a sk que stions r egarding t hese 
briefings. A rticle 21 of  t he T reaty of  t he E uropean U nion ( TEU) established t his i nformed, 
questioning role. A negative view would look at the limitations of the information and question 
session, and the fact that of ten such information comes only after Member S tate consensus on 
policy, leaving little room for change. With this, the role of the Council Presidency is a critical 
variable. Some argue that the EP’s influence in CFSP is dependent on the Presidency country of 
the Council and how much they endeavor to keep the Parliament informed.77
The EP does have a l imited formal role in CFSP. They debate issues of foreign policy, 
issue de clarations, r eports, a nd r ecommendations on t he s ubject, c onduct publ ic i nterview 
sessions with issue experts and EU officials.
  
78
                                                 
76 Jørgensen (2002). pg. 223. 
 The interview process of public questioning is the 
77 Allen (1996). pg. 297. 
78 Stavridis (2003). pg. 3. 
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most public of these enterprises. However, the questioning process is considered of limited value 
by some. Hill (1983) suggested that “MEPs have worked hard to achieve their present r ight to 
question t he P resident o n E PC que stions, but  t hey rarely extract m ore t han t he ki nd of  bl and 
answers which diplomats ar e well-used to preparing for publ ic consumption.”79 With that, the 
obligation is to present the EP with “the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP,” rather than the 
full domain of the decision process.80 This implies that even when informed, the EP remains not 
fully informed. Not only that, but the actions that the EP does make have been characterized as 
“non-binding s crutiny r ights.”81 If a nything, the E P’s r ole is  ex post facto as S tavridis ( 2003) 
suggests—the EP is reactive to already-made CFSP decisions, often with the understanding that 
those decisions will not be modified, regardless of EP actions.82
Despite the perceived weak role in security and defense policy, scholars do recognize that 
in ot her pa rts of  t he foreign pol icy, t he E P do es pl ay a  r ole i nstitutionally. For e conomic 
(sometimes r eferred to as f irst pi llar) is sues tha t a re a lso foreign policy (some int ernational 
agreements and Enlargement t reaties) the EP has a role by assent procedure.
 
83 For example, in 
1987 the Single European Act (SEA) provided for veto power for the EP over agreements with 
third c ountries. P arliament be gan us ing t his t o f orce a dding of  human r ights c lauses 
(conditionality) t o such ag reements. EP w as conc erned explicitly t hat E U i nternational 
agreements work to improve democracy around the world. This added a political element to the 
EU’s foreign relations that had been absent.84
                                                 
79 Hill (1983), pg. 188. 
 Another area that some scholars consider to be an 
emerging control of the EP over foreign policy is the use of budgetary powers to exert pressure 
80 Hurd (1994). pg. 425. 
81 Gavrilescu (2004), pg. 82. 
82 Stavridis (2003), pg. 3. 
83 Jørgensen (2002), pg. 223. 
84 Holland (2002), pg. 120. 
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on Commission “to reform the operation of its external delegations.”85 These budgetary powers 
apply mainly to areas of Community policy that are nevertheless foreign policy: trade and tariffs, 
commerce, and development aid.86
The odd f it of  t he E P i n t he U nion’s f oreign p olicy i s clearly a case o f t he w eight o f 
associations. While in other areas there are concerns about the democratic deficit of the EU, calls 
to democratize t he Union’s foreign pol icy process—through increased parliamentary role—are 
virtually non-existent. This matches t he suggestion that t he approved role for t he EP i s drawn 
straight from the  na tion-state m odel. S ome s cholars a rgue t hat a ny ov ersight b y E P would be  
“inappropriate,” be cause of  a “t otal lack of  pr ecedent… i n m ost national pa rliamentary 
traditions.”
  
87
“National parliaments in almost all West European states had long found foreign 
policy a more di fficult a rea in which to hold their governments to account than 
most a spects of  dom estic pol icy. Foreign pol icy a nd de fence w ere t raditionally 
considered matters outside and above the partisan domestic debate: directly linked 
to t he pr eservation of  s overeignty, a nd t herefore t o be  e ntrusted t o t he 
executive.”
 Fundamentally, t here s eems t o be  t he opi nion t hat f oreign pol icy i s s imply non -
parliamentarian: 
88
 
  
With a precedent of limited parliamentary influence at the national level, it is understandable that 
in the European Union the right of influencing foreign policy was not intentionally extended to 
the EP.  
Compounding the matter, scholars such as Hill and Wallace (1996) rely upon the issue of 
sovereignty i n e xplaining w hy t he e xecutive ha s t raditionally be en t he s eat of  f oreign pol icy. 
When moving above the nation-state level, sovereignty concerns become increasingly complex. 
                                                 
85 Jørgensen (2002), pg. 223. 
86 Stavridis (2003), pg. 3. 
87 Howorth (2001), pg. 778. 
88 Hill and Wallace (1996), pg. 6. 
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If sovereignty trumps domestic debate within the nation state, then certainly it w ould seem that 
debate of  s overeignty-domain issues b y bodi es e xterior to the na tion state a re p roblematic. 
Fundamentally, scholars conclude that there is simply no i nterest in having democratic controls 
of the foreign policy process located at the Community level.89
In summary, the purely institutional picture of the EP seems to explain why there is little 
interest and/or mention of the EP when it comes to foreign policy. Not only does the EP have no 
formal role, but  it exists in a climate w here no formal r ole is  expected of pa rliamentary-style 
bodies in the first place. However, the formal realm is only one location where influence may be 
gained. T he f ollowing s ection e xplores t he ot her f ace o f t he E P—an informal s haper o f t he 
Union’s foreign policy.  
 
4.3 ENHANCING DEMOCRACY THROUGH RHETORICAL ACTION 
Having seen the limitations placed on and expected for the European Parliament when it comes 
to f oreign pol icy, i t i s i mportant t o not e t heir or igin: l argely bound  up i n not ions a bout 
parliaments s temming f rom s tate experience and sovereignty. This section seeks to break from 
those assumptions, by examining a way in which the EP does have a voice in foreign policy. And 
most importantly to the overall project, that voice can be a democratic one. The EP demonstrates 
power and the ability to be an actor in the foreign policy process, but  in ways not traditionally 
considered t o be  i ndications of  pow er. M ost no tably, t he E P pl ays a  k ey role i n r hetorical 
strategies that affect Union’s policies. Rhetorical action, norm-shaping, framing, and shaming (or 
                                                 
89 Stavridis (2003), pg. 5. 
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“naming and shaming” as it is often referred to in EU documents) appear as strategies that: 1) the 
EP utilizes, 2) give some guiding power to the EP in foreign policy that i t does not possess in 
terms of formal institutional design, and 3) can have democratic implications.  
From a traditional or formal analysis, the EP’s role is informed but rarely consulted. Note 
that from this angle, the EP is not  much of  an actor—it is  reactive and passive. However, this 
view misses crucial ways in which the EP is an actor in foreign policy: through rhetorical action. 
Rhetorical action is an idea that links strategic behavior with an idea of power being found in and 
through t he us e of  no rmative i deas. S chimmelfennig ( 2001) de fines r hetorical action a s “ the 
strategic us e o f nor m-based a rguments.”90 In hi s f ormulation, S chimmelfennig l ooks a t how  
actors use the standards which the EU has already agreed upon, and how arguments have been 
used t o c onstrain or  “ entrap” a ctors w ho pr opose pol icy t hat doe s not  a ffirm t he i deals of  t he 
community. This particular argument is similar to the broader mechanic that I believe is the EP’s 
source of influence on f oreign policy. This section will expand on t he idea of rhetorical action, 
paying particular attention to how it is used by the EP.91
The pr ior s ection of  t his paper described the i nstitutional actions t hat t he EP i s able to 
take r egarding foreign p olicy—debate of  i ssues, publ ication of  r eports a nd r ecommendations, 
and the publ ic questioning of  Union officials. These are the means of  involvement that the EP 
has given its institutional position within the Union. For the purposes of talking about rhetorical 
 Furthermore, it will lay the groundwork 
for s howing how  t hat rhetorical action, w hen a ttached t o de mocratic pr inciples, pl ays a  
democratizing role on European foreign policy.  
                                                 
90 Schimmelfennig (2001), pg. 48. 
91 Note that Schimmelfennig’s analysis is largely about rhetorical action used by foreign ministers and heads of 
state. While there is mention of members of the EP (MEPs), the parliament’s use of rhetorical action  remains under-
explored. Schimmelfennig (2001), pg. 71.  
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action, knowing what the EP can do gives us a sense for what types of rhetorical action it is able 
to use. 
Given the formal and institutional position of the EP, I observe that two main rhetorical 
strategies seem most l ikely to be employed effectively. These are the strategies of  framing and 
shaming. While other means of rhetorical action may exist, these are the two that are most suited 
to the EP given i ts form, mandate, and self-image of i ts role in the EU. And if the EP is using 
rhetorical action, then i t s hould mean that t here are cases where such rhetorical action had an  
effect upon foreign policy.92
 
 
Shaming: This mode of rhetorical action is about the public presentation of an actor not 
following some agreed-upon set of rules or norms. It is about showing the disjunction between 
an actor’s no rmative commitments a nd behavior. The a ctor us ing the  r hetorical s trategy first 
identifies t hat a nother a ctor ( whose a ctions t hey w ish t o i nfluence) i s a cting c ontrary t o s ome 
norm or  r ule t hat i s c onsidered f undamental t o a  pa rticular a udience ( or t hat t he a udience 
understands a s fundamental t o t he a ctors). The s haming a ctor t hen m akes a publ ic 
pronouncement detailing how the shamed actor did or does not follow the norms or rules that the 
audience holds. If the shaming is successful, the shamed actor then will change position to be in 
accordance w ith the es tablished norms/rules. These ar e m any nu ances of  t he pr ocess j ust 
generalized. Who the audience is, what the norms/rules are and how they were agreed upon, and 
the publicity of the shaming speech act are all important variables.  
In t he E uropean cont ext, there s eem t o be a couple of  s alient f eatures that de fine t he 
shaming process in the Union regarding foreign policy. First and foremost, the declaratory and 
                                                 
92 If the EP is using a tool that simply doesn’t work for the ends intended, then the inquiry should be not on how and 
whether that tool gives influence, but why an institution uses a tool that does not yield results.  
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treaty nature of the Union’s accords mean that a number of “rhetorical commitments” have been 
advanced a s s hared b y the U nion a nd a ll t he member s tates.93
A sense o f E uropean i dentity i s t he s traightforward ex ample of  one  of  t hese 
commitments. Europe’s t reaties i nclude the not ion of  a  common identity t hat i s European that 
should m otivate a ll E uropean pe oples a nd s tates t o j oin i n t he U nion.
 These c ommitments a re th e 
agreed-upon nor ms o r r ules t o w hich f uture a ctions/rhetoric of  actors can be  c ompared. M ost 
notably, s tatements a bout de mocracy, freedom, e quality, a nd i dentity pop ulate t hese r hetorical 
commitments of the Union.  
94 This c ommitment, 
enshrined i n t reaty, was us ed b y P arliamentarians a mong ot hers t o i nfluence foreign pol icy 
regarding EU expansion. On the question of making association treaties with external European 
states ve rsus i ncorporating t hem i nto Union m embership, m embers of  E uropean P arliament 
(MEPs) us ed s haming t echniques t o a rgue f or w ider e xpansion of  t he E U. P articularly, M EPs 
suggested publicly that the existing European Community was not giving membership to states 
that also had a European identity.95
Rhetorical action akin to shaming relies upon a  mechanism that Schimmelfennig (2001) 
describes as: “pre-suppos[ing] weakly socialized actors.”
 The “caught in the act” nature of  this—of not  l iving up to 
one’s promises and ideas—has a potent influence and was integral to reaching a Europe of  25 
members.  
96
                                                 
93 Schimmelfennig (2001), pg. 66. 
 This describes situations where actors 
are not using the agreed-upon norms and ideas that they share as the justification for all action—
instead other preferences are competing with the shared ideas. Thus, there have to be the shared 
94 Ibid, pg. 67. 
95 Ibid, pg. 71. 
96 Ibid. pg. 62. 
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norms t o br ing s hame w ith, a nd t he a ctors t o be  s hamed m ust be  s hown ( or c haracterized) a s 
operating by the dictates of another norm or preference.  
Another consideration is the audience of the shaming activity. When the EP was shaming 
the member states over European identity claims and admission to the EU, who was the audience 
of the  s haming? W as it the  c itizens of  th e E U? O r the  f oreign ministries of  th e e xcluded 
European states? O r eve n the m ember s tates t hemselves? I t s eems unc lear w ho the audi ence 
really is in the European case. The EP is a representative body, so in one sense it seems that the 
shame s hould c ome on g overnments b y s howing t he pe ople t hat t heir e lected/appointed 
executive officials were not following the very language of their treaties. However, a strong case 
for the mechanism resting the shamed actor itself can be made. By recognizing that they made a 
mistake, perhaps shamed governments respond with contrition. The shaming mechanism seems 
clearer when applied between member states on this issue—one side uses the rhetorical action to 
gain ba rgaining l everage or  a greement f rom a nother s tate. W hen t he E P i s c onducting t he 
shaming, however, it i s l ess cl ear w hat t he t arget audi ence i s, and where t he m echanism f or 
shaming truly lies.  
Shaming s eems t o be  a  s trategy e mployed due  t o t he i nstitutional pos ition of  t he E P, 
rather t han b y s ome s ense of  “ what our  m ission i s” a mong M EPs. B ecause of  i ts na ture a s a  
public forum, the EP is a prime location for public shaming (its semi-public forum is still one of 
the m ost ope n of  t he s upranational i nstitutions i n t he E U). T he t arget a udience m ay remain 
underspecified, but the publicity of the venue is obvious to the actor being shamed in the very 
least. Thus, shaming as a mode of influence seems to not only have some precedent in the EP, 
but a lso i t s eems t o b e a  na tural m ethod chosen be cause of  t he i nstitutional de sign of  t he 
parliament itself. 
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Framing: This rhetorical s trategy i s about i nfluence ove r t he w ay in which individuals 
see a nd und erstand an i ssue. In a  rational choice f ramework, f raming be gins w ith t he 
understanding that actors must make cost-benefit analyses when choosing options, and that those 
analyses are conducted in relation to some point of reference.97
Examples of t he EP us ing t he r hetorical a ction of  f raming w hen i t c omes t o f oreign 
policy are prevalent. An excellent example is the actions of the EP regarding Central American 
(particularly Nicaraguan) ties with the EU during the 1980s. Disturbed by human rights abuses in 
Nicaragua, the E P di rectly s uggested that m ember s tate f oreign policy be ne utral t oward the 
revolutionary government a nd f oremost c ognizant of  hum an r ights a nd de mocracy i ssues.
 Framing is a way of presenting 
the point of reference in a pa rticular way that makes the actor inclined to decide along specific 
lines (even if that decision is not objectively rational). More generally, framing is the notion that 
controlling the way in which a problem is viewed has an impact on how that problem is solved. 
European integration takes a very different image depending on w hether the problem is framed 
as pr eserving na tional s overeignty v ersus e mpowering ef fective d ecision-making a mong 
members of a community. 
98 
Around this policy stance, the EP generated policy positions on human rights, economic aid, area 
no-intervention, and democracy that were subsequently “pressed” on t he other European Union 
institutions.99
Even without a clear formal role, the EP served as a policy entrepreneur. In addition to 
resolutions about proper foreign policy toward Central America, parliamentary sessions became 
  
                                                 
97 Maoz (1990), pg. 88. 
98 Smith (1996). 
99 Ibid.  
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a place where Central American heads of state and other officials could deliver public and “high 
profile” s tatements on the ma tter.100 Due to the E P’s di rect int erest in this of ten marginalized 
geopolitical region for Europe, within 10 years the Council had incorporated the EP’s own policy 
largely i ntact. On this i ssue, t he EP set t he s tage and de fined the t erms of  how Europe would 
approach a particular set of foreign policies. Its initiation of the successful policy seems to show 
a di rect i nfluence of  h ow f raming—defining the  C ommunity’s C entral A merican policy a s 
having t he dua l obj ectives of  hum an r ights a nd ne utrality—has be en us ed b y t he E P t o g ain 
influence in an area where it plays no formal role.101
The EP is willing to act rhetorically through framing, even in realms where i t does not  
have a  c lear i nstitutional r ole. For another example, i n t he W TO ba nanas di spute i n t he e arly 
1990’s, EP had “no formal right of initiative” yet it still spoke out on the issue—two Parliament 
committees developed reports that supported the position of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
(ACP) states that exported bananas.
 
102 By siding with the ACP nations, the EP used the outsider 
status (provided by its lack of formal role) to try to change the debate from the basis of economic 
liberalization to one about maintaining hi storical tie s and post-colonial r esponsibility. While it  
may not have a formal right of influence, the EP gains some leverage on foreign policy issues in 
this alternate way, shaping the “atmosphere” in which the EU determines its policy objectives.103
 While a role in foreign policy through framing seems apparent, explaining why the EP 
relies upon framing as a pa rticular r hetorical a ction is mor e di fficult. On t he one  h and, a n 
explanation is tha t w hen the E P is  e ngaged in f raming E U foreign policy obj ectives it is  a  
conscious e ffort on  t he part of  M EPs t o fill t heir de mocratic r ole—speaking on b ehalf of  t he 
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people for the concerns that should drive the Community’s policy. There is some indication that 
MEPs s ee t hemselves as  ne eding t o pl ay a r ole in security and defense policy. This ha s b een 
explained as part institutional power struggle and part the “EU’s self image and construction as a 
civilian pow er.”104 As a c ivilian pow er, de bate a nd di scussion of  pol itical pr iorities b y 
representative of the people seem to be a more legitimate basis for foreign policy. Perhaps MEPs 
are r eacting t o this r ole, and actively s eeking m ore de mocratic controls b y at l east de fining 
foreign pol icy i ssues in terms of  democratic and human r ights i ssues.105
So what c an we dr aw f rom thi s br ief a nalysis int o the r hetorical a ction strategies 
employed b y t he E P?  T he f irst i nsight i s clear: t hese r hetorical s trategies w ould have b een 
missed had the weight of association not been lifted prior to thinking about the EP. The adaptive 
approach, b y r eleasing us  f rom pa rliamentary assumptions, a llows us  t o c onsider t he s mall, 
seemingly i ncidental, a ctions of  t he EP as a complementary w ay in which it democratizes the  
Union.  
 Also, it is  di fficult to  
determine whether i t is the MEPs being active policy entrepreneurs, or whether the nature of a 
legislative body (and accompanying committees on foreign policy topics) to strive to define the 
issues that should take policy priority.  
The questions of the nature of EP involvement are interesting, but it is the content of the 
rhetorical action that holds promise for democracy. Rhetorical action is a means for ensuring that 
the principles a s ystem espouses are indeed the principles which policy is based. This example 
shows t hat t he E P’s r ole i n f oreign pol icy i s t hat of  hol ding t he U nion’s pol icies nor matively 
                                                 
104 Howorth (2001). pg. 778. 
105 I found no study that includes a systematic evaluation of MEPs and their explicit deployment of democratic 
principles as a means of democratizing the EU. Such would be a difficult measurement to obtain. Every MEP would 
likely be a savvy enough politician to “smell” the desired answer of democratic principles being a motivation, 
perhaps. Yet, this is one area where future empirical work built on the normative framework that the adaptive 
approach to democracy provides would be illuminating.  
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accountable. And that is a new wrinkle to the democratic picture. Parliaments have a number of 
ideas as sociated, but  w ith t he E P w e c an s ee a nother r ole. It’s not  a bout a ccountability t o t he 
people (in traditional representation), but accountability to the shared norms of the people. When 
those s hared nor ms are de mocratic, t hen t his f unction s eems t o be  a  p art of  de mocracy 
observable in the system.  
One question that stems from this observation is whether this is  all that new. Assembly 
oversight over executive moves has been a consistent part of the parliamentary tradition. From 
Locke a nd M ontesquieu t hrough the foundational t hinkers of  t he U nited S tates, c hecks and 
balances have been viewed as a cornerstone of democracy. Rhetorical action could be classified 
as one mode of that checking, rather than some new form of power exclusive to the EP. Certainly 
rhetorical action ha s b een us ed b y r epresentative bodi es be fore t he E P, and c onstrains i n t he 
same way. 
`The new innovation to note here, however, comes from a different angle. The essential 
element here is the flexibility in the institutional form of the EP that allowed this shift to happen. 
Despite its inability to formally participate, the EP still found its way to ensuring outcomes that 
satisfy t he s hared pr inciples w hich t he E U a greed upon —not coincidentally t he ve ry s ame 
principles w hich s atisfy t he f undamental f irst order pr inciples of  d emocracy: freedom and  
equality.  
The i nnovation c omes i n t he m ethod of  us ing t he publ ic s pace a nd t he ve ry l anguage 
commitments agreed upon by the EU. Rhetorical action is used be used to bind the EU to other 
shared notions—efficiency, common identity, economic growth—which are not functions of the 
first principles of democracy. In fact, one could use rhetorical action to support accountability to 
any no rmative pr inciple, including fascism, theology, depravity, or  r estriction. The tr ick in the 
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EU case comes f rom the debate detailed in chapter one : Europe’s conc ern with its democratic 
identity. A perpetual malaise about the Union’s democratic credentials seems fairly widespread. 
In some of these examples, we see the EP able to use that concern as a motivating tool to help 
reach policy outcomes that are consistent with democratic principles. 
4.4 DEMOCRACY ON THE WHOLE: THE EP AS A PART OF THE EU 
Chapter three referred to the European Parliament as the institution of first resort in treatments of 
European supranational democracy. While we can understand the factors that position the EP as 
a first resort, it is essential to notice that it need not be the institution of last resort. The weight of 
association that comes with the institution and name of parliament can be felt heavily. The more 
convinced we are t hat t he as sembly i s t he cradle of  d emocracy at t he state l evel, the m ore 
difficult democratic deficit scholarship on the EU becomes. Democracy is not contained within a 
single institution, nor within the functions of any one institutional experience. Foreign policy of 
the EP was just one example that proves particularly illustrative of the adaptive approach—it is 
not t he onl y w ay t hat t he E P i s or  might be  de mocratic. While th is a pplies to the s tate, the 
supranational level makes this point even more pressing.  
As chapter two suggested, democracy must be viewed as having a fluid quality. The EU 
is neither wholly democratic nor wholly undemocratic, regardless of our analysis of the EP. The 
EP forms one cog of many overlapping functions which contribute to the system as a whole. To 
hang a ll our  hope s on a  pa rliament i s s imply pr oblematic. A nd w hile a nother s et of  s cholars 
emerges from the shadows of the EP’s limitations to locate democracy elsewhere, the taint of the 
nation-state and the idea of parliament colors that action—my own work included. The adaptive 
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approach i s a bout b reaking f ree f rom t he c alcified ha ng-ups of  d emocracy as l earned in a 
particular setting (the state). It is not easy to do. Yet as I hopefully demonstrated in this chapter, 
thinking that presses outside of traditional democratic roles for institutions can be helpful. The 
EP’s movement in the informal space of foreign policy has had a democratic tone at times—a 
tone which would go invisible if we let stale notions wrapped up in institutional names color our 
thought.  
This pr oject w orks t o l ay out a  s ystem f or a pproaching s upranational d emocracy t hat 
guides scholarly thinking in this manner. In the paired sets of case chapters that follow, along 
with t his one , on ly t he t ip of  t he r esearch i ceberg i s s howing. W hole ne w a nalyses of  t he 
European Parliament, the most democratic-looking of  European supranational institutions need 
to be  ge nerated. W ith t he a daptive approach, t hey can s tart f rom w hat i s ha ppening a nd f ind 
democracy (if pr esent), rather t han start f rom be liefs about  a cer tain form of  de mocracy and  
compare from that prejudiced perspective.  
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5.0  THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: AT THE JUNCTION OF 
CONSTITUION AND DEMOCRACY 
In t he pr ior c hapters, I considered t he E uropean P arliament i ts pos ition as t he f irst r esort f or 
democracy i n t he E uropean U nion. In this ch apter and the n ext, I t urn m y attention t o an 
institution that does not immediately come to mind when talking about democracy: the European 
Court of  J ustice ( ECJ). Many o f t he w orries t hat pr ompt t he di scussion of de mocratic de ficit 
arise from the number and major role of  non-majoritarian institutions in the functioning of the 
EU. These institutions—which the ECJ is one of—are a source of  worry due to their i solation 
from popular control and other principles of democratic legitimacy that play into the worries of 
the democratic deficit.  
The ECJ may generate s ome unease for other s cholars and pundi ts concerned with the 
democratic credentials of the European Union (and by extension, the institutions of the EU). Yet 
from the standpoint of democratic theory, fretting about the links between court and populace are 
a recent arrival. Courts have fit or clash with democratic notions through time in various ways, 
leaving a f ar m uddier p icture of  how  a  j udicial s tructure s uch a s t he E CJ s hould be  j udged 
democratically. The current concern seems to stem f rom the same problems that have pl agued 
other EU institutions in discussion of democratic deficit: notions of democracy stemming from 
the lessons learned in state context.  
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Further complicating the matter of thinking about the ECJ is the constitutional debate that 
has been ongoing in the EU for years. Wedded to potential concerns about the court’s democratic 
character come a set of arguments—normative and empirical—about the constitutional situation 
of the Union. For some, the treaties form a quasi-constitution, for others the push is for a proper 
constitution to be ratified by the EU. The history of the ECJ, and its reliance upon treaties of the 
Union in constitution-like fashion, draws the institution of the ECJ squarely into discussions of 
European constitutionalism.  
This c hapter f ocuses on  t he ne xus of  these t wo a rguments. O n t he one  ha nd, t he E CJ 
generates concern from some democratic vantage points as an insulated, non-majoritarian, non-
accountable institution. Yet on the other hand, a continued persistence of constitutional debate—
both treaty-as-constitution and European Constitution—has tendencies to elevate a certain notion 
of the ECJ with democratic overtones. I argue these two currents of discourse leaves scholarship 
on the ECJ in a bind.  
This chapter addr esses t his split i n d iscourse a bout the E CJ b y clearing up s ome 
persistent problems in the judicial and constitutional discourses of the EU. I argue that the arrival 
of c oncerns a bout t ransparency and a ccountability of  c ourts s tem f rom t he a pplication of  a 
generalized not ion of  de mocracy pul led di rectly from the context of  t he state. Concerns about 
accountability and transparency are s ystem i ssues r ather t han the pa rticular pr inciples f or 
considering c ourts, whose de mocratic f unction i s one  of  guardianship and guarantees i n a 
democratic system. By clarifying the form and function of a general model of courts, we get a 
better sense of what democratic principles are correctly applied to an institution like the ECJ. 
As i f these faulty applications of  certain second-order democratic pr inciples to the ECJ 
were not enough, the discussion of European constitutionalism brings in another faulty premise 
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for t he E CJ. C onstitutionalism, be  i t f ormal or  i nformal, pa per doc ument or  l egal t radition, 
carries cer tain signifiers t hat obs ervers as sociate w ith democracy. For s ome, pressuring for a  
European c onstitution or  t he t reatment of  t reaty-as-constitution w as a m ethod t hey felt w ould 
solve the democratic deficit. The ECJ goes from being a potential concern of democratic deficit 
to being the preliminary author of the treaty-as-constitution, and assured of its democratic role in 
a pot ential E uropean c onstitution. T his s wift t ransition of  how  t he E CJ i s vi ewed de serves 
careful i nquiry a t t he l east. F urther c aution i s w arranted f or t hose w ho w ould a ssume t hat 
constitutionalism would directly cause democracy in the EU. Given these worries, I a rgue that 
our analysis of the ECJ is best conducted outside of any constitutional debate, in order to keep 
assumptions about democracy from slipping into the institution through that tenuous pathway.   
Like the  e xamples be fore it, this c hapter w orks in tandem w ith the f ollowing c hapter. 
Here, I w ill l ay out  t he na ture of  t he ECJ, and turn t o explore t he two problematic di scourses 
clouding ou r de mocratic a ssessments of  th e E CJ. I s tart w ith a br ief s ketch of  t he f orm and 
function of the  E CJ its elf, to familiarize r eaders w ith the na ture o f the  ins titution. Then, I 
consider s ome of  t he d emocratic que stioning o f t he E CJ, a nd c ompare t hat que stioning t o a  
general hi story of t he court as  a d emocratic s tructure. I w ill a rgue t hat the  hi storical a nd 
theoretically a ppropriate t reatment of  t he de mocratic “ footprint” of  c ourts i nvolves c oncerns 
about rule of law, equal treatment, and justice. Thus, applying concerns drawn from generalized 
democratic models such as accountability and transparency proves problematic at best.  
Following that discussion of the democratic history of courts, I turn my attention to the 
second strand of argument for this chapter: constitutionalism. I argue that constitution, either in 
formal f orm or  eve n in the t reaty-as-constitution m old, f ormed a  s ort of  m agic bul let of  
democracy for some scholars. The notion emerges that constitution is the cure for the lingering 
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ailments of  t he E U, particularly an y m aladies o f de mocratic de ficit—and t hus t he E CJ g ets 
named democratic in the process. I question these assumptions, and argue that constitution is not 
so easily equivalent of democracy in the European case.  
The appl ication of m any generalized democratic s econd-order pr inciples—drawn f rom 
the state cont ext—simply does not  g ive t raction on t he de mocratic na ture of  t he E CJ. A nd 
likewise, the ECJ cannot be shoehorned into democratic status simply through the constitutional 
pathway. Thus, our evaluation of the democratic nature of the ECJ can only be found through a 
different approach: the adaptive approach, which is the subject of the following chapter.   
5.1 FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
The European Court of  Justice has been the subject of  many good t reatments of  i ts nature and 
role in the European Union, particularly the groundbreaking work o f Karen Alter (1998), Eric 
Stein ( 1981), a nd J .H.H. W eiler ( 1981) a mong ot hers. Indebted t o t hose w ho c an c ertainly 
explain t he nua nces of  the c ourt be tter t han I, this s ection s ketches t he b asics of form a nd 
function of the ECJ.  
The Treaty of Paris in 1951 formally established the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
Luxembourg. In form, t he ECJ i s a  judicial court s tructure. Composed o f a  group of  member-
state appointed judges and various support staff, the ECJ operates in similar design to traditional 
national courts. Currently 27 judges compose the court, a  number that has increased with each 
wave of expansion adding new member states. The judges are appointed by common accord of 
the member states, which effectively lead to a long history of each judge being nominated by the 
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state of  hi s or  he r na tional a ffiliation.106
After a l ong s tretch of rapidly i ncreasing case load, the m ember s tates agr eed to the 
formation of  a  c omplementary bod y t o t he E CJ, t he C ourt of  F irst Instance ( CFI). T his c ourt 
exists a longside the ECJ to ease case load on the justices, generating a  different judgeship for 
cases of administrative disputes in the EU—the area that accounted for a high proportion of the 
increasing and time-consuming case load.   
 In a ddition t o t he j udges, t he c ourt ut ilizes e ight 
advocates general, persons whose task i t is to assist the ECJ justices through the production of 
submissions and opinions about cases relying upon precedent or other principles. 
The ECJ i s also uni que due t o its r elationship with the na tional c ourts o f the  me mber 
states. The ECJ evolved into a forum that is closely tied to national courts and their cases, thanks 
to a  num ber of  i nstances w here na tional c ourts referred c ases t o t he E CJ. T his r elationship i s 
reciprocal, a s i t bot h s trengthened t he E CJ a nd s uddenly gave na tional c ourts a  r ole i n t he 
community level.107
More i mportant t han t he ba sic f orm o f t he E CJ, t he f unctions of  t he E CJ a re du e 
consideration.  Evaluating the function of any institution is tricky due to multiple functions, and 
the E CJ i s no e xception. F rom a rbitrator, s ource of  j urisprudence, a nd out come-provider t o 
guardian, gatekeeper, and guarantor, many function tags can be applied to the supranational court 
of the EU. Cataloguing the functions of an institution is further complicated by the level of the 
function. Some functions are grand in scope, touching on  foundational first-order principles of 
 This linkage takes a  hierarchical shape, much in the familiar manner o f a  
federal cour t s ystem, where p recedent and requests for rulings ar e pa ssed upward to the more 
centralized ECJ.  
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this chapter.  
107 Ibid. pg. 43.  
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normative concern (court as guarantor or guardian fits this mode). These are the functions that 
are most salient for the inquiry at hand, because they are where the democratic credentials of the 
court will be assessed. Meanwhile, other functions are almost mechanistic in their nature (such 
court a s s ource of  pr ecedent or  di stributor of  case r ecords), a nd a re l ess of  a c oncern t o t his 
treatment. While of  int erest, these me chanistic functions c ome f rom t he a rrangement of  t he 
institution and the duties that it performs as part of that arrangement. 
 
Figure 9. Foundational versus mechanistic functions of the European Court of Justice 
 
The be st m ethod t o a ddress t he f oundational f unctions of  t he c ourt ( those w ith t he 
normative underpinnings) comes from the treatments of the court in legal scholarship, stemming 
from t he t wo pr inciples of  C ommunity j urisprudence: di rect e ffect a nd s upremacy. 
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Understanding t hese t wo pr inciples of  ho w t he c ourt ha s come t o i nfluence t he c ommunity 
generates a clear picture of the function of the ECJ in the EU.  
While the effects of these two principles of jurisprudence are complex, their descriptions 
are de ceptively s imple. D irect e ffect is  me rely the  pr inciple th at the  pr ovisions of  the  
international tr eaties tha t form the  EU do not need any special action on the  parts of  s tates to  
apply t o t he dom estic legal or der o f t he m ember s tates. T his not ion c ouples ne atly w ith 
Supremacy, the pr inciple tha t in  the  case of  a  dispute be tween the tr eaties tha t c ompose the  
European C ommunity a nd t he l egislation of  a  national pa rliament, t he treaties s upersede a ny 
national legislation.  
Direct e ffect and supremacy w ere not  granted to t he t reaty ov ernight, nor w ere t hey 
perhaps even intended in the 1951 t reaty forming the ECJ. Instead, these two principles of ECJ 
jurisprudence e merged o ver t ime as t he ECJ g ot i nvolved i n va rious c ommunity a nd n ational 
disputes. Perhaps the most critical case in that development was the Van Gend en Loos decision 
in 1963 (case 26/62). Through the dispute of a Dutch company over the raising of customs duties 
despite t reaty prohibitions of  s uch r aises, t he ECJ e stablished t he groundwork of  t hese t wo 
principles: that individual Europeans had the rights to the treaties that their member s tates had 
agreed to. This decision was to have far ranging implications, and is the lynchpin for allowing 
direct effect and supremacy to generate the foundational functions of the ECJ.  
Membership in European treaty includes an agreement that the Commission and the ECJ 
are competent i n ove rseeing m atters of  di sputes ove r t reaty. F rom t he be ginning, t he 
Commission has been the institution of primary competence in this regard. Should a state shirk 
its duties in the treaty, the Commission is intended to drive the inquiry. The ECJ forms the end of 
point of the process initiated by the Commission. Yet in experience, the court has a bigger role 
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than even its own rulings would suggest. In the Star Fruit decision (case 247/87) the ECJ clearly 
established t hat t he C ommission, no t t he c ourt, w as t he i nstitution t hat should a ctively pur sue 
conflicts between treaty and national law.108 However, despite the Commission’s responsibility 
in this ma nner, that r esponsibility ha s s hifted largely to the E CJ. P art of thi s c ame f rom the  
reluctance of the Commission to actually pursue its enforcement and monitoring role. Invoking 
sanctioning a m ere 16 t imes pr ior t o t he year 2 000, t he C ommission ha s s een m ost of  t hose 
proceedings be settled outside of court rather than in formal mechanisms of enforcement.109 This 
left a g ap which needed t o be f illed—and t he E CJ s tepped i n. E uropean C ourt Judge R obert 
Lecourt e xpressed t he s ituation be st i n h is of ten-cited r emarks: “ The c ourt c ould not  but  b e 
struck b y t he e xtreme vul nerability of  t he C ommunity’s l egal or der i f i t c ould onl y r ely on 
sanctioning through the censure of a long and insufficient infringement procedure.”110
With the C ommission’s la ckluster filling of  t he e nforcer r ole f or t he t reaties, t he Van 
Gend en Loos case ope ned the door  f or t he E CJ t o become t he m ain m echanism of  t reaty 
enforcement in the EU. The notion that EU law could be drawn on in domestic disputes made its 
way into the actions of national courts. Private l itigants in national courts began drawing upon 
EU treaty and directives to justify their cases. Then, as mentioned before, the ECJ found i tself 
being referred cases from member state courts for various reasons. As referrals continued, so the 
jurisprudence of  s upremacy w as r einforced. E uropean t reaty be came considered hi erarchically 
ordered above national law.
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Very quickly, direct effect and supremacy went from dubious juridical pr inciples to the 
foundations of  E uropean j urisprudence. S cholars a nd j udges a like m arveled a t how  these 
principles, w hich w ere often de nied i n t he e arly d ecisions of  t he E CJ, be came c ommonly 
accepted and followed by national legal orders as well as those of the EU—and which have been 
further enforced by additional articles of European treaty.112
The ECJ became the central agent for keeping the states accountable to the treaties they 
signed.
 And through these two principles, 
the foundational function of the ECJ became clear.  
113
Note in particular that the ECJ serves as a guarantor of rights and obligations incurred by 
the member states. EU directives are aimed at states, not private individuals—they set out what 
obligations t he s tates h ave i n r egard t o bot h t heir c itizens a nd t o ot her s tates ( case 152/ 84 
Marshall). Thus the enforcing of obligations (and rights generated by those obligations) has the 
ECJ monitoring and guaranteeing member state compliance to the treaties they signed.  
 Supremacy and direct ef fect give t he court a m eans t o not onl y ens ure t hat s tates 
comply, but also to ensure equal enforcement across the internal borders of the EU. While EU 
directives leave space for “choice of form and methods” by which the member states can fulfill 
their obligations, the ECJ’s position leaves it as the arbitrator to ensure that the methods chosen 
do fulfill obligations should they be challenged (Article 189 [249]).  
In effect, the ECJ ens ures t he r ule o f l aw b etween the m ember s tates as cont racting 
parties.114 Garrett and Weingast ( 1993) de scribed the t echnical as pects of  t he cour t cl arifying 
language as “ filling i n i ncomplete c ontracts.”115
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 Their c hoice of  t erminology is  te lling, as i t 
points to a final functional role of the ECJ. The EU, with its treaty-based origin, continues to be a 
113 Delhousse (1994). Pg. 22.  
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system of  contractually bound parties (member states). Originally, the l egal s ystem of  the  E U 
was de signed to pr otect t he s overeignty of  t he cont racting s tates—in effect, t o pr eserve t he 
independence of the contracting parties.116
These are the form and functions of the ECJ which should be accessed in our democratic 
assessments of  the  ins titution, as the y s eem mo st like ly to be a t the  core of  th e ins titution’s 
behavior. Y et, a s t he ne xt two s ections s how, o ther pr inciples of  de mocracy ha ve s nuck i nto 
assessments of the ECJ with pernicious effect.   
 Thus, the function of the ECJ as arbiter of contracts 
and enforcing agreed-upon obligations becomes salient. It continues to enforce that sovereignty 
in the sense of ensuring that each contracting party equally fulfills its agreement.  
5.2 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE COURT AND DEMOCRACY 
The pr ior s ection e xamined s ome of  t he pa rticular nua nces of  t he E uropean C ourt of  J ustice. 
However, in one central area the ECJ has received the same treatment as all other institutions of 
the E uropean Union: w orries about t he de mocratic de ficit. T he E CJ, a s pa rt o f t he s ystem 
perceived as lacking in democracy, has been dragged into the democratic deficit mire from time 
to t ime. For many works, t his t akes no l arger form than pl acing the ECJ a longside other non-
majoritarian a nd non -transparent i nstitutions s uch a s t he E uropean C entral B ank. T his t hrow-
away example usage of the ECJ would likely be harmless, were it not indicative of a general flaw 
in democratic analysis that is subtly coloring some of the detailed studies of the ECJ as well.  
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Treatments of the ECJ seem to pose certain question marks for democratic thinking that 
is dr awn f rom t he n ation-state e xperience of  democracy. Similar to the pi tfalls of  s ome 
democratic analysis considered in pr ior chapters, the same f law appears with the ECJ. Pundits 
and scholars al ike too easily take pr inciples derived for other institutions in other settings, and 
apply them to judge the democratic impact of the ECJ. And in this, the ECJ is doubly-harmed. 
Not onl y are p rinciples sometimes forged in t he s tate experience of  democracy, but  t hey s tem 
even from non-judicial sources. For instance, assuming that a court must meet the same qualities 
of de mocratic p articipation as an  el ected assembly i s a  r ecipe f or di saster—a disaster onl y 
complicated when a supranational court is  judged by the democratic pr inciples that stem from  
national-level parliamentary notions. 117
Two particular a reas s eem mos t likely to draw the  E CJ into the de mocratic de ficit 
concern. T he f irst i s t he pe rceived di stance be tween t he c ourt a nd t he pe ople (or c itizens or  
demos in certain formulations) of Europe. The second is a worry about the procedural aspects of 
the court lacking certain democratic qualities. As I explore these two strands of complaint below, 
the problem becomes clear: these are not  fallacies of the ECJ but rather obtrusive second-order 
principles of democracy being applied to an institution that they simply do not fit.  
  
First, some critiques of the ECJ hover around the distance between the ECJ and its link to 
the popul ation of  E urope. P rinciples of  a ccountability, access, and pa rticipation play a  c entral 
role here. Often times, these critiques come packaged with concerns about the ECJ as a creative 
judiciary that makes new laws through its rulings. The argument is that law-making is the task of 
representative as semblies, and thus an  institution that is n’t di rectly accountable to the pe ople 
                                                 
117 Mercifully, most of the quality work on the ECJ is insulated from this type of thinking… an improvement over 
the rampant mistaken applications of democratic notions to the European Parliament covered in chapters three and 
four.  
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should not be involved in that process. This thinking is typified by Renaud Delhousse’s (1994) 
statement: “ In a s ystem tha t s ees its elf a s de mocratic, it is  not  easy t o find justification for 
creative judi ciary ( law-making judi ciary)”118 To the ex tent t hat t he E CJ appears active and  
creative, so worries about its links to the people increase. At the national level, the thought is that 
the populace is due laws made by a body of its choosing. Creative judiciaries seem to offend not 
by the nature of the decision, but the fact that the official “making law from the bench” is not the 
empowered representative of  a l egislative br anch. While s ome w ork ha s s triven t o s how t hat 
non-representative ins titutions in  supranational s ettings can pl ay a  responsive a nd e ven 
participatory role, such arguments are in the minority. 119 The ECJ remains subject to frequent 
concerns about its involvement in building European law without a perceived democratic right to 
do so. This is further complicated by the independence of the ECJ, as accountability has become 
the de fault benchmark f or democracy in non-elected institutions in an increasingly democratic 
deficit-worried Europe.120
The second democratic critique of the ECJ also links to accountability, but in a different 
way. These critiques criticize the ECJ’s procedural and compositional e lements, worrying th at 
the court’s system of appointments and closed discussion are contributors to the democratic woes 
of the Union. These concerns start with the frequently referenced worry about the independence 
of j udges on  t he E CJ. Remember t hat t he p rocedure f or s electing j udges i s one  of  n ational 
nomination. In effect, but not required, the court had an unwritten rule of one justice per member 
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state.121
The pressure of member states may be felt in various ways. One example is the tenure of 
Justice Manfred Zuleeg, the German appointee to the ECJ in the early 1990s. Many attribute the 
critiques that Chancellor Kohl had for the ECJ rulings as being particularly aimed at pressuring 
Zuleeg.
 This pol icy h as l ed t o a watchful a ttitude toward the c ourt, w ith s cholars c ontinually 
looking for signs of member state tampering with the judiciary through their national justice.  
122 When his term of office was not renewed in 1994, i t seemed to be a punishment for 
not ensuring the court ruled in German national interests. Due to experiences like this, additional 
informal m easures ha ve be en a dopted b y t he E CJ—most not ably, utilizing a n informal r ule 
controlling which judges are given the lead role in given cases. Any judge from a country that is 
a pa rty to the case i s not  g iven a cent ral role in the t rial proceeding for that case. 123 Informal 
practices l ike t hese ha ve l eft t he E CJ i n a  c uriously pr ecarious pos ition. S cholars of  t he E CJ 
point out that as it stands, member states easily could pressure the ECJ, yet have largely refrained 
from doing do.124
Further c omplicating m atters, the me asures ta ken by the  court to insulate its elf f rom 
pressure from the member states can raise certain democratic question marks, particularly among 
those who seek to apply participatory and accountability principles of democracy to the court. In 
sheltering itself from undue member state pressure on justices, the court uses secret deliberations 
and pr oduces c ase d ecisions w hich a re c orporate i n na ture. T his l eaves s pace f or a  j ustice t o 
decide a gainst he r na tional government without worry t hat he r comments will be  made publ ic 
and thus jeopardize her appointment to the court. While some rumors do leak out—for instance, 
the story that the Spanish justice was instrumental in ruling for strict compliance by Spain with 
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Union e nvironmental di rectives—this m ethod i nsulates t he j ustices t o a  degree. However, t he 
problem he re i s one  t hat l oops ba ck f ull c ircle t o t he pr ior c oncerns. T he s olution t o one  
supposed pr oblem of  de mocracy (non-independence) i nvolves t reading o n a nother frequently-
cited democratic principle in the EU: transparency.  
The basic c laim of  both of  t hese c ritiques comes f rom the same source. There ex ists a 
perspective i n work on  E uropean i nstitutions t hat he avily f avors t he specific s econd-order 
principles mos t of ten cited in the de mocratic de ficit de bate ( detailed in chapter one). T he 
message i s t hat E urope l acks accou ntability, legitimacy, pa rticipation, a nd t ransparency. T hus, 
scholars carry these specific second-order principles as they examine European institutions, and 
apply them often unconsciously to their subject. These system-wide complaints have become the 
particular criteria for every institution within the Union, whether that institution is rightly judged 
on those principles or not. This flawed application of principles is a notably recent phenomenon, 
which further credits the  role of  the  democratic deficit model inf luencing other s cholarship on  
the EU. To properly treat a court structure in the EU, a better starting point than the democratic 
deficit is to look at how courts have fit into democracy in different ways over time.  
The history of courts and democracy is complex, and deserving of a full treatment in its 
own r ight. Y et a  ba sic ove rview o f t he r elationship of  t he c ourt t o de mocratic t heory 
demonstrates both the recentness and peculiarity of the democratic fears above being leveraged 
upon c ourts. Instead, t he hi story o f t he c ourt i n democratic s ocieties poi nts our  a ttention t o a  
different set of democratic factors—factors that are found more in the foundational functions of 
the ECJ than in the mechanistic functions where the prior worries are centered.  
While glaringly obvious, the entry point to this discussion is the fact that courts pre-date 
democracy and democratic ideas considerably. Thus, the history of courts and democracy is one 
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of democratic ideals being theorized and installed in societies containing courts. Courts were not 
something that were theorized as a component of democracy, and thereby added to the social and 
governmental s ystem. A lready, t hen, we ha ve o ur f irst not ation a bout h ow de mocratic t heory 
should a pproach j udicial s tructures. The c ourt, b eing an institution co-opted i nto de mocratic 
regimes, often gets less or negative attention from theories of democracy. The adaptive approach 
reminds us  t hat a n i nstitution ne ed not  be  a ll-or-nothing, a nd t he c ourt c an s erve a s a  great 
example of that despite its seeming non-democratic origins.  
Looking a t e arly m odern t heorists a nd t heir work on de mocracies a nd g overnment 
organization, w e qui ckly recognize c ertain pa tterns of  i ncluding j udicial s tructures i nto 
democratic theory. Early notions drew on the central principles of freedom and equality for their 
democratic insights, but with a notable focus on the role that the system of governance played in 
people’s lives. Limited democracy became the core pr inciple, where the rights and liberties o f 
individuals were shielded f rom the absolutist power that monarchy (and later, a ll government) 
possessed. And here is where judicial structures found their home in democratic theory. Courts 
and judges were buffers, guardians, protectors, and balancers of the fragile system that was ever-
ready to swallow the individual’s freedom and equal standing.     
Charles de  Secondat, Baron de  Montesquieu’s (1748) reflections on t he judicial role in 
political or ganization ( democracy and m onarchy) pl ay a n e ssential r ole t he de velopment of  
courts as democratic institutions. Shaping both continental democratic thinkers and the f ederal 
architects of  the United States, hi s work posed the essential role o f courts in the separation of  
powers. C ourts pr otected l iberty of  citizens b y checking a gainst a buses b y t he governmental 
structures that would come quite easily should executive, legislative, and judiciary be contained 
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in a single entity.125
While others came prior to Montesquieu and after, his seminal work set the tone for the 
way i n which courts w ere t o be  i ncluded i n o ur de mocratic conceptions. Liberal de mocratic 
notions grew out of the origins of limited democracy, and even Rousseau’s republican model of 
democracy drew from the same well of ensuring separation of a judiciary in order to preserve the 
people from any will a government may wish to impose over the general will.
 In addition to protecting the citizens, this role prevented the decline of the 
system as  a whole, en suring that t he rule o f l aw and the r ights and f reedoms of  c itizens were 
maintained over time.  
126
Along with these not ions, it is  impor tant to recognize the  role tha t the  social c ontract 
model of social organization and Enlightenment thinking added to the development of courts in 
this de mocratic role a s guardian i n l imited g overnment. T he ne ed f or the c ourt w as one  of  
insurance against the central government. That comes prefaced on the notion of individual liberty 
and r ights di rectly f rom E nlightenment t hought. T hus, unde r t he s ocial c ontract not ion, our  
citizenship in the system was one of mutual agreement, carrying contractual obligations for the 
government and our  f ellow c itizens. Judicial s tructures emerge as t he c entral forum where t he 
protection of  t hose contractually-defined f reedom and e quality took pl ace, bot h i n early 
democratic t heory and c ontinuing i nto m odern de mocratic t hought. In c urrent r ights-based 
 Codified both in 
the Federalist documents and in the early perceived successes of the United States’ constitutional 
system, courts increasingly fell into their role as a  part of  the  s ystem tha t was there to shelter 
rights and freedoms against the potential for abuse by government.  
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democratic t heory, t he r ole of  c ourts c ontinues t o be  l inked t o t he i nterpretation of  r ights a nd 
insurance of equality and freedom in the system.127
This short look at the history of courts in democracy provides a g eneral overview. One 
central element hopefully comes clear. The classical democratic role for courts is not the current 
one t hat c ertain s cholars s eek t o f ind i n t he E CJ. C ourts w ere not  f orums of  pa rticipatory 
engagement nor  s ubject t o t ransparency o r a ccountability r equirements. Instead, c ourts ha d a  
different function in the de mocratic cha racter o f s tate s ystems: a r ole as g uardian of r ights, 
protector against hegemonic authority, and enforcer of the rule of law.  
 
Notice how this f its w ith t he pr ior functional exploration of  t he ECJ. The foundational 
functions of  e nforcing t reaty and r ule of  l aw, equalizing e nforcement for a ll c itizens a cross 
borders, m onitoring f or s tate c ompliance, and guaranteeing t he c ontractual r ole be tween t he 
member states falls  more in the realm of the classical democratic criteria for judging courts. Yet 
the critiques of the ECJ, inspired by democratic deficit thinking, tend to focus their attention on 
the mechanistic functions of the ECJ: its composition, working, and procedure.  
The following chapter will address the question of situating a democratic perspective of 
the ECJ in full. For the purposes of this chapter, the essential recognition is that current judgment 
of the ECJ seems to fall on its mechanistic elements, when the history of courts and democracy 
suggest that a court’s democratic involvement falls more on the foundational functions provided 
by the judiciary. Thus, a new look at the ECJ—which my adaptive approach to democracy can 
provide—must start with the foundational role of the ECJ as a structure whose role comes more 
from what it does than how it functions as an institution.  
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5.3 GRANDFATHERING THE ECJ INTO A DEMOCRATIC ROLE: EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTION AS A “MAGIC BULLET” OF DEMOCRACY 
In 2005, F rench a nd Dutch r eferendums r ejected a  p roposed f ormal C onstitution f or t he 
European Union. Leading up to the rejection, Constitution was touted as the democratic solution 
to t he w oes of  E urope. A nd a fterward, c ontinual pr essure f or C onstitution a s a  s olution t o 
democratic d eficit r emained, s upported b y a ssuring s tatements t hat E U would be  oka y i n t he 
meantime thanks to the informal constitution it already had in its treaties. Hidden amidst these 
trends i s a subtle me ssage a bout the  E CJ a s well. If c onstitution was a  ma gic bul let of  
democracy—one change that would suddenly transform the entirety of the Union—then the ECJ 
would clearly be one  o f t he b eneficiaries. Already, t he E CJ’s r ole i n creating t he t reaty-as-
constitution was undeniable, and thus once a constitution was in place to solve the democratic 
deficit, any worries about the nature of the ECJ as potentially undemocratic would evaporate.  
I want t o b riefly qu estion t hese a ssumptions, a rguing t hat c onstitution i s not  s uch a  
simple solution for democracy as some painted it. Furthermore, no matter what the constitutional 
basis of  t he E U, I a rgue t hat t he E CJ m ust be  i ndependently c onsidered f rom a  de mocratic 
standpoint. N o m atter w hat w ould c ome f rom a  formal c onstitution, the ECJ s till ne eds to be 
considered on i ts ow n m erits a nd f unctions f rom a  de mocratic s tandpoint. O nce t he E CJ i s 
disentangled from the mere existence of  constitution, scholarship on t he supranational court of  
the EU can proceed.  
One of the common reasons given in favor of constitutionalism for the EU is that formal 
constitutionalism s olves the de mocratic d eficit.128
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 The i dea i s f airly s traightforward, focusing 
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mainly on the notion of securing a form of legitimacy for the system. A constitution would meet 
certain notions democratic l egitimacy and thus r educe the pe rceived democratic de ficit.129 The 
perception seems to be  that t aking a s tep be yond the bindings of  t reaty to the obl igations of  a 
constitutional document would allow for that injection of additional legitimacy into the system. 
Even studies questioning the benefits of constitutionalism for the EU have pointed out that “the 
one pur pose of  t he c onstitution is t o e nsure de mocratic l egitimacy i n t he f uture de cisional 
processes of Europe.”130 The very process of agitation for constitution has been judged by some 
as a pr ima facie indicator of  democracy.131 As Andrew Moravcsik (2002) expressed in t ypical 
fashion, t he problem of  Europe was t hat i t had too many M adisons. There was a  multitude of  
scholars, policy-makers, and citizens agitating for a European constitution, all under the guise of 
ensuring democratic legitimacy for the EU.132
Thus, t he r ejection of  t he pr oposed E uropean c onstitution w as di fficult t o na vigate for 
many concerned with the democratic qualities of  the  EU. By putting all their democratic eggs 
into the constitutional basket, so to speak, its defeat caused some to increase their concern over 
the democratic deficit. More, however, fell back to a compromise position for their democratic 
and constitutional hopes: the t reaty-as-constitution. Scholars had argued for some t ime that the 
modern mode of constitutional construction was finding the right format to provide democratic 
legitimacy to the s ystem.
 
133
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 Thus, t he t ime, c onditions, or  f ormat s imply w as not  r ight f or a 
formal constitution to add democratic legitimacy to the EU. Instead, other less formal pathways 
would have to suffice for the time being.  
130 Weiler (2002). Pg. 571. 
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Insightfully, Jan Erk (2007) pointed out that the failure of the first constitutional attempt 
was not  a  rejection of democracy, but a conflict between an ex isting t reaty-as-constitution and 
the f ormal c onstitution w hich w as pr omoted.134 The t reaty-as-constitution model be came th e 
refuge of democratic hopes for many, given the defeat of the formal constitution. And with that 
comes a new perspective on the ECJ. The ECJ gets drawn into these notions thanks to its role in 
shaping the current s ystem of  t reaty obl igations i nto constitution-like f ashion. Many rightfully 
view the ECJ as having built a “constitutional type structure” which “blurred” the parts of the EU 
that would make it similar to any traditional international order.135
Despite these trends, I argue that the constitution as democracy-bringer notion deserves 
considerable s crutiny. A nd t hus b y extension, t he E CJ’s de mocratic qu alities s hould not  be  
established via s imple a ssociation with a constitutional pr ocess in the E U. What 
constitutionalism would bring to the EU is not an overnight solution to democratic problems, but 
a new and potentially different set of circumstances which would still need to be democratized. 
The question is what changes constitutionalism would bring to a system that is currently treaty-
based.  
 While not a complete solution 
to democratic deficits, the informal constitution became a safety net that caught many who got 
their democratic hopes dashed by the 2005 referendums.  
The di fficulty w ith s ome pa rts of  t he E uropean c onstitution de bate w as t he e ase w ith 
which c onstitution a nd democracy were e quated. It i s i mportant t o r emember G iandomenico 
Majone’s ( 2001) r eminder t hat “’constitutionalism’ a nd ‘democracy’ a re hi storically a nd 
conceptually distinct ideas.”136
                                                 
134 Erk (2007). Pg. 634. 
 Scholarship is starting to point out some of the barriers between a 
135 Delhousse (1994). Pg. 37. 
136 Majone (2001). Pg. 57.  
 127 
European constitution a nd s olution t o t he pe rceived de mocratic de ficit. F or i nstance, a nove l 
approach a ppears i n Jan E rk’s ( 2007) i nsightful w ork on t he m anner i n which l anguage i tself 
creates a  ba rrier b etween t he i mplementation of  c onstitution a nd a m ythical ove rnight 
transformation of the system to democratic legitimacy. However, the specifics of  the European 
case are not the only reason that constitutions are not instant indicators of democracy. Giovanni 
Sartori (1962) reminds us that a constitutional document is merely a means to a social end—a set 
of principles with a “correlative institutional arrangement.”137
In this w ay, I a rgue tha t s cholarship on the E CJ a s a  de mocratic ins titution is be tter 
advised to s tay out of  the E uropean constitutional de bate. T he e asy assumption i s t hat i f 
constitution instantly generates democratic legitimacy, that the ECJ will simply be packaged into 
a democratic role b y association. Even the t reaty-as-constitution thinking can fall a foul o f this 
assumption. Yet the  lin ks of  the  E CJ to  the  na ture of  the  E U tr eaties a re e ssential to our 
judgments of the institution itself.  Therefore, what is needed is an approach that can manage the 
difficulties of the competing ideas that swirl around the ECJ: constitution and democratic deficit. 
Using t he pl atform c onstructed i n t his c hapter—giving a ttention t o t he E CJ’s f oundational 
functions and employing a caution against simply assuming that constitutionalism shoehorns the 
ECJ in to democratic s tatus—my ada ptive approach will r econsider t he ECJ as  a de mocratic 
institution i n the f ollowing c hapter. B y w atching t he f oundational f unctions of  t he c ourt, 
 Constitution may historically link 
to not ions of  l imited g overnment a nd r estrictions of  a rbitrary pow er, but  t hat c omes f rom t he 
settings in which it w as e mployed. In the E U c ase, constitution m ay l ead t o a n i ncrease i n 
democracy, but it does not do so simply by virtue of being a document entitled “constitution.”  
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understanding i ts hi storical r ole as a rbitrator o f democracy, a nd relaxing t he ne ed t o c onsider 
treaty as constitution, a novel approach to the ECJ as a democratic institution is possible.  
 
 129 
6.0  DEMOCRACY VIA SOVEREIGN FICTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF JUSTICE 
The prior paired chapter provided three elements of groundwork that the argument in this chapter 
is built upon. F irst, it detailed the basic form of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and more 
importantly the functions that the ECJ appears to fill in the system of the European Union. Then 
some ne w conc erns abo ut t he E CJ t hat s tem f rom t he de mocratic de ficit w ere s hown t o be  
misplaced, focusing more on t he mechanistic s tructure of  the ECJ rather than the foundational 
functions of  the  court that are more consistent with its democratic impact. Finally, the linkage 
between the ECJ, democracy, and constitutionalism were considered. While a formal constitution 
may lead to democratic improvements in the EU, the assumption that democracy is a direct and 
automatic outcome of constitutionalism was challenged. And more important to our focus on the 
ECJ, I  a rgued t hat t he ECJ’s m erits ne ed t o b e c onsidered i ndependently of  constitutional 
discourse, lest the court be too easily judged democratic by association alone.  
From those points, the s tage is set to apply my adaptive approach to the ECJ, to better 
assess the  ins titution’s de mocratic c haracter. I argue t hat t he E CJ s hould be  c onsidered i n 
democratic lig ht w hile mini mizing the  c onstitutional di scourse s urrounding the  ins titution. 
Instead of thinking that the court is democratic via constitution, I argue that a case can be made 
for a certain democratic role for the ECJ from its position as a supranational court presiding over 
international treaty alone. By focusing on treaty rather than treaty-as-constitution or constitution, 
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the adaptive appr oach f rees us  from m any of t he s tatist democratic d eficit not ions tha t pl ague 
studies of the ECJ while at the same time suggesting a new view of the ECJ: as a guarantor of 
contract.  
I a rgue t hat t his c ontractual r ole f or t he E CJ de pends on i ts r elation to t reaty, not  t o 
constitution or constitutional treaty—due primarily to the way in which states (and the elites that 
compose them) differentiate between treaty and constitution through their notions of sovereignty. 
To the ex tent t hat t he E CJ r emains an arbiter of  t reaty, the b eliefs ( perhaps fictions) of  
sovereignty held by state leaders play into a particular democratic situation. Conversely, to the 
extent t he a rrow m oves a way f rom t reaty and t oward c onstitution, t hose be liefs a bout 
sovereignty are changed or challenged, and that unique role is lost.  
To be  c lear: t his do es not m ean t hat constitutionalism m oves a way from de mocracy. 
Instead, it swaps an existing reasonably democratic process (ECJ as guarantor of contract) for an 
untested democratic p rocess: E uro-constitutionalism, w hich a lthough some be lieve w ill be  a  
magic bullet of democracy, is not necessarily a guaranteed fix for democratic concerns. From the 
vantage poi nt o f t he a daptive a pproach, n either t reaty no r c onstitution i s ne cessarily “ better”. 
Instead, each brings certain democratic elements that we may evaluate. In the end, the status quo 
of E CJ as  ar biter of  t reaty clearly contains s econd-order p rinciples t hat l ink t o t he f irst-order 
principles of  freedom a nd e quality, a nd t hus meets r easonable de mocratic s tandards i n t he 
adaptive perspective. S cholars a nd pol icy-makers of  t he E U ha ve s omething t o gain out  of  
revisiting their assumptions about the ECJ and reconsidering the way in which i ts role toward 
treaty enhances the democratic character of the Union.  
The s tructure o f t his cha pter w ill be  a s f ollows. I f irst t urn t o t he a daptive a pproach, 
which I use to consider the various second-order principles of democracy in the case of the ECJ. 
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Showing t hat s ome of  t he t raditional one s, e specially t hose t hat f igure prominently i n w orries 
about de mocratic de ficit, a re pr oblematic i n t he case o f c ourts, I t urn t o e xploring w hat ot her 
principles may be useful using the groundwork laid in chapter five. I argue that the foundational 
functions of  t he ECJ f it w ith t he general model of courts. This suggests that t he s econd-order 
principles of  r ule of  l aw, g uarantee, a nd obl igation pr ove m ost s alient f or c onsideration of  a  
supranational court structure like the ECJ.  
From this point, I turn my attention to the way in which the ECJ’s ability to function as a 
guarantor of obligations works particularly well with the way in which sovereignty is considered 
by state leaders. I argue that the guarantor role is not only democratic, but works through treaty 
where t here are m utual be liefs about  t he s overeignty of s tates. These m utual be liefs are 
contractual in nature, with the ECJ filling the role of a guarantor of contractual equality. Thus the 
ECJ pl ays a  du al de mocratic r ole: e nsuring t he obligations of  s tates i n t erms of  f reedom a nd 
equality to the citizens of the EU, while at the same time providing an equality-preserving role 
between states as contracting parties.  I conclude with a brief look at what change would bring, 
and how moving from treaty and sovereignty in this case would change democratic evaluations 
of the ECJ.  
6.1 LOCATING SECOND-ORDER PRINCIPLES WITHIN THE COURT 
Much l ike the prior paired chapters on t he European Parliament, I t reat the European Court of  
Justice a s a n example c ase w here m y adaptive approach c an pr ovide n ew i nsight bot h i nto 
democratic t heory and t he i nstitutions of  t he European Union. In t his case, us ing the adaptive 
approach sheds light on de mocratic qualities of the ECJ both unexpected and often-overlooked. 
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Instead of  s tarting f rom s ome pr e-formed c onception of  de mocracy—such as those pa ckaged 
with democratic deficit concerns—the adaptive approach begins by examining the institution and 
what second-order principles of democracy are present or absent in the case of the ECJ.  
I argue t hat t he common standards t hat w orry de mocratic deficit thi nkers los e the ir 
usefulness w hen a pplied t o t he c ase o f t he E CJ. I nstead, pr inciples t hat a re c loser t o t he 
foundational functions of courts in general and the ECJ in its specific context are present: rule of 
law, g uarantee, a nd obl igation. F urthermore, t he a daptive a pproach a lso pr ovides a  uni que 
position t o e valuate a nother m otivational f actor in t he c ase of  t he ECJ, namely, s overeignty. 
Instead of  r ejecting s overeignty as out  of  pl ace i n s upranational s pace, t he a daptive a pproach 
gives new evaluation for the way in which the idea of sovereignty plays on the minds of those 
who administer states. Furthermore, this particular fiction of sovereignty actually proves useful 
for establishing the current democratic aspects of the ECJ. 
So we begin with the first step of the adaptive approach, identifying what second-order 
principles are present in the ECJ while being comfortable with the fact that not every principle of 
democracy need be used in this situation. Luckily, the discussion in chapter five has done some 
of the initial work for us. A host of democratic ideas, stemming from the literature on democratic 
deficits, has been applied to the ECJ in ways that are less than satisfactory. The judicial structure 
of the ECJ sets up some initial barriers to certain democratic principles. For other paradigms of 
democracy, this causes a problem. If we must hold to a strict rule of what principles a democratic 
institution carries, the difference in the ECJ from the more familiar state sources where we have 
drawn such principles from can produce untenable friction.  
Democratic s econd-order pr inciples s uch a s a ccountability, c ontact, c ontestation, 
discourse (at least public in nature), participation, responsiveness, and transparency all prove less 
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useful when applied to a judicial structure like the ECJ. Such principles have their place, but are 
mistakenly leveraged if used to consider the court. The second part of the adaptive approach is 
especially important here. This poor fitting of principles to institution does not mean that the ECJ 
is not democracy, just as it does not mean that we are working with non-democratic principles. 
Rather, they are principles of varied application. The adaptive approach frees us from needing to 
see them present in every institutional nook a nd cranny of the system of governance which we 
study—a pattern that is unfortunately too frequent in democratic deficit literature.  
The adaptive approach proves flexible yet robust when certain principles seem less useful 
in a  g iven context. T he pr evious c hapter s uggested t hat t he hi story of  courts a nd de mocracy 
points tow ard a di fferent s et of  d emocratic c riteria tha t are a pplicable t o judicial ins titutions. 
Here t he rigidity o f ot her p erspectives i s out shined b y t he a daptive a pproach. G iven a n 
institution, t he a daptive a pproach c an be tter z oom i n on w hat de mocratic a spects a re a ctually 
occurring within t hat i nstitution. B y r eferencing our  t heoretical f oundations w ithout de ciding 
upon one s ingle set of  second-order p rinciples that are applicable universally, our t reatment of  
specific s ituated a nd c ontextual ins titutions is  e nhanced. We can  co nsider t he d emocratic 
qualities of  t he E CJ i n a  r obust a nd f lexible manner, r ather be ing f orced t hrough t he t hin 
theoretical strainer of a rigid theory.  
So what are the second-order principles that are more applicable to the case of the ECJ? I 
have suggested that they revolve around rule of law, guarantee, and obligation. But how do we 
reach the reasoning behind this list of second-order principles? The following sections push on 
the ECJ, both on its general form and its unique contextual situation. By conducting this essential 
third step of the adaptive approach, a more powerful democratic analysis of the ECJ emerges.  
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6.2 THE COURT IN ABSTRACT: AN AGENT OF EQUALITY 
Courts pos e a  m ulti-layered puz zle f or de mocratic t heory. T he r easoning f or c ourts c an be  a  
thoroughly democratic one, even i f the institution of  the court can seem to lack certain second 
order principles that have become shorthand for democracy. This is the problem that my adaptive 
approach t o de mocracy is pe rfect a t r esolving. Remember, a  c entral s trength of  t he adaptive 
approach is the way in which it relaxes any perceived need that every
As I demonstrated in chapter five, the court’s role in democracy (in the nation state) was 
traditionally one  of  guaranteeing the agreed r ights and functions of  the pol itical system. Three 
interesting principles that are linked to the general model of a court can be teased out of that role: 
rule of  l aw, guarantee, a nd obl igations. Y et t he que stion i s: how  do we r each t hose t hree 
principles from an idealized conception of a court? 
 second order principle of 
democracy b e pr esent i n a  given i nstitution. F urthermore, t he adaptive a pproach gives t he 
leverage to see how we come to expect certain second order principles, and why those principles 
become incorrectly applied t o i nstitutions s uch as c ourts. A  c ourt’s l ack of  t ransparency or  
accountability to the public, for instance, i s not  as problematic f rom a democratic view as one 
might think—as long as the court is being evaluated from the adaptive vantage point.  
  The r ule of  l aw i s t he e asiest t o c onfirm, a s i t ha s c onsistently a ppeared i n va rious 
models of  de mocracy. In s hort, t he r ule of  l aw says t hat t he ex isting l aws ar e be ing appl ied 
faithfully and impartially. W hen those l aws ar e de mocratic, t he r ule o f l aw ensures that the  
system is fulfilling the rights and liberties it s aid it would provide. Rule of law applies to both 
individuals a nd t o t he s ystem, m aking s ure t o t hat w hatever pr inciples the s ystem i s f ounded 
upon a re m et. C ourts, a ccordingly, ha ve t he central r ole i n rule of  l aw. W hen r ule of  l aw i s 
challenged—i.e. there is a discrepancy in behavior on the part of some party—court forms a site 
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of redress. Thus, the judicial structure promotes the second-order principle of rule of law through 
its functioning. 
The t rick h ere, and f or g uarantee a nd obl igation, i s t hat t he s ystem be one  t hat i s 
committed to the first-order principles of democracy: freedom and equality. One could have a set 
of laws, and a court to enforce the rule of law, yet that court may not reach democratic outcomes. 
Rule of law is democracy-enabling only as a second-order principle. It must be balanced on top 
of the principles of freedom and equality. In the case of the European Union, this qualifier seems 
to be met. The one thing that the EU does not lack is language about freedom and equalities in 
the documents and principles that guide the system. These are coupled with the legal traditions of 
the European states that compose the EU, where principles of justice and legitimacy are drawn 
from the  milie u of f reedom a nd equality tha t were established in the s tate s ystems w here 
European jurisprudence is drawn from. Thus, there is a touchstone by which rule of law works to 
democratic ends—by enforcing the basic principles of the system.  
Now t urning t o guarantee a nd obl igation, i t i s he lpful t o di sentangle t he pur poses 
(foundational functions) of a court from the mechanistic functions of a court. Courts, having their 
origin outside of democracy, can in principle pursue any set of outcomes based off of common 
principles a nd l aws. A law w ith extremely non -democratic out comes could still be  ef fectively 
enforced via the mechanistic functions of courts. In a way, these functions have a non-normative 
content. T hey can be  s et t o w hatever pur pose l aw di rects. T hus, w e m ust t urn t o t he w ays i n 
which courts r eceive t he pr inciples t hat t hey reference i n order t o examine t heir de mocratic 
credentials.  
Two main sources come to mind that can provide the principles that a court utilizes: from 
the law the court works with and the t raditions of jurisprudence used by the court. For a  court 
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structure to act on principles of democracy and equality, the law needs to have its basis in some 
statement or  not ion of  t hose pr inciples, be  i t f rom a  c onstitutional doc ument, s hared c ultural 
understanding, legal t radition, pol icy out look, or  other source. Courts existed long before legal 
equality existed. If the laws push toward inequality, social hierarchy, etc., then the court would 
simply reflect t hose t hings. R ule of  l aw would s till e nsure t hat t he une qual r ules a re a pplied 
evenly t o a ll. B ut e ven application doe s not  e quate t o e quality. A  c ourt m ay apply t he s ame 
principle to all slaves or to all slave owners under law, yet we could not say that the court was 
promoting equality in a democratic fashion. In the case of the EU, however, a clear commitment 
to these principles can be found in law, treaty, directive, and document.  
The s econd s ource f or vi ewing a  c ourt a s a  g uarantor of  e quality i s t he m ode of  
jurisprudence employed by the court. Various jurisprudential traditions exist, and there is some 
variation on how  e quality and f reedom figure as ba sic pr inciples of  each. Legal s cholars m ay 
balk here, but perhaps certain forms of jurisprudence could be judged more democracy-enabling 
than others based upon their emphasis on equality. Here we can look at the link between the EU 
and i ts member s tates for guidance. Traditions of  jurisprudence come f rom the member s tates, 
where s uitably d emocratic s tate s tructures c an be pr esumed t o e xist. T hus, t he t raditions of  
jurisprudence t hat t he E CJ dr ew upon ( discussed br iefly i n chapter five) w ere yielded f rom 
traditions w ith the b asic c onstellation o f f reedom a nd equality in pl ace. In t he E CJ, t hese 
different traditions of jurisprudence were synthesized, and new forms of jurisprudence appeared 
that fit with the EU system (and the principles of freedom and equality which were embraced in 
the foundations of  t he U nion). W hile E CJ j urisprudence challenged s ome l egal a nd pol itical 
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traditions, such challenges were composed with a clear preference for equality in application and 
justification.138
In this way, we see the pr inciples of  the ECJ come into focus. As a court s tructure, i ts 
goal (foundational function) is to promote rule of law, which carries an internal ethic of  equal 
application. This notion of equality of application of the laws combines with the basic principles 
of equality and freedom as they appear in both national settings and in the documents and ideas 
that composed the EU. The ECJ thus can be  seen as a  participant in a  particular dual-pronged 
role of  e quality s eeking. It s eeks t o e nsure e quality b etween E uropean c itizens, de spite t he 
obstacles of national borders, while at the same time enhancing the equality of obligation of the 
member states that are party to the treaties which it oversees.  
  
We can vi ew the court as a  guarantor of  obl igations, which c arries t he l inkages t o our  
first-order pr inciples of  de mocracy. T his g uarantor r ole i s t he f unction t hat s eems t o be  
especially democratic. By ensuring rule of law, equal enforcement, and equal protection, courts 
maintain the equality of a system of governance. Thus, with equality as one of the two first-order 
principles of  de mocracy, w e c an be gin t o s ee t he c ourt’s r ole i n de mocracy—as an agent 
ensuring that one of our first order principles is maintained.  
Thus we see the perfect fit for the adaptive approach to democracy for the case of courts. 
Democratic pr inciples t hat a re t oo f unctional s eem t o grade courts po orly, even w hile t hose 
courts m ay en rich the d emocratic character of  t he s ystem. My ad aptive appr oach allows us  t o 
move past the format of the court and focus on the role of the court. Recall from chapter two that 
the adaptive approach frees us from needing the entirety of democracy in a system to be held in 
one pa rticular ins titution a s w ell. Instead, we c ontinually e valuate pa rts of  s ystems f or the ir 
                                                 
138 Alter (2001). Pg. 25.  
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democratic qualities, to get a sense for how and in what ways democracy is at work in a given 
system of  g overnance a s a w hole. For t he E CJ, t hat r ole i s a s a  g uarantor of  obl igations a nd 
monitor of the rule of law for both the people of Europe and contracting member states.  
6.3 THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGN FICTIONS AND STATES 
So having drawn some second-order principles from an idealized notion of courts, we can turn to 
the E uropean C ourt of  J ustice ( ECJ). In t he ECJ c ase, t he c ourt i s situated t o pe rform a 
democratic role along the lines of these principles. While the court’s functioning and mandates 
bear t he di stinctive i mpression of  t he uni que i nternational s ystem t hat i s t he E U, t he t hree 
principles of rule of law, guarantee, and obligation are both present in the court and connect the 
actions of the court to the first-order principles of freedom and equality.  
The f orm and f unction of  t he E CJ w as a ddressed i n t he pr ior c hapter w here I 
distinguished the different functions of the ECJ as foundational or mechanistic. As the previous 
chapter s uggested, s ome of  t he s econd-order pr inciples c hampioned f rom de mocratic d eficit 
perspectives had some links to the mechanistic functions of the court. Yet those concerns were 
limited i n f ashion a nd left unc lear m ethods of  s olution—the pr ocess of m aking a  judicial 
structure more participatory with the citizens of Europe would seem difficult at best. Instead, my 
inquiry i nto t he hi story a nd i deal n ature o f courts ha s s uggested t hat it i s t he f oundational 
functions of the ECJ that bear its democratic credentials. It is in the court’s role in guaranteeing 
treaty c ompliance, e nsuring equality of application a cross m ember s tate bor ders, a nd i n 
providing a guarantor role for the treaties of the member states that the functions of the ECJ meet 
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with s econd-order p rinciples of  de mocracy, a s the r evised figure f rom chapter five s uggests 
below.  
 
 Figure 10. Locating principles of democracy within the foundational versus mechanistic functions of the 
European Court of Justice 
 
While rule of law is straightforward, the other notions of guarantee and obligation require 
further unpacking given the specifics of  the ECJ’s unique institutional position. In particular, I 
turn to an examination of perhaps an unlikely subject in a chapter on courts: sovereignty. I will 
endeavor t o s how t hat sovereignty i s a  c ritical e lement i n unde rstanding t he E CJ’s us e of  
guarantee and obligation to further the first-order principles of freedom and equality in the EU.  
Given that sovereignty a s a  concept has proven to be  contentious and expansive i n t he 
literature of both political theory and international relations, I begin with a simple point. States 
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arrived in the EU with a sense of sovereignty. Here I us e t he t erm “s tates” as  convenient, if 
horribly non -specific, shorthand. T he s tate i s c omposed of  c ountless a ctors w hich c onduct i ts 
business, all of  whom cannot be assumed to be of  one s ingle mindset. Yet for my argument, I 
will be  t alking a bout a  general out look c ommon t o t hat of  l eaders, pol icy-makers, and many 
citizens of the state. Thus, while not ideal, I will often refer to the term “state” as if it w ere an 
actor in its own right instead of a composite actor in the international policy space. Yet to save a 
paragraph of typing with each mention, the moniker “state” will have to suffice. 
With this in mind, I r epeat m y s imple poi nt: states arrived in the EU with a sense of 
sovereignty. Here I am m aking an explicitly ps ychological ar gument, not a t heoretical one . 
Regardless about how we may feel about the countless debates on w hether sovereignty exists, 
does not exist, or ever existed in the international sphere, one thing remains factual rather than 
conjectural. T he i dea o f s overeignty has crept i nto t he m indsets of  l eaders, pol icy-makers, 
scholars, a nd t he general popul ace, d espite t he e ffect t hat globalization m ay o r m ay not  b e 
having upon  t hat not ion. T hus, i t s eems c lear t hat s tates arrived i n t he E U w ith a  s ense of  
sovereignty—carrying a  bundl e of  a ssumptions a bout a n i dea c alled s overeignty t hat ha ve a  
psychological impact upon the state. Whether or not it exists is less important than the fact that 
states have acted as if it exists. Thus, we can say that states have acted in ways consistent with 
sovereignty, even if that idea itself does not exist.139
What is  important from the s tandpoint of  the EU, is that the states creating and joining 
the EU carried (and still carry) concerns about the maintenance of their state power and ability to 
  
                                                 
139 Should this seem too much, compare to the case of religious faith. An observer may look at a man practicing a 
different religious faith than she does, and think: “Your God, gods, and/or idea do not exist.” Yet that same observer 
would have to recognize that the religious practitioner is behaving in a predictable manner based upon his faith. 
Thus, his actions would be consistent whether or not the idea he patterns his actions upon exists in Truth or not. The 
same seems to hold true for sovereignty—whether it exists in principle or not does not change the fact that as an idea 
with historical influence, states have behaved in a manner consistent with the principle. And like religion, the debate 
over the existence of sovereignty is important to carry out in places other than this research project.  
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retain t hat power. These f ictions of  sovereignty (in t he s ense of  a  s tory believed b y the a ctor) 
pattern the be haviors o f t he m ember s tates. N ot onl y t hat, but  t hese pa tterns a re notably 
predictable thanks t o t heir common source. And it i s t hese f ictions of  sovereignty he ld b y the 
states which caused the integration scholarship of the EU to be so stunningly interesting. As the 
European Coal and Steel Community morphed into the European Community and subsequently 
the EU, common agreement through treaty became a cent ral tenet of the process. The European 
state, a ll c arrying va rious not ions a bout s overeignty, b egan t ying t heir systems i n closer and 
closer f ashion t hrough i ntegration—yet a t the  s ame time  c linging i n va rious de grees t o t he 
fictions of sovereignty that they began with.  
Thus we see in the EU the central fountain of good research topics for years to come: a 
situation w here s tates c arry v arious a ssumptions about t he e xistence a nd ne ed f or s overeignty 
while at the  same time performing actions which clearly erode any “real sovereignty” or “true 
sovereignty” the states may or may not have had in the first place. In effect, this created not a 
crisis of  sovereignty but  a  crisis of  psychology in s tate leaders, citizens, and academics. States 
were left with a catalog of beliefs and desires from sovereignty, yet found their situation to be 
one where those notions were being challenged.  
Thus, for a  s tate to retain i ts sense of sovereignty (as sense may have been all it r eally 
was in the first place), a different source of feeling powerful and in-control needed to be found. 
Most importantly, the feelings of sovereignty are relational, as any power relation. From Thomas 
Hobbes t o Michel Foucault, we are r eminded t hat pow er i s a  commodity that r elies upon our  
assessment of  ot hers. F or s tates t o r etain their f eelings of  s overeignty, they n eeded t o feel 
empowered relative to their fellow member states.  
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With these fictions of inviolable sovereignty pressing on the leaders’ and some scholars’ 
minds, member states face a problem. States were clearly wedded to the EU process, especially 
by the t ime that sovereignty concerns be gan to be  fully felt. Thus, despite t he c laims of  some 
scholars, exit is not a particularly realistic or pleasant option for states already so closely tied.140
At this point, we can finally turn to the ECJ’s role in this de tour into sovereignty. The 
essential s hift tha t a llows s tates to remain in the E U w hile ma intaining the  ve neer of  the ir 
sovereign fictions is ensuring that the rules they agree to will be followed by all other parties as 
well. Thus, the role of treaty—and guarantees of the obligations imposed by treaty—becomes of 
paramount i mportance. The m ember s tates, b y vi rtue of  t heir concerns a bout s overeignty, 
roughly approximate a  c ontractual s ituation t hat br eathes t he d emocratic connections i nto t he 
second-order principles I discussed above.
 
And at t he s ame t ime t he pe ople w ho compose t he m ember s tates and act on their be half 
continue to carry assorted beliefs about sovereignty. 
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140 Weiler (1991). Pg. 2412. 
141 And here is an additional area where the assumption of states as solitary, single-minded actors is put to the test. 
To treat them as contracting parties is problematic, unless we make the following assumption in addition to our 
distinctions about sovereignty: leaders and policy-makers prefer decisions that they perceive are in the interest of the 
entire state. Thus, they can be considered to act in the interest of the state as a solitary actor, allowing the contractual 
comparison to work. There is nothing new about these assumptions, but again my goal is to be honest about the 
potential fault lines of my treatment.  
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6.4 CONTRACTS, TREATY, AND THE ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO THE ECJ 
Here our notion of the European Court of Justice’s role arrives at familiar ground for the political 
theorist. The s ituation of e nforcing tr eaties w here th e pa rties t o those t reaties de sire equ al 
enforcement i s c ontractual i n na ture. T he m ember s tates, t hanks t o t he f ictions of  s overeignty 
that t hey m aintain, be have r oughly i n t he m anner of  i ndependent a utonomous pa rties. T he 
intergovernmental treaties that create the European Union, like all treaties, are a form of contract 
between the party states. And thus, we reach a point where the standard notions about behavior 
and motivations of contracting parties can be employed. 
The question of  compliance looms large here. States that care about sovereignty would 
seek to secure their feeling of independence and power. In a contractual situation, our fears of the 
contract imposing conditions upon our  own behavior (limiting autonomy, thus sovereignty) are 
eased when we are assured of similar compliance by the other parties to the contract. If we are 
certain that others will be held to the same limits, then our restrictions in behavior become more 
tolerable.  
In the case of EU treaty, the ECJ emerges as the mechanism by which equal enforcement 
of contractual limits  is enforced upon a ll the contracting pa rties. The ECJ c learly considers i ts 
role to be  one  of  monitoring the pa rties of  the t reaty and guaranteeing their compliance to the 
obligations t hey accepted t hrough t reaty. This out look i s r einforced by t he na ture o f E U 
directives, which are aimed at states rather than private individuals (case 182/84 Marshall). Thus 
the ve ry j udicial pr ocedure of  t he E CJ a rbitrates t he e qual a pplication of l aws a mong pa rties 
engaged in a contract.  
Looking more closely at the situation, it is the particular notions about treaties that come 
with the f iction of s overeignty th at r einforce th is s ystem. Essential to  remember is  tha t the  
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system of sovereign states has generated a set of  norms about how those states are to approach 
treaties. For m any s tates, treaty i s pl aced hierarchically ove r na tional l aw. The D utch 
constitution, for instance, squarely elevates the obligations of treaty over national law.142 Similar 
provisions exist in the French system and the Italian system with its transfers of treaty.143
The ECJ’s own actions, as well as those of  the judiciaries of  member s tates, have only 
further solidified this. Part of the battle was in changing jurisprudence in member state judicial 
systems. One notable principle that the ECJ worked to reduce was the principle of honoring the 
most recent law passed first.
  
144 That not ion of  jurisprudence was recognized as a  conveniently 
easy escape for member states from treaty obligations. As discussed in chapter five, cases such 
as t he Van Gend en Loos decision a nd t he s upremacy p rinciple r einforced t he not ion t hat 
community law causes conflicting national law (even if made later) to be “set aside” as “treaty 
commitments must be honored.”145
However, t he pr ocess of  ke eping t he E CJ as  a g uarantor of  t he c ontract e mbodied i n 
treaty between member states has both limits and challenges. The ECJ’s extent of  enforcement 
does not extend to all areas where the first-order principles of freedom and equality need to be 
guaranteed. T he G erman na tional c ourt’s “M aastricht D ecision” f orced the i ssue of  t he E CJ’s 
competency, ruling that it only has oversight in agreed treaty concerns, not on anything deemed 
“outside” com petences.
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142 Alter (2001). Pg. 23-24.  
 Thus t he guarantor r ole of  t he E CJ i n e nforcing obl igations i n a 
manner consistent with democratic principles is limited in that sense.  
143 Delhousse (1994). Pg. 43-44.  
144 Alter (2001). Pg. 23-24.  Lex posterior deroget legi aprioro is the principle of jurisprudence described here. 
145 Delhousse (1994).  pg. 41. 
146 Weiler (2001). Pg. 221. 
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Other difficulties also arise with this particular conception of states as contracting parties 
and t he E CJ a s t he g uarantor of  t hat c ontract. E specially pr oblematic a re m oments w hen we 
observe s tates a ttempting to get a way with non-equal be havior. C ritics m ay qui ckly j ump t o 
recent concerns about  differential t reatment of  s tates w hen it c ame t o obeying t he de ficit 
limitations of the Stability and Growth Pact. While Portugal received one standard, France and 
Germany seemed to be able to get away with running deficits in excess of the agreed amounts. 
While this is problematic, the response to these actions was indicative of  a new mindset in the 
EU. The Commission worked to solve these issues without the ECJ because everyone recognized 
the imbalance i n t he s ystem, and opted to work to coerce F rance and Germany back into l ine 
rather than threaten ECJ action where the equalizing solution may have been too strong for some 
Eurocrats to stomach.  
The trick here is that the system’s threat has become informal in these areas which are the 
common por tions of  t he e conomic pi llar of  t he E U. Informal, r hetorical pr ocesses w ere 
employed in this case. The mere fussing over French and German infractions of the stability and 
growth guidelines can work to ensure the equality of the system. Applying the labels of “being 
bad” or  “un fair” t o France and Germany i n t his cas e may not  ha ve c orralled their imme diate 
actions, but brought them back in line over the long run. This is not a drawback to my argument, 
but r ather i t s hows t he l evel t o w hich m ember s tates, pol icy m akers, a nd s cholars ha ve 
internalized the notion of equal contracting member states.  
When i t c omes t o E CJ de cisions a gainst states, the s tates’ a cceptance of  t he E CJ’s 
guarantor role is the status quo. While incidents of state resistance to ECJ rulings do occur, such 
protests against equal enforcement of treaty are isolated and rare.147
                                                 
147 Delhousse (1994). Pg. 118. 
 In addition, the nature of the 
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relationship between the member s tates is  not  s tatic ove r time—it ha s evolved a long w ith t he 
integration process of the EU. Over time, the ECJ has become more restrained and offered fewer 
challenges t o state be havior.148
The ve ry pr actice o f co ntracting causes t he s tates t o habituate t o following t he a greed-
upon r ules of  t he c ommunity. C onfidence i n t he s ystem be ing on e of  e qual e nforcement a nd 
maximum liberty while under obligation breeds compliance in state behaviors. This is similar to 
the proposed evolution of social contract models: we start out single, sovereign, self-interested, 
and selfish. Then we learn that our interest as sovereign individuals is in the system working, so 
we learn that compliance is the ideal strategy for maintaining the maximum amount of our own 
liberty.  
 This i s not  a  s hocking r evelation. T he m ember s tates are no w 
“civilized” within the system, just as long-term contracting agents become able to self-enforce 
most of the tenets of their contract.  
At this point, I feel obligated to address perhaps the biggest critique to my argument in 
this chapter. The critique is perhaps best stated by Karen Alter (2001), who writes: 
“Nor did national governments welcome the transformation of the European legal  
system. It is often argued that if the member states created an international legal  
system for the EC and did not reverse the transformed ECJ’s expansion of the  
system, then at some level they must be satisfied with how the European legal  
system is working… This does not mean that states wanted national courts to  
participate in enforcing European law against their governments… There are also clear 
indications that legal integration proceeded despite the will of national governments.”149
 
 
In short, she claims that we cannot treat member s tates as wanting the  system of  the  ECJ that 
they have and questions theories that claim otherwise. This poses a considerable challenge to my 
                                                 
148 Ibid. pg. 148.  
149 Alter (2001). Pg. 26. 
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argument, as it is predicated on the notion that a state’s sovereign fictions will lead it to seek out 
and/or appreciate a guarantor of contracts like the ECJ.  
While Alter is  correct that s tates may not  have expressly wanted the ECJ in its current 
form, I do not  agree t hat m ember s tates w ould wish t o r eject t he c urrent system. Instead, m y 
argument is bolstered once more in reference to the contractual situation. Integration, especially 
in the ECJ, was not clearly telegraphed to the member states as the process occurred. The process 
was slow, incremental, and varied in pace. It may be the case that one morning, the leaders of the 
member s tates woke up and realized that the ECJ was more powerful than they would ideally 
like it to be. Yet the process that got the states to that point was difficult to step into and change. 
States did get involved at points where they had clearly defined objections to specific parts of the 
process. However, by the time the architecture for the ECJ as a guarantor of treaty was in place 
the me mber s tates w ere too wedded to the s ystem to actively oppose i t. T hus, A lter’s poi nt 
focuses m ore on obs erving t he w ay i n w hich s tates r eached a  poi nt t hey m ay not  ha ve l iked, 
rather t han di rectly challenges m y argument t hat s tates r eaped some b enefits f rom t he ECJ 
system as it evolved.  
Given t his r ead on t he ECJ as  a g uarantor of  contracts, we can turn to t he de mocratic 
links. I  s uggested e arlier t hat g uarantee a nd obl igation w ere t he t wo pr inciples t hat w ould be  
illuminated by this discussion of the ECJ. Guarantee is clearly a principle that developed in the 
ECJ ove r t ime, w ith i t picking up t he ne ed t o provide g uarantees of  a greed-upon t reaties a nd 
rights. N ote t hat t his g uarantor r ole ope rates a t t wo l evels, bot h of  w hich t ap i nto de mocratic 
first-order principles. On the one hand, the ECJ pursues guarantees of rights and privileges which 
the European system of law promises to the citizens of Europe. It insures that the member states 
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carry out what they owe to the people, which guided by the agreed-upon basic rights and liberties 
put forth in the treaties, play a role in securing freedom and equality for citizens of the Union.  
On t he ot her ha nd, t he ECJ pur sues a  di rect f orm of  e quality-enforcement t hrough t he 
contractual enforcement of the treaties between member states. It guarantees equal compliance, 
which f eeds i nto t he s econd pr inciple of  obl igation. T he E CJ i s uni quely s ituated t o pur sue 
equality a cross t he i nternal bor ders of  t he E U. By ov erseeing obl igations of  m ember s tates, i t 
ensures that the obligations are met throughout the Union. The rights, protections, and policies 
that apply to a Spaniard apply in the same way to a Czech. More than many institutions in the 
EU, the ECJ has a direct role in equalizing and harmonizing policy as it is  felt by the citizens. 
When a ci tizen feels un equally treated, t heir r edress c an b e f ound t hrough j udicial c hannels, 
where t he E CJ—and t he na tional c ourts be low i t—enforce t he s tandard of e quality a cross t he 
Union. 
In t his vi ew o f t he ECJ, I ha ve d emonstrated b oth a  di fferent l ook a t t he E CJ a s a n 
institution as well as the strengths of the adaptive approach at navigating the difficulties of varied 
institutional design. The flexible yet robust qualities proved invaluable here. It provides a strong 
notion of  a  w ay i n w hich t he c urrent t reaty s ystem f its de mocratic no tions ( i.e. i s e quality 
enhancing on multiple levels). The contracting parties’ situation is one particular to the EU, yet 
our discourse on the courts’ role in democracy can be applied to other instances of supranational 
courts. The role of the ECJ as guarantor of obligations and rule of law were specifically pursued. 
The a daptive a pproach s howed t he w ays t hat t he E CJ may not  f it s ome of  t he s tandard 
democratic deficit principles of democracy, yet has clear linkages to the first-order principles of 
freedom and equality.  
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Figure 11. Second-order principles and the European Court of Justice 
6.5 VIEWING TREATY AND CONSTITUTION AS DEMOCRATICALLY 
DIFFERENT 
The pr ior s ection s howed t he w ay that t he a daptive a pproach allowed u s t o f ind de mocratic 
elements inside the European Court of Justice as observed. However, I want to stress that this is 
not an absolute endorsement of the status quo o f treaty-as-contract in the European Union. The 
prior chapter discussed the fact that constitutional notions have been variously tied to democratic 
possibilities of  t he U nion. T hus, m y a rgument t hat t reaty p remised o n s tate c onceptions of  
sovereignty—with t he a ssociated not ions of  i dentity and i ndependence—may s eem to detract 
from constitutional possibilities. 
I argue t hat t he p receding a nalysis s hould not  i mpact our  j udgments a bout w hat a 
constitutional process would mean for democracy in the EU. I remain skeptical of claims that the 
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constitution provides automatic democratic legitimacy. However, that does not rule out the fact 
that ove r t ime a nd t hrough a djustment, a  c onstitutional doc ument c ould ha ve de mocratic 
qualities. Rather, I argue tha t a  s witch to a f ormal c onstitution is not  patently mor e o r le ss 
democratic in principle. The adaptive approach has found democratic qualities in the system as it 
stands, a nd t hus a  c hange t o c onstitutionalism—having ma ny tie s to the c urrent ins titutional 
make-up—would likely carry some of those principles as well as perhaps uncover new second-
order pr inciples. C alls f or constitution as a  de mocratic requirement for the  s ystem a re not  
needed. Particularized arguments from the adaptive approach about constitution would be much 
more helpful: arguments that suggest a certain second-order principle of democracy that would 
appear in a c onstitutional s ystem tha t is  a bsent in the c urrent tr eaty system. The a daptive 
approach s hows t he de mocratic qua lities pos sessed now , a nd c ould d emonstrate a lternative 
qualities that would be brought by other modes of organization.  
The ada ptive approach is uni que i n letting us  ana lyze t he d emocratic elements of  a 
system. Yet it is an approach for analysis, not a normative justification of one particular system. 
In this chapter, I argued that the current treaty system of the ECJ, whether proto constitutional or 
not, ha s one  pa rticular method of  e ncouraging equality i n t he s ystem b y relying upon s tates’ 
notions a s c ontracting s overeign pa rties. A nd t hat t ranslates t he c ourt i nto i ts g uarantor of  
equality r ole w here it a ctively me ets the  f irst-order pr inciples of  de mocracy (and t hus i n t he 
adaptive approach is a source of democracy in the EU).  
What the adaptive approach is unable to suggest i s whether a  European Constitution or 
the m aintained status q uo of s uccessive t reaties g uarded by t he E CJ is s omehow “be tter” 
normatively a nd d emocratically. T he c onstitutional not ion w ould c hange t he w ays t he s tates 
interact with the system, potentially disrupting their sovereign fictions past the point of no return. 
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But t hat i s not  n ecessarily a  ba d thing. The ad aptive a pproach would simply ne ed t o be  re-
applied t o a ny c onstitutional r egime a nd n ew ( or pe rhaps s ame) s econd-order pr inciples of  
democracy be located and explored.  
However, t he c ontrast doe s br ing out  one  i mportant poi nt. W ith a  c onstitution, the 
mindset of  s tates w ould g radually s hift f rom us together to we, a nd t hus t he s ources a nd 
pressures t hat dr ive for equal t reatment across t he union would change. If t he Union relies on 
some vestigial not ions about sovereignty to keep s tates abiding by t reaty, then we should seek 
out what mechanisms would replace those should that sovereign sense be lost. Such an inquiry 
would be well-founded with or without constitution, as the increasing togetherness of the EU is 
making it harder and harder for strict sovereignty notions to be maintained by state leaders. As 
Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002) reminded us, “Where the democratic deficit in Europe looks more 
serious, is where one imagines Europe as itself a political community, rather than a structure of 
intergovernmentalism.”150
 
 Thus, we must be mindful of the way in which the shift in perception 
away f rom s overeign f ictions w ill a ffect t he be havior of  pa rties i n t he E U—especially i n the 
unique arena of the European Court of Justice.   
 
                                                 
150 Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002). Pg. 780. 
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7.0  DAPHNE: DEMOCRACY AND THE EUROPEAN ATTAINMENT OF 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
In 1996,  t he na me M arc D utroux a nd t he hor rid de tails of  hi s c rimes s pread across 
European n ews channels l ike w ildfire. T his Belgian m an w as a rrested for ha ving ki dnapped, 
tortured, a nd s exually abused s ix g irls, f our of  w hom he  m urdered a s w ell. D utroux w as 
suggested to be linked to child prostitution rings, with testimony of gang kidnapping and assaults 
being pr ovided b y t he surviving vi ctims. A long w ith t his he inous s et of  c rimes c ame a n 
outpouring of European attention to the issues of violence, sexual exploitation, and trafficking of 
children. And from this catalyst of public opinion, the European Union achieved a community-
wide pr ogram t o pr otect w omen a nd c hildren f rom vi olence t hat r aises particular i nterest f or 
those conc erned w ith t he de mocratic na ture of  E uropean i nstitutions: the D aphne pr ogram. 
Daphne i s a  p rogram d esigned a nd f unded b y t he E uropean C ommission w ith t he e xpress 
intentions of  r educing v iolence, i ncreasing h armonization a mong E U M ember S tates a long a 
particular policy area, and protecting the most fundamental human rights of women and children. 
And Daphne serves as an interesting case of how democracy and its second order principles can 
be realized through unexpected pathways in the European Union.  
The previous cases were presented as paired chapters, yet this chapter contains the entire 
treatment of  D aphne. As m entioned i n c hapter one , t his i s de liberate. In t he cases of t he 
European P arliament ( EP) a nd t he E uropean C ourt of  J ustice ( ECJ), t hey ha d received 
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considerable t reatment i n the ex isting de mocratic de ficit l iterature. Thus, the cha pters t ook a 
necessary “their approach, my approach” sort of format.  
With Daphne, existing scholarship about the program has been either de scriptive (what 
the pr ogram doe s) or  e valuative ( whether t he pr ogram w orks). Because t here i s no existing 
literature making claims about  Daphne as democratic (or non democratic), there is no ne ed for 
the split f ormat of t he pr ior c hapters. H ere w e ha ve a r easonably cl ean slate—there a re no 
existing s tudies tha t a ttribute c ertain second-order p rinciples t o D aphne t hat ne ed t o be  
considered.   
Another di fference f rom t he pr ior c ases i s t hat na ture of  D aphne i tself. W hile pr ior 
chapters de alt w ith E uropean i nstitutions l ike t he E P, D aphne i s e ssentially a he ap of  f unding 
with a name. While particularized requirements for that funding causes the unique character of  
Daphne t o be  of  i nterest, t his i s a  di fferent s ort of  i nstitution t han t he E P, t he European 
Commission, or other foci of this project. Daphne is interesting because of the way in which the 
EU explicitly pursues a decentralized, organic structure to secure those things which are usually 
demanded to be provided in a unified, comprehensive manner: human rights.  
Given these differences, why address Daphne in the first place? Daphne provides a good 
case for the adaptive approach to democracy in a  way that other institutions do not . The pr ior 
chapters ex plored two extremes: a cas e t hat was as sumed t o be  de mocratic ( the E uropean 
Parliament) and a case that is assumed to be unrelated or tangential to democratic questions (the 
European Court of  Justice). Daphne gives us  an unexpected case to consider, where a  familiar 
democratic second-order principle, human rights, is operating in a somewhat unlikely place.  
This cha pter begins by examining t he ba sic e nvironment t hat f ormed t he i ssues a nd 
conditions that Daphne was created from. Then I detail the construction of  the Daphne project 
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itself, and the evolution that the institution has experienced in its 10-year history. Building on the 
historical account, I tease out what the intentions of Daphne’s creators were, as well as how it is 
currently e valuated b y t he E uropean C ommission and s cholars. It f ocuses on t heir m odel of  
organically c reating community-wide s imilarity in violence pr ogramming thr ough a 
decentralized process of tying purse strings to best practices. This forms the essential frame of  
reference for any democratic inquiry into the program.  
This chapter is primarily concerned with assessing Daphne as a source of  democracy in 
the European Union. Daphne’s democratic credentials are initially hidden beneath the veneer of 
its institutional design and the issues which i t confronts. Yet the adaptive democracy approach 
allows us to consider Daphne in a different light than traditional democratic appraisals. Not only 
that, but  t he adaptive d emocracy a pproach a lso pr ovides a m eans of  e scaping t he t ensions 
between the program’s intentions and its institutional design. From that discussion, the argument 
clarifies to become a question about the nature of providing universal rights. It briefly questions 
whether uni versal r ights ne ed a  s ystem of  uni versal pr ovision. P ut di fferently, c an a  di sparate 
group of NGOs working in conjunction with a common source can provide the level of human 
rights protections that a system of Europe-wide governance feels obligated to ensure? And how 
does the concern that freedom and equality require uniform and comprehensive protection affect 
our thinking? 
The ada ptive appr oach to democracy highlights the w ay t hat pur suit of  hum an r ights 
becomes the essential vi rtue of  Daphne.  The program funds projects that di rectly improve the 
lives of Europeans subjected to gendered violence, and in a way that is guided by the core ethic 
of freedom and equality. The adaptive approach, in this case, highlights a different pathway to 
the f amiliar s econd-order pr inciples. P rior c hapters w ere a bout f inding new pr inciples i n ol d 
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places. This chapter highlights a standard democratic principle—human rights—found within an 
unexpected a nd unde r-explored l ocation. D aphne i s not  be tter or  w orse t han ot her E uropean 
institutions when it comes to democracy, merely different. It is that difference adds to the milieu 
of democracy in the Union, and allows us to view Daphne as one component of democracy being 
met on the European scale.  
7.1 DAPHNE: HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
Daphne developed like many European institutions, in a gradual and evolutionary fashion. When 
talking about Daphne’s conceptualization and development, two factors are essential to consider. 
First, g lobalization a nd t he pr ocess of  e conomic i ntegration i n E urope s et t he s tage f or t he 
concerns t hat i nitially s parked D aphne’s creation. S econd, early steps t oward ge nder 
mainstreaming and the use of European-level platforms for the advancement of women’s rights 
were rapidly expanding. These increases in women’s rights planning were a transformative force 
which generated a  pr oliferation of  non -governmental or ganizations ( NGOs) t hat could e xpand 
Daphne far beyond its original motivations. Each will be considered in turn.  
Europe of the 1990s was undergoing massive economic integration. As markets opened, 
so did the f low of  t rade and commodities across borders. A full catalog o f the  benefits of  this 
integration can be  found e lsewhere. A ttention he re i s pa id t o t he more unpleasant e lements of  
economic i ntegration a nd ope nness. Illegal ope rations a nd c ommodities a lso be nefit f rom 
globalization, and the particular brand of globalization that Europe was experiencing (economic 
union) w as no e xception. O ne pa rticular c ategory of  c ommodity t hat proved a  c oncern f or 
European officials was human trafficking. From sex workers to forced prostitutes to exploitable 
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children, the oppor tunities f or c ross-border ex ploitation increased al ongside t he b eneficial 
elements of integration. Peter Mameli (2002) described the process with regard to sex workers: 
“As markets have become more open and fluid through globalization processes in the 1990s, the 
mobility of  s ex w orkers i n t he E uropean U nion ( EU) h as i ncreased dr amatically, creating a  
migrant class of sex worker that can be found operating to some degree in any EU country.”151
Citizens, politicians, and media s ources be came i ncreasingly aw are of  t hese ne w 
concerns—particularly t ransnational movements of children and exploited or  enslaved women, 
as opposed to “volunteer” migrant sex workers.
  
152 The call to do something about this arrival of 
persons who individuals felt needed protection was felt both locally and Europe-wide. National 
law enforcement became more attentive to these concerns. At the European level, steps were also 
taken. Pursuit of trafficking human beings in the EU fell to Europol in 1994 (being specifically 
delegated to the E uropol dr ugs uni t), w ith m andate of  do cumenting c ases and de veloping 
strategies to combat the rise of trafficking.153 This activity was designed to provide expertise and 
coordination t o m ember-state l aw enf orcement f or i nvestigating t hese t ypes of  cr oss-border 
concerns.154
                                                 
151 Mameli (2002). pg. 70.  
 In a ddition t o l aw e nforcement, ot her pr ojects w ere de veloped t o a ddress hum an 
trafficking and forced prostitution concerns. These initiatives include the Incentive and Exchange 
Programme f or P ersons R esponsible f or C ombating T rade i n H uman Beings a nd t he S exual 
Exploitation of  C hildren ( STOP) a s w ell a s t he T ransnational A IDS/STD P revention Among 
152 If there were no economic incentives for sex work, it is unclear how many women would volunteer for that 
vocation instead of pursuing other career paths. Thus, economic incentives could produce forced participation 
(lacking means other than one’s body to survive and make that kind of money) rather than a woman “freely” 
choosing to be a sex worker. Thus, I use the term volunteer with hesitation. It remains a useful category for 
differentiating women forced into sex work from women who made a semi-autonomous and/or justified choice to 
become a sex worker. However, I do not wish to suggest that a position on whether sex work can truly be freely 
chosen (or not) is addressed in this study.  
153 Mameli (2002). pg. 71. 
154 Ibid. pg. 73.  
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Migrant Prostitutes i n Europe P roject (TAMPEP).155
At t he s ame t ime of  t hese i ncreased concerns about  t he m obility of t hreatened or 
exploited individuals, efforts to secure the rights of women were being pursued on the European 
stage. As t he de velopment of  t he Treaty o f A msterdam continued, gender m ainstreaming w as 
being promoted as a practice which could change EU and Member State law to better respond to 
the pr otection of  w omen’s r ights, pa rticularly i n economic e ndeavors. Likewise, gender rights 
advocacy groups were increasingly looking across borders and to the European Community to 
generate cha nge. NGOs r esponded to the i ncreased integration of  t he Union b y m aking t he 
European level a focus of their efforts in addition to local, regional, and state-based endeavors.  
 In a ll, t he European Union seemed to be 
taking cross-border trafficking and protection seriously when Daphne was conceived.  
From this background, the push to Daphne began with public outcry against heinous acts 
of vi olence a nd exploitation t hat ha d be en a ppearing i n t he n ews. M any point t o t he B elgian 
“Dutroux a ffair” as an  essential m otivator o f ear ly public con cern which helped mot ivate 
Daphne’s s tart.156
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 Following t hese e vents, E uropean m eetings be gan t o be  held t o a ddress t he 
concerns raised. One of  these me etings, the S tockholm C ongress against C ommercial S exual 
Exploitation of Children began the process that would end in Daphne. The Stockholm Congress 
was es sentially an informational and awareness-raising event, designed to disseminate da ta on  
the threat of  c ommercial s exual e xploitation. In response t o t he m eeting, t he E uropean U nion 
held i ts ow n m eeting o n A pril 11, 1997. T he meeting consisted of  30  N GO r epresentatives, 
European Parliamentarians, Commission members, and a number of law-enforcement officials. 
Their goal was to address the problematic statistics about sexual and gendered violence raised by 
156 European Commission (2003). pg. 9.  
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the S tockholm C ongress.157 The E uropean C ommission f elt t hat t he 1997 m eeting b egan a  
process of  t hinking “ how E uropean-level coop eration and exchange could f unction a nd w here 
the f ocus o f e fforts s hould be  pl aced.”158 Following thi s me eting, the  E uropean Commission 
quickly began i ts own actions to combat gendered violence and exploitation through a process 
that they dubbed “the Daphne Initiative.”159
The C ommission de scribed D aphne’s i nitial s tructure and pur pose a s a  m eans o f 
collaboration on projects to address and advise methods of dealing with the types of violence that 
the April meeting discussed. The Daphne Initiative was “attached to the Commission’s services 
in charge of justice and home affairs and fundamental rights, this one year funding line would be 
used to support modest projects (up to ECU 100,000 in the first year) that would bring together 
NGOs f rom at  l east t wo Member S tates t o cooperate in research, data c ollection and analysis, 
good pr actice i dentification and sharing, t raining, exchange and ne tworking, awareness-raising 
and information campaigns, di rect action to support victims of  violence, and the production of  
tools f or pol icy and pr actice, s uch a s guidelines a nd pr otocols.”
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While Daphne was bo rn in response to the commercial s exual exploitation of  children, 
the initiative’s focus was quickly expanded. When 1999 was declared the European Year Against 
Violence Against Women, Daphne’s efforts expanded to include a Union-wide zero-tolerance for 
violence against women (modeled after a  highly successful Scottish zero-tolerance ini tiative in 
 With thi s s tructure a nd 
funding in place, Daphne began funding projects almost immediately. 
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158 Ibid. pg. 5-6. 
159 The name Daphne comes from Greek mythology, where a woman escaped Apollo’s desire to rape her by 
transforming herself into a tree.  
160 European Commission (2003). pg. 6. Note that Daphne has a number of distinct phases. This statement refers to 
the Daphne Initiative, not to be confused with the phases of the Daphne Program that would follow.  
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1992).161 This s witch a nd/or e xpansion of  D aphne be came c haracteristic, a s i t qui ckly 
incorporated a  much h eavier focus on  women’s r ights. The European Commission felt t hat a s 
Europe heightened its awareness of migration and women’s rights, Daphne funding lines moved 
from protection of sexual exploitation of children to fill those areas as well.162
The s uccess of  t he i nitial D aphne i nitiative be came c lear as 1998 a nd 1999 s aw i t 
renewed with increased budgets. From this platform, Daphne was transformed into a continuing 
program of the Union. Expressly linking to the Union’s public health actions (citing Article 152 
of t he A msterdam T reaty), t he E uropean C ommission e stablished t he D aphne pr ogram a s t he 
successor to the Daphne initiative.
 
163 The first Daphne program was funded for 2000-2003 (with 
total funding of 20 m illion Euros), and had its mandate extended to cover regional cooperation 
with candidate Member States in Eastern Europe and Turkey.164
Not everything has b een smooth sailing, however. Expansion to fund p rojects be tween 
Member State-based and candidate country-based groups proved to be a complication with the 
Daphne program. Daphne found need to streamline proposals with the steps that the candidates 
were t aking, as E U-funded pr ogramming ha d t o be  i n l ine w ith t he di plomatic pr ogression.
 Daphne II followed as a second 
phase measure, with an increased budget (50 million Euros) for 2004-2008. Daphne III is already 
under planning and discussion today. The environment of women’s rights NGOs and the climate 
for these programs seeking support at the European level caused much of this exponential growth 
for Daphne.  
165
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While such cross-national endeavors have always remained at the core of Daphne, the timing and 
162 European Commission (2003). pg. 13. 
163 Appelt and Kaselitz (2000). pg. 4.  
164 European Commission (2003). pg. 6.  
165 Ibid. pg. 15.  
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politics of  i ncluding N GOs a nd government a gencies from non -Member S tate count ries 
generated clear limitations on what sort of projects could be funded, and which needed to change 
their focus or  method. With the expanded EU today, this concern is lessened as many projects 
find that their candidate country partners are now Member State partners. However, opportunity 
remains for interaction with groups exterior to the Union.  
Having established the history and development of Daphne, what remains essential to my 
endeavor i s to question the purpose and intentions of  Daphne. Initially, it was perceived as an  
answer t o a  c oncern a bout a  pa rticular c lass o f a ctivities t hat t he pe ople of  E urope f ound 
despicable. Yet as  D aphne ex panded, it be came cl ear t hat de eper t ouchstone pr inciples w ere 
motivating its actions and continuation.  
The purpose that Europeans placed with Daphne is harder to tease out, especially because 
different people ascribe different purposes. Yet some commonalities can  be i solated. I identify 
three main purposes that are identified both by members of the EU itself as well as other outside 
observers j udging t he i ntentions of  D aphne. T hey are a  de sire t o pr otect a gainst a ll f orms of  
violence, t he g oal of  c oncerted a ction a nd ha rmonization, a nd a  E uropean-level s ense of  
responsibility for human rights. 
Daphne is a  project that i s s teeped in concern with violence in all forms. Daphne grew 
out of initial children’s protection roots, recognizing that violence against children and violence 
against w omen a re s ignificantly connected. From da y one, t he f ace o f Daphne’s foe h as be en 
violence against those who are viewed as likely to be exploited. Interestingly, this concern with 
violence qui ckly be came m ore t han j ust a  w orry about pr otection f rom ph ysical ha rm. T he 
European C ommission ha s i ncluded ps ychological vi olence alongside ph ysical vi olence in its 
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protections and definitions of violence.166 Psychological violence became the issue because of its 
centrality i n t he ne xus be tween vi olence a gainst w omen a nd vi olence a gainst c hildren. 
Participants in Daphne r ecognized the commonalities be tween these forms, and thus moved to 
address t hem. E ven U nion f orums ha ve r ecognized t hat t hey ha ve a  r ole t o pl ay i n pr otecting 
against this type of violence. EU institutions, especially the European Parliament, have increased 
their view of psychological violence being a harm that disproportionately affects women in the 
economic ar ena.167
The other purposes of Daphne come bundled with the attention to violence and the roots 
of t he d ebate i n t he e ffects of  globalization. V iolence b ecomes a n i ssue that s pans bor ders o f 
Europe. D iscussion a nd C ommission doc uments ha ve e mphasized t he r ole t hat c ooperative 
action and harmonization play in the purpose of  Daphne. Anita Gradin was the Commissioner 
whose por tfolio i ncluded e fforts t o p revent t rafficking and e xploitation of  c hildren when t he 
Daphne Initiative was produced. She clearly expressed that the European Commission respected 
the Stockholm Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children’s assessment that 
this problem required concerted international, regional, and local action, and that the EU had a 
“responsibility” to participate in that “concerted action.”
 Daphne s ymbolizes E urope’s concern t hat vi olence af fects qu ality o f l ife 
(health, economic, and in abstract), and thus the desire to combat violence has remained essential 
to the Daphne agenda.  
168 Likewise, harmonization of law was 
stressed by all pa rties in the cr eation of D aphne, a f actor w hich the C ommission clearly 
understood a s a  g oal f or t he pr oject.169
                                                 
166 Ferrari (2004). pg. 8.  
 The pur pose di stills i nto t he belief t hat t he E urozone 
167 Ibid. pg. 4.  
168 European Commission (2003). pg. 5. 
169 Ibid. pg. 6.  
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should conduct a common effort against the problem of gendered violence and violence against 
children.  
That common effort becomes further apparent as the language of human rights becomes 
clear in Daphne literature and programming. Daphne’s focus on violence placed it in two areas 
of European-level concern: health and human rights. It found its initial home in the public health 
realm, but  t he c reators of  D aphne a lso s tressed t he l inkage t o hum an r ights. T he de cision t o 
establish the Daphne program for 2000-2003 included explicit usage of rights-based language to 
justify the creation of Daphne, calling for “the right to life, safety, freedom, dignity and physical 
and e motional i ntegrity.”170
This t hree-fold pur pose of  combating vi olence, ha rmonization, a nd p rotecting hum an 
rights of  a ll those inside European borders becomes particularly interesting when compared to 
the mechanics of how Daphne actually works to accomplish those goals. The following section 
concerns i tself w ith t he “ how” of  D aphne’s op eration. It a lso be gins t o e ngage t he l ooming 
question t hat r emains a bout D aphne. W hy do w e ge t D aphne—a p articularized, decentralized, 
and multi-form practice—as a response when the purpose includes goals that nominally suggest 
comprehensiveness and overarching legislation, perhaps at a Europe-wide level? Some European 
traditions, particularly Sweden’s, may begin to explain the shape of Daphne by citing views that 
the state has an obligation for funding groups engaging in public awareness campaigns and other 
 This language has s erved as a cons istent reminder t o t he 
Commission a nd t o D aphne pa rticipants t hat t he pur pose of  t hese a ctivities i s t o e nsure t he 
protection of rights. Daphne is consistently articulated as a Union activity designed to explicitly 
protect a nd pr omote hu man r ights. T his pur pose c an be  unde rstated w ith t he s trong f ocus on  
violence, yet human rights are clearly a strong motivator for the program.  
                                                 
170 Ibid. pg. 19.  
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costly yet c ommunity-improving e ndeavors.171
7.2 DAPHNE IN PRACTICE 
 This i s t he s tandard l ine t hat e xplanations f or 
“why Daphne i n t his f ashion” r eceive. Y et t he que stion r emains w hy t he pr ocedure doe s not  
initially s eem to fit the  pur pose—why doe s a program de signed t o ensure uni versal rights 
manifest in a particular and localized manner.  
This section explores the method by which the Daphne Initiative and Programs work, to set the 
stage f or how  t he f eatures of  t his pr actice c an be  unde rstood i n t he c ontext of  t he pur pose 
ascribed to Daphne. By showing the nature of Daphne, we can get a sense for how well it may be 
meeting the purposes invested in it—a question of effectiveness. The crux of the objection from 
before was that the purposes do not  match the nature in abstract, so i t i s important to see how 
those purposes are supposed to be met with the system as it is . Can the bottom-up structure of 
Daphne a ctually me et th e g oals tha t it s ets f or it self? After pr oviding a  brief a nalysis of  how  
Daphne works, this section will address the prevailing judgments of scholars on the benefits and 
flaws of  t he D aphne m odel of  pur suing vi olence r eduction, ha rmonization a cross t he E U, a nd 
protection of human rights.  
Daphne is a framework of oversight and funding for disparate projects operated by local 
authorities, volunteers, and NGOs. Applications are submitted by groups in search of funding to 
conduct projects to reduce violence against women or children. These applications are evaluated, 
with those f unded be ing accepted be cause t hey meet t he criteria t hat t he cr eators of  Daphne, 
                                                 
171 Appelt and Kaselitz (2000). pg. 10. 
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essentially the European Commission, have set. Daphne selection criteria include the basics of  
all g ood f unding pr oposals s uch as i nnovation, cost e ffectiveness, a nd t he pr omotion of  b est 
practices.  
In addition, two particular selection criteria should be noted. The Commission asks that 
proposals also include transnational exchanges and provide “added value at the European Union 
level.”172 With the se, the intentions s eem c lear. D aphne i s i ntentionally a rranged t o ha ve i ts 
funded e fforts work across the internal borders of the Union. These may either be in terms of  
populations s erved b y t he pr oject or  i n t erms of  i ncreased unde rstanding of  vi olence a gainst 
women a nd c hildren a s a  c ross-border phe nomenon. “European-ness” has de veloped i nto a n 
explicit r equirement f or s election, as the  C ommission explicitly r ecognized that is olated local 
work alone was not the intention of this endeavor.173
In Daphne’s 10 years o f e volution, t he pr ogram ha s de veloped a p articular for m o f 
oversight in addition to simply providing a t rans-national source of  funding. As the reports on 
successes and f ailures of f unded i nitiatives w ere reported t o t he C ommission, t he D aphne 
institution effectively l earned f rom i ts mistakes. Later in the Daphne process, the Commission 
began articulating i ts ow n role i n t his l earning p rocess. Looking at t he s uccess o f t he Daphne 
initiative and programs, the Commission suggested that their role was one of a disseminator of 
good practices. Their intention is that good practices filter upward and are shared thanks to the 
unique exchange and funding structure of Daphne.
  
174
                                                 
172 European Commission (2003). pg. 10. 
 In effect, Daphne has realized that it can be 
essential to a flow of inventive and effective ideas and practices. This is the source of the “good 
practices” moniker that dominates literature on the subject. Encouraging good practices, in this 
173 Ibid. pg. 16.  
174 Ibid. pg. 8.  
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institutional us age, r efer t o a  pa rticularized c hain of  i nstitutional l earning. D aphne b egins 
collecting a nd correlating good pr actices w hich i n t urn be come guidelines f or funding 
disseminated to groups who are seeking funding.175
Good practices are not the only thing that the Daphne system develops. The development 
of a “D aphne language” was also recognized among program participant interactions.
 Thus, no centralized set of procedures exists 
for how the European Union should approach gendered violence, yet the Commission and some 
practitioners feel that harmonization can occur. As more groups compete for Daphne funding, so 
more groups learn the “good practices” that a re required for a  group to gain that funding, and 
thus similar tactics and approaches are promoted across the Union. Yet this method avoids the 
difficulty of starting from an initial idealized format for how practice must be conducted. Instead, 
it is organic and developmental. The learning process creates a web of common protection that is 
sustained without explicit common law and common activity.  
176
According t o s ome s cholars, D aphne ha s a lso ha d a n i mpact on l egislation, de spite 
hurdles t o t hat pr ocess. D aphne i nitially f ound i ts a ction pur posefully r emoved f rom pol icy 
change and legislative activity.
 These 
shared unde rstandings of i ssues a nd t erminology be came e ssential t o t he w ork, a s g roups 
recognized that harmonizing begins with shared nomenclature: when someone says “violence,” 
“vulnerability,” or  “ human rights” it is  essential tha t the  me aning is  the  s ame. This lin guistic 
bridging of borders and cultures is an essential triumph that many in the Daphne program tout as 
displaying the transnational effectiveness of the Daphne system. 
177
                                                 
175 Ibid. pg. 49.  
 Yet the Commission recognizes that the initiative has inspired 
some pol icy c hanges. Programs f unded b y D aphne gained s upport f rom l ocal g overnance 
176 Ibid. pg. 16-17.  
177 Ibid. pg. 47. 
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agencies merely through having the decisiveness of  the “European Commission” label.178
 
Figure 12. Policy influenced by Daphne, according to the Commission
 And 
linkages t o government a re not  the onl y means of  changing pol icy. The pol icy and l egislation 
that the Commission identifies as linked to or inspired by Daphne is numerous and varied.  
179
 
 
Member-states have al so acted on their own to combat violence against women dur ing 
the l ifespan of  t he D aphne pr ogram, i ncluding A ustria’s Protection from Violence Act (1997), 
Sweden’s Gross Violation of a Woman’s Integrity legislation ( 1998), and t he U K’s Living 
Without Fear – An Integrated Approach to Tackling Violence Against Women strategy (1999).180
                                                 
178 Ibid. pg. 14.  
 
All of these developments have been linked to Daphne in some measure. Yet this accolade can 
be pr oblematic. D aphne’s c ausal r elationship t o s uch pr ograms m ust be  a ssessed pr ior 
celebrating the ability of Daphne to drive legislative change.  
179 European Commission (2003). pg. 48. Note that the Commission is quick to place limitations on just how much 
legislation Daphne affected. This list includes items where Daphne caused “promotion of the circumstances favoring 
legislative/regulatory change.” Daphne remains consistently more effective when describing the real gains that its 
funded initiatives and organizations have made in individual lives.  
180 Appelt and Kaselitz (2000). pg. 27-35. 
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The Daphne project is not all accolades, however. A number of scholars have pointed out 
the l imitations and drawbacks t o t he current s ystem of  violence reduction, ha rmonization, and 
human rights protection. For many, the main flaw in European prevention of violence is a lack of 
comprehensiveness.181 Daphne s uffers t his ba rb a s w ell. D espite D aphne’s s ystem of  
encouraging best practices, it is often viewed that too many people slip through the cracks. If no 
NGOs or  agencies from a Member S tate apply t o Daphne in a given year, then the threatened 
people of  t hat s tate w ould f ind t hemselves l acking. C omprehensiveness a lso s uffers t hrough 
differential impl ementation from M ember S tates. Violence in specific s tructures s uch as t he 
workplace s how di fferences i n na tional e nforcement a nd r esponse ve ry c learly. E uropean 
response t o g ender-based ha rassment ( including bul lying a nd “ mobbing”) i s va ried t hanks t o 
differences between member-state implementation. States have shown differences in attitude as 
well a s pr ocedure f or i mplementing pr otections of  w omen i n t he w orkplace, va rying f rom 
generating specific new legislation to widening scopes of existing protections or non-legislative 
measures such as promoting workplace codes of conduct.182 Member states that pursued specific 
new legislation to protect against gendered bullying in the workplace include France, Belgium, 
Denmark, F inland, S weden a nd t he N etherlands. O ther m ember-states, i ncluding Ireland, t he 
UK, Germany and Spain, chose a different strategy. They concluded that entirely new legislation 
was not  n eeded f or c oncerns about non -violent harassment, i nstead opt ing for e xpanding t he 
scope of existing protections.183
Another c omplaint i s t hat D aphne’s response t o vi olence is not  di rect e nough. D aphne 
projects a re accused of  only t ouching t he e dges of  t he pr oblem. V iolence i s s uch a  pe rvasive 
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problem that money and discussion forums alone do not  suffice for many observers. For them, 
protection r equires m ore t han j ust D aphne, needing a  le gislative ba cking of  puni tive la ws in  
addition t o t he s upport of fered b y D aphne-funded pr ogramming.184 European vi olence 
prevention pr ograms of ten a ddress onl y s econdary s ources of  vi olence, r ather t han t he s ocial 
structures that are “primary” sources of  violence.185 Yet primary sources are difficult to tackle, 
being the s orts o f thi ngs ide ntified as th e e ssential c ultural a nd s ocial modes of  or ganization 
themselves—radical upheavals of social order that have long been identified by feminist thinkers 
yet continue to prove distasteful to the r uling power e lites ( male a nd female) o f pol itical 
systems.186 To the extent that violence is part of the system itself, then systemic change (state-
level or  hi gher) i s ne eded. F or s cholars l ike Appelt a nd K aselitz ( 2000) c easing gendered 
violence must become the essential concern of governments, as that is the only reason that “far-
reaching changes in state structures [can] commence.”187
Finally, t here are t he European C ommission’s ow n j udgments of  D aphne t o c onsider. 
While la rgely pos itive, the C ommission ha s no ted some limita tions to  the  e ffectiveness of  
Daphne. M ost not ably, t hey remain c oncerned t hat some t ransnational p artnerships are tokens 
simply to meet the Daphne criteria.
  
188
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 Token partners would lead to a very hollow harmonization 
through the best practices model, as exchanges would not be leading to a change in all countries. 
Yet t he C ommission ha s not  t aken up t he s lack i n pur suing ot her m odes of  ha rmonizing t he 
prevention of gendered violence, modes that would deviate from the contracted-style procedure 
of D aphne’s f unding t o g enerate good pr actices. T he C ommission consistently d eflects 
185 Ibid. pg. 8. 
186 Ibid. pg. 6.  
187 Ibid. pg. 11. 
188 European Commission (2003). pg. 13. 
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discussion of stronger harmonization, instead citing technical difficulties such as the inability to 
form a  s ingle t elephone vi olence he lpline t hat c ould s pan t he e ntire C ommunity.189 Yet the y 
clearly recognize that Daphne developed a  community who felt that the program should move 
from short-term funding opportunities to, in their words, “a comprehensive response to this EU-
wide problem.”190
7.3 DEMOCRACY AND “BOTTOM-UP” PROTECTION  
 
The pr ior s ection d etailed t he va ried r esponses t o D aphne a nd i ts ability t o m eet i ts goals o f 
comprehensive coverage of  protection f rom gendered violence. Yet for t he adaptive approach, 
questions r emain. M y q uestion i s l ess a bout e ffectiveness t han about m aking a  de mocratic 
analysis. Daphne is designed at promoting protections against gendered violence, a component of 
human r ights p rotections. B efore di ving i nto t he a daptive approach, one c oncern ne eds t o be  
raised. A s w as di scussed i n t he pr ior s ections, D aphne’s s tructure i s one  of  “ bottom-up” 
protection: a llowing l ocal g roups t o c ompete f or f unding t o pr otect t he vi ctims of  g endered 
violence a s i t i s oc curring i n t heir ow n c ommunities, i n w ays t hat va ry across t he di fferent 
groups. I ha ve argued t hat t his pr otection i s one  m eans b y w hich t he E uropean c ommunity i s 
working to protect the human rights of Europeans. Yet that hides a subtle tension when it comes 
to t he que stion o f de mocracy: doe s bot tom-up protection f it w ith freedom a nd e quality, t wo 
values that are universal requirements of democracy? 
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 There i s a s ense t hat b ecause f reedom and equality ar e uni versal r equirements t hat 
institutions that access these principles must themselves be uniform or comprehensive. At least 
in terms of the bounded polis, democratic institutions have often been described as reaching all 
citizens. Suffrage movements, voting expansions, and the removal of barriers to voting (i.e. poll 
taxes) w ere al l con ducted i n t he na mes of  expanding t he uni versality o f c itizenship f or 
democracy w ithin a bou nded/territorial s ystem. How c an t he requirements of  c omprehensive 
protection be reconciled with an institution whose entire approach is a bottom-up procedure of  
localized, subsidiary, and varying protections?  
The C ommission’s ow n de scriptions of  Daphne’s m andate com plicate m atters. As 
discussed before, they feel that common t reatment and protection from violence is owed to all 
within t he E uropean U nion w ho a re or  m ay b e t hreatened. Yet D aphne r emains t he p rimary 
European-level vehicle for ensuring that common treatment. And Daphne’s nature and resultant 
programs a re a nything b ut c ommon. D aphne r emains a  s ystem of  f unding l ocalized e fforts t o 
combat specific patterns of violence in specific and limited target subsections of the Union. The 
Commission can comment about the shared learning going on, but  the skeptic will point to the 
limitations of the program.  
In particular, the conceptual sticking point with Daphne seems to be that its language and 
intentions be tray a  uni versal-leaning goal f or t he pr otection of  hum an r ights t hrough l imiting 
violence. Y et t he pr ogram r emains not ably s pecific, c ompartmentalized, a nd l ocalized. T he 
problem comes with envisioning alternatives to Daphne, and treading the waters of what ideal-
form s olutions c an be  r eached r egarding hum an r ights a s pr otection f rom vi olence. If hum an 
rights do m atter t o t he E uropean U nion, t hen w e m ay b egin t o a pply a n e xternal s tandard of  
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judgment t o t he i ssue. The pr ocess m ay s tart f rom t he nor mative s ide, c onsidering t he i deal 
manner of providing human rights protections against violence. 
Human rights claims often carry a component of universality to the argument, evident in 
their name alone. Thus, ideal practices for protecting of  human r ights funnel down the path of  
thinking that measures must be taken that apply to all—the uniform and comprehensive access to 
freedom and equality co ncern. It m ay come t o a ddress a  s ubset o f t hose w ho ne ed p rotection 
from a specific problem, but the emphasis remains one of ensuring that all are nominally under 
the protections of the program. This leads to a basic proclivity within the normative framework 
of hum an r ights—the default s etting s eems to lean toward an all-covered approach t o 
governance. This is not  a necessity of human r ights thinking, merely a tendency that can arise 
naturally due t o t he n ature of  t he a rgument. A nd f rom a n all-covered position, i t i s not  t oo 
difficult to see that appeal may be s trongest for institutions and procedures that protect human 
rights from a top-down, universal coverage standpoint.  
While my nuanced account of Daphne has some room for seeing signs of some top-down 
elements, Daphne’s nature remains stringently a bottom-up, grass roots, incomplete patchwork of 
coverage. In a  given funding c ycle, some member s tates may receive the a ttention of  multiple 
initiatives, while others have no Daphne funded programs accepted. This gains more complexity 
with the European Union’s goal of harmonizing procedures across states. While other protections 
that have been linked to economics have been instituted from the top down, protections against 
gendered violence—with t heir enormous and recognized impacts on e conomic pa rticipation of  
women—remain differential a cross t he Union.191
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 These di fferentials may l ead t o further 
questions of  Daphne’s e ffectiveness a t f ulfilling i ts g oal of  s ecuring hum an r ights t hrough 
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protecting a gainst vi olence, e specially i f t he assumption i s t hat c omprehensive and uni form 
coverage is the proper method for such protection.  
The first reminder, as always with the adaptive approach to democracy, is to ask whether 
these concerns s tem f rom s tate-derived views of  democracy. Is uni form application of  r ights a  
concern i n t he case of  t he E U, o r a  c oncern t hat a rose f rom bounde d, territorial s overeignty 
conceptions? T he a daptive a pproach t o de mocracy allows f or t he r elaxation of  s ome of  t hese 
worries. While the y ma y have or igins in the te rritoriality of  the  s tate s ystem, concerns a bout 
universality of  coverage c an be  c omponents f or s ome e xpressions of  de mocracy. A daptive 
democracy a llows us  t o di sentangle t he not ion somewhat b y a llowing f or ot her s econd or der 
principles to do the work with certain cases. For some institutions, universality may be a central 
concern. Yet the adaptive approach to democracy reminds us  that i t need not  be central to our 
conceptions of the Daphne program’s democratic nature. Particularly in the case of the EU where 
there are multiple layers of human rights protections in place. A citizen is not relying upon t he 
EU alone for their r ight to f reedom from gendered violence. They also deserve that protection 
from their state.  
The flexibility of the adaptive approach means that we need not get stuck on the fact that 
not e very l ocality will ha ve t he s ame ex act pr otections vi a t he D aphne pr ogram. In a ddition, 
bottom-up or concentric circles of human rights protections may also be judged to work better if 
we me rely s hift our  r equirements f or w hat “working b etter” me ans. Practical impl ementation 
yields da ta t hat i s ha rd t o i gnore: D aphne ha s made a  pos itive i mpact i n t he l ives of  w omen 
across t he E uropean U nion. It m ay not  be  all women, a nd i t m ay not  be  conducted t hrough 
universally available conduits, but individuals have benefitted from the program.  
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In the following section, I use the adaptive approach to consider the Daphne program. We 
can get a r ead on  D aphne a nd what i t br ings t o t he U nion t hrough t he adaptive a pproach t o 
democracy. Instead of  being hun g upon not ions of  uni formity—or a ny ot her complicating 
factors—the adaptive approach to democracy avoids the problem of  vi ewing Daphne solely in 
terms of its success or failure at accomplishing its institutional goals. Instead, it approaches the 
question of whether Daphne provides a source of democracy to the Union. This in turn gives us 
insight into what Daphne does—in particular what is novel about the Daphne program—which 
gives a better evaluative point for those wishing to appraise the practice to begin from. 
7.4 THE ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY AND DAPHNE 
This section engages in the adaptive approach to examine the democratic nature of the Daphne 
program. As should be familiar by now, the central ethos of the adaptive approach to democracy 
is that it can be flexible and robust. The adaptive approach, when applied to Daphne, can account 
for t he c omplex a nd un usual na ture of  t he p ractice. A t t he s ame t ime, the a daptive a pproach 
provides t he nor mative power t o de monstrate t hat t he D aphne p rogram a dds a  l ayer—albeit 
different i n appearance—to the de mocratic n ature of  t he E uropean U nion s ystem a s a w hole. 
This section begins by applying the adaptive approach to democracy in the manner developed in 
chapter t wo.  I a ddress s econd-order pr inciples t hat a re bot h pr esent a nd a bsent w ith D aphne. 
Through the adaptive approach examination of Daphne is freed from any universalist drives, as 
they are merely second (or third) order principles which need not be present in all expressions of 
democracy.  
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The adaptive approach to democracy frees us from the need to feel that every principle is 
necessary at onc e t o t hink a bout a n i nstitution or pr actice a s a  s ource of  de mocracy. S econd-
order principles can be mutable or unique in new circumstances. And the adaptive approach to 
democracy begins with inquiry into the second-order principles at work in Daphne.  
 
Figure 13. Second-order principles and the Daphne program 
 
The Daphne program is notably different than the other institutions that my project has 
dealt with. At the very least, it has far fewer functions that the European Parliament, the Council 
of Ministers, or the European Court of Justice. It does not meet many prima facie tests of what 
democratic institutions have looked like in the past. Because of this difference in form, starting 
with the second-order principles that are less useful in the Daphne case seems appropriate. After 
establishing what Daphne is not, then I will turn to what Daphne is with respect to second-order 
principles of democracy. 
Non-electoral and not participatory i n an y usual f ashion, D aphne i s a centrally-
administered l ine of  f unding f or s pecific p rojects c ontrolled b y t he C ommission. M any of  t he 
familiar second-order principles of democracy that have been mentioned in prior chapters do not 
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fit the Daphne case at  al l: rule of  law, contact be tween citizen and governance, toleration, and 
protection ( in t he m anner of  M adison) are not  a  part of  t he Daphne l andscape. In t he c ase o f 
certain other second-order principles—participation, discourse, accountability, transparency, and 
contestation—Daphne also fails to meet the general criteria. Yet with these principles, what it is 
not doing can be equally valuable to explore as what it is doing. Thus, I will explore each in turn.  
Participation and Discourse: Daphne pr oves i nteresting w ith respect t o these, because 
the program does have strong channels of communication and feedback that are important to its 
democratic potential. Yet the basic criteria of participation and discourse as usually given are not 
fulfilled. Instead, Daphne is doing something that can be viewed similar to these two principles, 
but does not exactly rely upon e ither of them. Participation is neither the reason nor the vehicle 
for D aphne. T he i ntention i s not  i nvolvement o f c itizens i n t he de cision-making tha t e ffects 
them, nor is it a means of allowing citizens to develop and build their civic skills (a goal certain 
strains of participation theory hold in high esteem). NGOs and researchers submit proposals and 
network f or f unding a nd pr ogrammatic pur poses, not  t o de velop a nd e nhance t he c ommunity 
process. C ertainly s ome i nfluence t hrough p articipation of  f unding-seeking a gents oc curs, but  
this is a by-product of the system rather than the goal itself.  
The same holds true for discourse. Certainly a discourse occurs in the space between the 
commission deciding on “good practices” and organizations generating programs and adapting to 
the g ood pr actices s temming f rom p rior r ounds of  D aphne f unding. H owever, I i ntentionally 
stress the lower-case usage of  di scourse. This i s not Discourse writ l arge in the manner of  the 
discursive theories of Habermas and Dryzek. It is merely a process of exchanged communication 
with a learning element. Funding seekers interacting with each other and the Commission do not 
approximate s ome nor matively empowering s peech community no r f ollow a  s et of  pr oductive 
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rules of  e ngagement and di alog. T he good pr actices a pproach o f t he Commission i s qu ite 
interesting, and the implications of the procedure for democracy will be explored more fully later 
in this section. But the good practices approach does not replicate discourse or participation. 
Accountability and Transparency: I l ump t hese t wo s econd-order pr inciples t ogether 
because each seeks to realize the first-order principles of freedom and equality in similar ways. 
Yet ne ither of  t hese i s pr esent i n D aphne i n a  de mocratic s ense. D aphne i s not  a  s ystem of  
keeping government a buses i n c heck, or  of  ke eping pol icy-makers at tached to citizen interest. 
The C ommission, how ever, i s i nvested i n uph olding t he pr inciples o f a ccountability a nd 
transparency. T hus t he focus he re on D aphne as i ts ow n i nstitutional pr actice m akes t hese 
principles an issue. The Commission itself is careful to monitor the Daphne program, publish the 
funding r ecords and a nnual r eviews, a nd pr essure pa rticipating f unded or ganizations a nd 
researchers to do the same. Yet this fits into the Commission’s practices, not Daphne alone. Thus 
attributing a ny accountability or  t ransparency assurances t o D aphne i s gi ving t he c redit t o t he 
wrong institution.  
Contestation: Contestation in the manner of Schumpeter or Dahl—electoral competition 
or e lite c ompetition for pos ition—is c ertainly n ot pr esent w ithin D aphne. Y et a ctors s eeking 
Daphne f unding do compete. A nd f urthermore, t hat c ompetition i s ha rvested t o i mprove t he 
outcomes of future programs and the initiative in general. Thus classical democratic contestation 
can be ruled out, but an alternative notion of contestation will be revisited below.  
The interesting thing with the selected second-order principles that are less useful when 
considering D aphne i s t hat t heir be nefits a re s omewhat pr ovided, but  vi a a  di fferent pa thway. 
Through i ts “ good practices” m echanism, Daphne doe s yield some b enefits t hat di scourse can 
bring to democracy. The mechanism is one of refinement through involvement, repetition, trial, 
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and error. Discourse is helpful to democracy by refining the values of voters into more agreeable 
central ethics for how governance should proceed. The Commission’s promotion of  internally-
learned good practices is a s imilar source of refinement. Yes, the process is guided by the aims 
and analysis of the Commission. However, ideas about how to best promote the human rights of 
those threatened by gendered violence do c hange and develop. As the ideas transfer from agent 
to institution and back to future applicant agents, a  r efining process occurs. Good practices of  
one or ganization be come r equirements s ought f rom ot hers. T here i s a  n otable or ganic feel t o 
this—the Commission guides a controlled evolution of the Union’s practices through Daphne.  
This is a form of discourse and contestation. The good practices mandate and its effect on 
the f unding of  f uture D aphne pr ograms f orms a new contestation of s orts. It is  ins titutional 
learning and value transmission, but it also forms a struggle of ideas about what is best for the 
community. Like J .S. Mill’s c lassic not ion of  c ompeting i deas i n t he publ ic s pace, D aphne 
provides a financial incentive that generates a similar contestation of ideas for the title of good 
practice. The Commission serves as a guiding hand and the arbiter of prevailing opinion, and the 
system has less spoken than discourse theorists may wish, but the pathway taps into the goals of 
the Commission: to discover and implement the best approach to gendered violence policy via a 
decentralized system of practice (value) transmission.  
Having considered what is not present with Daphne (or what is present but different), I 
now turn to the second-order principles of democracy that can be seen in Daphne. A concern for 
human rights is definitely present. Difficulties of earlier sections aside, Daphne certainly pursues 
human r ights r egardless of  how  w e m ight j udge t he out comes of  t hat pursuit. A nd i t i s that 
pursuit that serves as the essential criterion to notice. Institutions may spawn from documents, 
treaties, a nd c onstitutions t hat pr omise or  g uarantee hum an rights. Y et t he t ransition f rom 
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principle to institution is  never exact—every institution in the world t hat cares about ensuring 
human rights could do a far better job than they have done. What we care about with institutions 
is that they have the commitment to human rights. There needs to be a sense of striving to realize 
human rights that stems from the institution—a sign that the institution will continue to evolve, 
change, and push for the principles it was created to ensure.  
Human rights are anot her s econd-order pr inciple e mbodied i n Daphne. T he m otivation 
behind D aphne’s c oncern w ith pr otection a gainst g endered vi olence i s n ot s ome pa ternalistic 
notion of  pr otecting t he w eak. Instead, vi olence i s a bhorred be cause i t degrades i ndividuals’ 
abilities to live the full life guaranteed to them by their system of governance (both member state 
and supranational, thanks to the EU’s use and reference to human rights in its treaties). Thus, the 
basic principles of  freedom and equality are accessed when people are not denied their human 
rights. It can also be stated in the positive: we can observe freedom and equality in a system to 
the extent that people enjoy their human rights.  
Daphne, as an institution, is arranged in a way to increase the ability of European citizens 
to see that all of their human rights are met. The program itself is not a human right. Rather, its 
funding i s C ommissions’ m ethod o f s upplementing existing pr otections of hum an rights—or 
addressing areas where there are some failures in protection. Daphne as an institution possesses 
the second-order principle of human rights because its actions are entirely conducted in pursuit 
of guaranteeing human rights to a category of people who lack them due to gendered violence.  
Pursuit is the  of ten-forgotten pi ece of  t he puz zle w hich r eally s hines w ith t he D aphne 
case. Democracy definitely includes a concern for human rights under i ts umbrella, given that 
human rights as a second-order principle seek to realize the first order principles of freedom and 
equality. Yet human r ights are not  a  feature of  any institution. Compare this to accountability. 
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Accountability i s a  d escription of  t he n ature of t he i nstitution. Y et w e don’ t d escribe a n 
institution a s pos sessing hum an r ights a s a qua lity. Instead, hum an r ights, a s a  p rinciple o f 
democracy, guide institutions. They define a target which the institutions seek to attain. Thus we 
seek f reedom a nd e quality gained t hrough hum an r ights w hen a n i nstitution pur sues hum an 
rights as realized in the lives of individuals. The discussion of the prior section dealt with human 
rights needing a best mode of provision. I argue that the diversity of institutions and l ife make 
any single best mode too limited in scope. I encourage attention to pursuit—a matter of intention 
as well as practice. Here we see a new means of judging an institution’s addition to what makes a 
system de mocratic—if t he i nstitution pur sues t he s econd-order pr inciples w e car e about , in 
addition t o di splaying s econd-order pr inciples ( i.e. be ing i nternally or dered a long t he s econd-
order principles identified).  
The other second-order principle that is present with Daphne is subsidiarity, with its links 
to federal a rrangement, grass-roots organization, and/or regionalism. Subsidiarity is  not  always 
associated with democracy, but  with the adaptive approach i f a  second-order principle l inks to 
freedom and e quality t hen i t ha s t o be  considered—when t hey work, t hey work. In this cas e, 
subsidiarity i s not  f ederal i n na ture, which i s i ts us ual a ppearance. S ubsidiarity i n t his c ase i s 
bound into the structure of competition in the Daphne program. Instead of chancing an oversight 
system t hat pr oduces a  universal g uideline f or how g endered vi olence will be  pr evented, t he 
Daphne program finds its success in its localized, distributed nature. There may be similarities in 
gendered violence in all places, but that does not mean that the solution for Poland is the same as 
for France. Culture is intimately bound up t o notions about gender, and thus gendered violence. 
Thus, programming that occurs at the local level may have an advantage that community-wide 
approaches do not.  
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Subsidiarity may not  always appear as a  second-order principle of  democracy. Looking 
for the “right level for administration” does not always entail democratic criteria. But in the case 
of Daphne, the principle does seem to be connected to our first-order principles more explicitly. 
Feminist theory h as long  poi nted out tha t equality m ay r equire di fferential tr eatment a t times. 
Law regarding maternity leave has to respect both women who want to have children and who 
don’t, those who adopt, and even men. The actual procedures for making the situation equal may 
vary for each of these groups. The same holds true with gendered violence. In a culture where 
psychological abuse is more prevalent than physical abuse, ensuring equality and freedom may 
need a di fferent pa thway t han a cul ture w here t he ph ysical as pect of  gendered violence i s t he 
most pr evalent i ssue. On a  c ase l ike D aphne, t he pr inciple of  s ubsidiarity i s a  r eaction t o t his 
understanding as well as to other concerns (efficiency being an important one as well).   
The adaptive approach to democracy seems to serve well in the case of Daphne. It shows 
certain second-order principles linked to freedom and equality at work in Daphne. Yet it allows 
us t o be  a daptive a cross s econd-order pr inciples. D aphne’s pur suit of  hum an r ights, a nd b y 
extension f reedom and equality, gives a  place for the program in the milieu of  European-level 
democracy. Meanwhile, the adaptive approach gives us the flexibility to understand participation 
and discourse in new ways, and allow for other principles to be less useful without affecting our 
final judgments of the institution.  
The r easoning b ehind t he e xisting s econd or der principles i s t he l ynch p in. R ecall t he 
story and intentions of the Daphne initiative. The program is founded with a desire to improve 
human rights, the equality of all citizens, and the freedom of individuals from gendered violence. 
This i s not  a n i nstitution t hat s tumbled ont o t he pr ovision of  de mocracy. D aphne w as 
purposefully constructed to help fulfill ends that enrich and enhance the democratic character of 
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the U nion. D aphne i s s eeking f reedom from gendered vi olence—assurance of  a l iberty t hat i s 
lacking for some individuals in Europe.  The other components of Daphne do not violate the two 
first or der pr inciples of  f reedom a nd e quality. S ome s econd-order e xpressions do f all b y t he 
wayside. E qual t reatment, a  s econd-order pr inciple of  e quality, i s a  l ooming que stion w ith 
Daphne’s patchwork system of funding. But the adaptive approach relaxes the need to see every 
expression of the first orders met. This inquiry gives us a sense for how Daphne can be placed in 
the constellation of components of democracy in the EU, despite it not looking exactly like the 
others. Daphne is exactly how we should see democracy in a complex world: continually striving 
to m ake t he w orld i ncreasingly f ree and m ore e qual. In t his c ase de mocracy i s not  r ules, 
promises, elections, or involvement. It is in the spark of desire, intention, and pursuit.  
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8.0  FROM THE EU CONTEXT TO THE GLOBAL DEBATE: NEW PATHWAYS 
FOR THE ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY 
This project began with a concern about a gap in theory—an apparent gulf between democratic 
scholarship on t he EU and the emerging theoretical positions of  global democratic theory. The 
adaptive approach to democracy is a pathway to forging connections over that gap. The task that 
remains i s answering the l ingering qu estions po sed b y the i ntroduction. How do we t ransition 
from asking “is the EU democratic or not” to a mindset that asks “how is the EU democratic”, a 
shift that is  especially important given the c ircumstances of  globalization and i ts e ffect on our  
conception of democracy? How can scholarship on the EU discuss democracy without resorting 
to recycling old state-based not ions of  t he i dea, and instead focus on t he new possibilities for 
understanding institutions that t he a daptive a pproach b rings? A nd how  can global de mocracy 
theory benefit from the adaptive approach to democracy when it comes to institutions other than 
the EU (the WTO, the IMF, and other “unlikely places” where statist notions do not fit)?  
 As I will expand on in the following sections, the conclusions of this work are threefold. 
First, I argue that the question of “how is the EU democratic” is one which can greatly benefit 
from t he a daptive a pproach t o de mocracy. In c ontrast, ove r-arching qu estions of  “ is t he E U 
democratic or  not ” mot ivate mos t a ccounts of  de mocratic de ficit. I argue tha t w hile the  la tter 
question may be of some interest, much more can be gained by focusing on the first question of 
“how”. I will briefly argue why the focus on how institutions are democratic yields useful insight 
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about those institutions in a way that “is or is not” questions about democracy in the EU might 
overlook. B y s witching t o a n a pproach t hat f ocuses on how , w e c an s ee how  s econd-order 
principles of democracy can manifest in many different ways. This allows for our accounts of the 
institutions to be both robust and flexible, making space for many institutional possibilities. This 
simple switch in the language of our inquiry represents the thinking of the adaptive approach to 
democracy that this study has laid out.  
 Second, I address the way in which the gap between scholarship on  the EU and global 
democratic t heorization can be  na rrowed. T he a daptive a pproach de monstrates t hat no m atter 
what the institution that we are looking at, our process of how we think about it democratically 
can be structured in the same way. The goal is to find an adaptive viewpoint, one that identifies 
what i s going on i n an institution a nd how  t hat m ay or  not  c onnect t o first-order de mocratic 
principles. The global democracy literature can learn from the case of the EU the pitfalls of how 
clinging to rigid or s tate-based not ions of  de mocracy l imits our  s ubsequent c onsideration of  
supranational i nstitutions. W ith t hat, s cholars o f t he E U c an dr aw f rom t he w ork on g lobal 
democracy t o locate bo th a) ne w s econd-order pr inciples t hat m ight be m ore appropriately 
situated for cases of  supranational democracy and b) see ho w other theories have successfully 
navigated a move away from s tate-centric concepts that have plagued talk of democracy is the 
context of the EU.  
 This gap in literatures leads toward a third conclusion that is worth addressing: where the 
adaptive a pproach t o d emocracy goes f rom h ere. W hat r emains i s t o t hink a bout w hat s ort of  
specific questions and cases are best for helping to bridge the literatures. To that end, I turn to a 
varied approach: building on both internal EU functions and supranational institutions that could 
benefit from the adaptive approach paradigm. The watchword of this section is: exploration. The 
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limits of the current document have kept the adaptive approach somewhat confined in topic and 
exploration. The ke y i s t he i dea t hat not  a ll democratic functions have to l ook the same or  be  
located i n t he s imilar pl aces across i nstitutions. A pplying t he adaptive approach to a dditional 
cases will help solidify that, as new pathways of democracy are uncovered and the old familiar 
standards of democracy are shown to either apply or to be less useful in particular supranational 
cases. Any ins titution becomes a  v alid site of  i nquiry t hrough t he a daptive a pproach, w hich 
hopefully c an l ead t o f inding w ays i n w hich t he s econd-order pr inciples of  de mocracy ar e 
working i n ne w w ays i n ne w a nd unde r-explored ( or ove r-explored) i nstitutions. A nd t his 
thought pr ocess c an also he lp w ith t he de sign of  ne w i nstitutions, a s a rchitects of  governance 
could think about new ways of capturing the core qualities of democracy without being limited 
to carbon copies of old state-based institutional formats.  
 Again, the goal of this project was to develop a way of studying supranational democracy 
that w as bot h a ble t o address t he E U but  not  l imited t o t he E U c ontext, a nd t hat w as a ble t o 
recognize new modes of democratic practice as well as the deployment of traditional democratic 
principles—whether those t raditional ways worked as they did in s tates or in changed fashion. 
The adaptive approach gives the researcher studying supranational governance a paradigm that 
escapes the dangers of either-or thinking, and that leads away from assuming an account has to 
be thin or thick—toward a new way of thinking about institutions. In doing so, I have hopefully 
shown that the adaptive approach is indeed up to the task I engaged.  
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8.1  “IS THE EU DEMOCRATIC OR NOT?” VERSUS “HOW IS THE EU 
DEMOCRATIC?” 
The democratic de ficit l iterature, not  to mention a great deal of  pundi try and discussion of  the 
EU, desperately s eeks a  de finitive ans wer t o the que stion “Is t he E U democratic?” Yet thi s 
question is not the question that my research is asking. I suggest that a different question is much 
more important to begin with: “How is the EU democratic?” The difference in the two may seem 
slight, but given the discussion of the adaptive approach that subtle distinction is a critical one. 
Of course that does not mean that the question of “is or is not” should be left completely by the 
wayside. It pr ovides a  di fferent f ocus t o one ’s r esearch, m otivating m ore ove r-arching 
theorization a bout i nstitutions a s t hey f unction t ogether, que stions of  s ufficiency, a nd ot her 
concerns. A nd i n a  ni ce way, t he a nswers t o que stions of  “ how i s t he EU de mocratic” c ould 
usefully inform the kind of overall judgments that other studies choose to ask.   
 So w hy is t he que stion “is t he E U de mocratic o r not ,” i f s uch a  c ommon que stion i n 
literature on democracy in the EU, not at the forefront of the adaptive approach? First, because it 
simply w as not  the  qu estion that mot ivated the r esearch. But mor e impor tantly, the a daptive 
approach is simply not designed to give much leverage on questions of that sort. At the heart of 
the adaptive approach is the recognition of  democracy as mutable, f lexible, and fundamentally 
diverse. Even the same second-order principles in similar institutions can still have very different 
links to the f irst-order pr inciples of  f reedom a nd e quality. T iny c hanges i n t he i nstitutional 
structure, the attitude and behavior of those citizens and officials interacting with the institution, 
and any consensus about the purposes of the institution can have profound effects.  
 The adaptive approach, as a  bridge between thin and thick theorization, actively rejects 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) dichotomous thinking. The very posing of the question: “Is the 
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EU de mocratic or  not ?” s ets up a  di fficulty that t he a daptive a pproach c an he lp a void. 
Democracy is more like a continuum than a democracy in the adaptive approach, though even a 
continuum can be problematic. A continuum would still have some tipping point, some moment 
where we would say that the l ine l ies more to one side than the other. We could transform the 
question of  “ is t he E U de mocratic” i nto t he query: “Is thi s s ufficient to call the  E U a  
democracy?” It m ay not  be  e nough f or s ome t o s ee de mocratic pr inciples a t w ork w ithin a  
system, the natural instinct may quickly lead to concerns whether enough principles are present. 
This falls too close to the approach of worrying whether enough boxes have been checked off on 
the list of democratic principles, which is against the intent of adaptive thinking. The response to 
such a  que stion m ust be  “ Sufficient f or w hom?” W hose vi ew of  s ufficiency i s i mplied w hen 
asking if the EU is sufficiently democratic? The citizens of the EU? Scholars of the EU? Myself? 
The answer will change when we alter whose concerns about sufficiency are at stake, or which 
particular c ontinuum o f de mocratic p rinciples w e ha ppen t o be  l ooking at. A nd m ore 
importantly, w hat a ssumptions a re t hey m aking about de mocratic p rinciples t hat a nswers o f 
sufficiency will be determined upon? Is having to wrangle with those issues of sufficiency really 
worth the investment of time, when we could instead be getting right to the nitty-gritty of how 
the institutions of the EU link to various second-order principles of democracy.  
 Forcing the adaptive approach into giving an answer to “ is the EU democratic or  not ,” 
would pr ovide ne w pi tfalls f or t he m ethod. In particular, t he fallacy of  c omposition must be  
addressed—the danger of using a number of small insights to color our judgment of the system 
as a whole. Take the example of voting as participation. If we observed a system of government 
where thousands of voting opportunities were given to decide certain ballot measures, it would 
still be  unde mocratic if  the s ystem a s a w hole h ad only a s ingle r uling party that de termined 
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which measures were t o b e d ecided b y vot e. The num ber of  obs ervations of  de mocracy a t a  
micro-level cannot combine to allow us  to judge a system of  governance as democratic on t he 
whole.  
While the adaptive approach may at first seem to lead down this line of thinking (taking 
individual institutions and locating the way each links to democratic ideas), it is insulated from 
this c oncern t hrough c are i n t he t ype of  j udgments t hat t he a pproach a llows. T he a daptive 
approach to democracy is not additive in nature. It does not tally up numbers of second orders as 
evidence f or conclusions a bout t he e ntire s ystem. Instead, i t e ncourages c omparison o f t he 
principles found to the first-order principles of freedom and equality (a check to see if the system 
pursues democratic ends or other ends) and
Another c oncern t hat t he a daptive a pproach b rings t o t he que stion o f “ is t he E U 
democratic or not” is that judgments made about the EU is that they will always be formed on 
the basis of limited exploration. Other practices in the EU may house anti-democratic elements, 
based upon pr inciples t hat ul timately c lash w ith freedom and e quality. Other i nstitutions m ay 
hold pi eces of  t he puz zle, a nd t hus c urrent j udgments w ill onl y be  m ade pe nding t hat f urther 
exploration. In the case of this project, the Council of Ministers is a most notable example—for 
many, the nature of  the  Council may be the  central determinant of  the  EU’s democratic s tatus 
because of its central role in guiding the system as a whole. Yet this limitation is shared by all 
work on political institutions. There is always another wrinkle, another case, another practice that 
 to an ever-growing and ever-changing list of second-
order principles (a comparison to all the various documented expressions of democracy that have 
appeared over the long evolution of the term). Thus, when making a judgment about whether the 
EU i s d emocratic, c are must be  t aken t o a void additive t hinking a nd i nstead w ork w ithin t he 
adaptive ethos. 
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can pot entially m odify t he c onclusions t hat w e draw. In t his w ay, t he adaptive app roach to 
democracy is no  different than any other theory. The conclusions drawn are not  absolutes, but  
simply based as best they can be upon what has been documented and described. Thus to make 
an all-or-nothing, is or is not kind of judgment based on limited information is a leap that can be 
avoided by simply asking different questions.  
 In this way, the adaptive approach is much more comfortable with its motivating concern: 
“How is the EU democratic?” The focus of the adaptive approach has been to let the institutions 
of the EU show what they have to offer democracy. The adaptive approach does not try to carry 
a pa rticular l ens a bout d emocracy t o t he i nstitutions t hat a re c onsidered. It do es not  pr esent a 
choice between forcing an institution to fit a given set of principles or writing that institution off 
as “insufficiently democratic.”   
Instead, the adaptive approach to democracy focuses on considering what elements of a 
given institution match up to the first-order principles of freedom and equality. Those matches—
the ways in which the institution connects to the first-orders—are the second-order principles of 
interest which the adaptive approach seeks to evaluate and understand. It i s about mapping an 
institution, in a way. Showing where the institution fits in the current debate (the provisional list 
of second-order principles) as well as where the institution may work democratically in a broader 
scope of democratic functions and ideals.  
Chapter t wo generated a provisional l ist of  second or der p rinciples: pa rticipation, 
accountability, contestation, and human rights. With a picture of democracy as fluid in terms of 
second-order principles over time, we can identify the salient principles of the time in which the 
institution i s e valuated. The pr inciples a re not  t he e nd-all of  t he c oncept but  m erely t he m ost 
likely second-orders given the idea of democracy that is being utilized by both theorists and the 
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architects of the institutions of the EU.  This provisional list represents the current trends—the 
components that seem important to scholars right now.  
The important thing to draw from the exercise is not that the institutions of the EU have 
enough “matches” on the list—that is thinking that trends toward the over-all evaluations of the 
Union. R ather, t he f ocus s hould be  t hat e ach i nstitution e ngaged t he l ist of  s econd-order 
principles in new and interesting ways. Each of the institutions examined in this study contained 
some second-order principles that were: a) on t he provisional l ist; b)  found those second-order 
principles to be plausibly linked to the first-order principles of freedom and equality; c) turned 
up additional second-order principles linked to freedom and equality; and d) found that some of 
these s econd-order principles w ere w orking i n di fferent w ays t han e xpected w ithin t hose 
institutions. Chapters three and four showed how participation (through representation as well as 
public i nvolvement) f ormed a n e ssential c onnection be tween t he E P a nd t he m aintenance of  
freedom and equality in governance at the European level. This paired with new notions about 
discourse a nd rhetorical a ction, w hich p rovided a  ne w t wist on a n ol d de mocratic s tandard: 
contestation. Through these insights, these chapters on t he EP demonstrated how the core ethic 
of t he i nstitution i s t ied not  onl y t o t wo of  t he pr ovisional s econd-orders, but  a lso how  t he 
second-orders t hat w ere l ocated f unctioned a s an e xtension of  t he f irst-order p rinciples o f 
democracy.  
Chapters f ive a nd s ix de monstrated how  e ven t he c ourt, s eemingly removed f rom 
democratic concerns, had its links to the first-order principles. Not only that, but these links came 
in ways familiar to the items on our provisional list. While the chapter focused on obligation and 
guarantee as  independent s econd-order p rinciples, t ogether t hey form a particular p athway of 
accountability t hat us es f reedom a nd e quality a s t heir t ouchstone. T hus, t hese c hapters 
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demonstrated how the ECJ, in curious fashion, helps the EU secure another principle f rom the 
provisional l ist. F inally, c hapter s even c ompletes t he pr ovisional l ist by de monstrating t he 
possibilities of  how an economic-focused system of  governance such as the EU can f ind itself 
supporting freedom and equality through the second-order principle of human rights, even if that 
principle i s m et i n s omewhat di fferent f ashion t han w e m ight e xpect w hen us ing t he t erm 
“rights”. T hus, w e c an s ee t hat our  pr ovisional l ist i s i ndeed c aptured b y t he s ystem. 
Participation, accountability, contestation, and human rights are all located within the institutions 
of the EU. Not only that, but there remain a host of other institutions within the EU that still may 
provide these second order principles and others.  
 Through t hese chapters, I ha ve s hown t he way i n w hich t he a daptive approach s heds 
particular l ight on  t he pathways of  de mocracy w ithin va rious i nstitutions. T hese are r obust, 
flexible a ccounts of  de mocracy. T hey t ake de mocracy w here i t c an be  f ound, i n w hat w ays i t 
exists. It m akes s pace for ne w pos sibilities: n ew ins titutional va riations, new s econd-order 
principles, a nd m ost i mportantly: n ew considerations a nd r esearch about t he i nstitutions of  
governance that affect citizens’ lives.  
 Given these c onsiderations, w hat c an w e s ay? T rue t o f orm, t he a daptive a pproach 
provides a  shift i n not  only what we’re l ooking at, but  what we are looking for. The adaptive 
approach is not about seeing democracy in black and white, yes or no terms. Instead, it pushes us 
to s ee de mocracy w here i t ha ppens a nd how  it happens ins tead of tr ying to find it in some 
particular pr e-theorized form. Y et t he e xamples pr ovided do f ind e nough s imilarity w ith t he 
provisional l ist second-order pr inciples to conclude that there i s democracy in the EU, a t l east 
along those principles. What is more, there are other second-order principles that are l inked to 
freedom and equality that the EU possesses, deepening the way in which its institutions touch the 
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core basis of democracy. Certainly, there may be un-mentioned institutions where things move in 
less-than-democratic w ays, or at  l east pl aces where t he l inks t o freedom and equality c an be 
strengthened. Y et t his s tudy ha s s hown t hree di stinct pl aces w ithin t he EU t hat de mocracy i s 
flourishing in its own way, both expected and unexpected.  
 This view of EU democracy will certainly refine over time. As more elements of the EU 
are s ubjected t o scrutiny and the ad aptive app roach to democracy, t he emphasis m ay change. 
More s tories a bout “ how” t he i nstitutions of  t he E U c onnect t o de mocratic s econd-order 
principles w ill be  ma de. New and di fferent m odes of  de mocracy—additional s econd-order 
principles t hat di rectly e ncourage freedom a nd e quality within t he E uropean s ystem of  
governance—may appear, w hile ot hers b ecome minimized. S uch i s t he w ay of t he a daptive 
approach.  
An important final consideration here, is the fact that asking “how is the EU democratic” 
may assist t hose who w ant t o a sk t he qu estion “is t he E U democratic o r not ”, even while t he 
adaptive a pproach i tself r esists t aking t hat r oad of  i nquiry. U pon enough r esearch a nd 
consideration, enough mapping of  the institutions of  governance and how they impact second-
order principles, some utility for asking overall judgments may be found. Both questions of “is 
the E U d emocratic” and “how  i s t he E U de mocratic” will cont inue t o be r aised by s cholars, 
policy-makers, and citizens of  the EU. The more that the latter i s answered, a process which I 
think the adaptive approach is uniquely suited to, the more material will exist that can aide those 
who prefer to ask the former.  
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8.2 BUILDING LINKS IN LITERATURES THROUGH THE ADAPTIVE 
APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY 
Inquiry into the adaptive approach began at the gap between two literatures—the EU democratic 
deficit w orries a nd t he reluctance of  s ome global de mocratic t heorists t o f ocus upon  t he E U. 
From this discussion emerged the difficulty of judging an institution or system of government as 
democratic ( or l acking democracy) w ithout r eference t o state-experience-informed pr inciples. 
When t rying t o s olve t hat di fficulty, a pa radigm e merges t hat pos es a d ichotomous de cision 
between notions of thick and thin scholarship. To describe these new and different institutions, 
where o ur e xisting pr inciples a re limite d in applicability, the tr aditional me thod was to either 
treat the new institutions thinly or thickly. Either we go the thin route, which enables us to talk 
about a lot of things in comparison despite needing to strip down our concepts greatly in order to 
allow the new and different institutions to be comparable. Or we had to proceed thickly, spinning 
a detailed conceptualization of the democratic qualities of an institution that left it fundamentally 
non-comparable to traditional forms of democracy as well as other supranational institutions.  
The a daptive a pproach, how ever, s olved t hese di fficulties b y essentially c utting t he 
Gordian knot—the dichotomous paradigm that seems to play its influence on theorization is not a 
dichotomy at all. Our theorization can be both robust and flexible at the same time, as long as we 
are careful to recognize and discard the paradigms about comparability and democratic essentials 
that stem from the comparative approach and the state origins of democratic thought.  
The a daptive a pproach t o de mocracy doe s t his b y r eferencing t he c omplex hi story o f 
democratic notions in the first place, and the way in which our conceptions of democracy change 
over time. With this recognition, coupled with deployment of family resemblances notions from 
critical and political theory, the adaptive approach to democracy gains its ability to be robust and 
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flexible a t the s ame tim e. Instead of tr eating de mocracy in an institution as r equiring s ome 
specific constellation of features, instead it looks at the overlapping nature of modern globalized 
supranational g overnance—where m ultiple i nstitutions, a gencies, a nd a ctors a re ha ving e ffects 
on t he l ives of  c itizens. Not a ll de mocratic qua lities a re g oing to be r ealized in a s ingle 
institution, nor need be present in at all in every case. 
Instead, the adaptive approach to democracy settles on a system of first- and second-order 
principles of  democracy. The two f irst-order pr inciples, freedom and equality, are the essential 
ideas from which democracy springs. The adaptive approach recognizes that all other principles 
that have been valued over the hi story of  democracy are second-order to  these f irst pr inciples. 
Furthermore, what second-orders are valued and why they are valued have changed considerably 
as opinions about democracy and the context of states and society have changed.  
These changes ar e what ga ve t he approach is m oniker i n the f irst p lace: adaptive. 
Democracy is a concept that has been recognized in various ways over various times—the only 
singly unifying factor seems to be that at each moment the principles of the system seemed to 
reach toward ensuring the basic freedom and equality of the citizen. Thus, to insist on particular 
qualities of  de mocracy as be ing uni versally ne cessary in all ins titutions is  di fficult a t be st. 
Rather, t he adaptive approach encourages us  t o examine practices, pol icies, and institutions in 
depth to see w hat s econd-order p rinciples of  d emocracy m ay be  p resent ( or a bsent) i n t hose 
institutions. T hus t he f ocus s hifts f rom ha ving a n a bsolute r ule f or w hat m akes a  s ystem of  
governance d emocratic or not , t o how  p articular i nstitutions a re l inked to ( or r emoved from) 
democratic principles.  
With this ethic of looking at particular parts of systems to see how they are democratic, 
rather th an trying to force e very ins titution into a c ookie-cutter m old of s pecified de mocratic 
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principles, I explored three cases in the EU: the European Parliament (EP), the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), and a Commission program called Daphne. Each of these cases came with prior 
scholarship that spoke to the democratic worries, problems, and/or needs. For the EP, the weight 
of associations that the term parliament brought to the table pressed democratic consideration to 
a particular set of  second-order principles. For the ECJ, a s imilar process suggested a minimal 
role of  c ourts i n t he de mocratic qua lifications of  a  r egime. A nd w ith D aphne, uni versalistic 
approaches to human rights seemed to clash with the particularized enforcement mechanisms of 
the program.  
With all three, existing consideration seemed too prone to making the mistakes that the 
adaptive a pproach t ranscends. F or e ach, hol ding a  p articularized s et of pr inciples a s t he 
necessary elements of  d emocracy tha t mus t b e present in all thi ngs w e a re s upposed to call 
democratic lead to difficulties in thinking creatively about the institution. In the second chapter 
of each pair, I demonstrated how the adaptive approach to democracy was able to better tease out 
exactly what second order principles were (and were not) being realized in each institution. From 
this, bot h ne w pr inciples w ere f ound a nd ol d, t raditional ( state-based) pr inciples pr oved l ess 
useful. T hus, w here de mocratic complaints w ould be  l odged und er t he pr ior approach, t he 
adaptive approach enabled a closer look at just what was going on in an institution and how we 
might view that as linking to the principles of freedom and equality.     
Much of  t he pr ior consideration ha s b een f ocused s pecifically on t he b enefits t hat t he 
adaptive approach brings to scholarship on t he EU. Yet the initial genesis of  this project came 
from a gap be tween the g lobal d emocracy and  t he de mocratic de ficit/EU l iteratures. T hus, b y 
way of  concluding, I will discuss the ways in which the adaptive approach can bridge the gap 
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between t hese l iteratures a nd pr ovide t raction f or bot h c omparative E U s cholars a nd global 
democratic theorists alike. 
In m y i ntroduction, I po inted t o the r eluctance of m any global d emocratic t hinkers t o 
engage t he E U di rectly. C ertain EU-addressing works l ike t hat of  M ichael G oodhart ( 2007), 
Thomas Pogge (1997), and others stand out in sharp relief to the larger field of global democratic 
theory which o ften avoids the  c omplexity tha t the  E U br ings. While s imple c omplexity ma y 
always de ter s ome t heorists, m y application of  t he a daptive a pproach to de mocracy—when 
paired w ith ot hers—demonstrates t he r ichness of  t heoretical v alue t hat t he E U br ings t o 
questions of democratic governance at the supranational level.  
At many points throughout this work, the adaptive approach to democracy has provided a 
means to break with the pitfalls that comparative political treatments can carry with them when 
applied t o a n i nstitution like  the  EU. Yet the  EU is  not  a lone in being a s pace w here the  
supranational i nstitutions of  governance can b e too e asily judged b y biased or  s tate-informed 
notions a bout de mocracy. T he phe nomenon of  globalization l eads us  t o r ecognize a ll s orts o f 
institutions which have an effect on our  lives that are not our familiar state authority. Thus, the 
same sorts of questions that spawned democratic deficit concerns arise in similar fashion for all 
other sources of supranational governance: is it legitimate, is it representative, is it transparent… 
is it democratic? Again, the essential motivating factor throughout is the assumption that people 
benefit from democratic rule and thus seek to ensure that all sources of authority in their life are 
democratic. The global democracy l iterature r eminds us  t hat t he phe nomenon of  globalization 
simply made many of us realize the sheer number of supranational authority sources—sources of 
governance—that impact our lives in addition to the traditionally supreme authority of the state.  
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And in t his l ight, democratic worries about t he EU and other supranational i nstitutions 
are n ot s o di fferent. A ll a re s ituations w here ou r ol d w ays of  t hinking about de mocracy were 
almost e ntirely inf ormed by the  s tate c ontext. Thus mo ving out  of  t hat c ontext, t hose ol d 
conceptualizations c an l eave p aradigms a bout w hat w e m ight e xpect i n the g lobal i nstitutions 
lurking i n pundi ts’ a nd r esearchers’ m inds a like. A fter a ll, j ust a s s overeignty-conscious 
diplomats created the EU, so the architects of all other supranational governance can be assumed 
to share that similar background.  
These s orts of  pr oblems ar e al ready be ing add ressed by global de mocratic l iterature. 
Where the adaptive approach brings a fresh angle is its ability to be both flexible and robust by 
rejecting and thick ve rsus t hink pa radigms. Our t heorization about g lobal i nstitutions does not  
have to be either thin enough to apply to all or so thick that only a specific case can be addressed. 
Just as the adaptive approach to democracy opens space to look at the EU’s complex form, so it 
can just the same work on other systems of governance at the supranational level.  
As the democratic foundations of  the s tate are cha llenged, so the theories that we have 
drawn from the state experience need to be flexible. And in order to assure ourselves that these 
new forms of governance that appear to us are not reductions in the democratic character of the 
system, we need a robust consideration of democracy to measure those changes. This situation is 
ideal f or t he ad aptive approach—whether t he i nstitution s tudied i s t he E U, s upranational 
organizations, or  even s tates themselves. Anywhere that our  assumptions about democracy are 
being tested, the adaptive approach can find purchase.  
The adaptive approach also frees us from concerns about finding the right levels at which 
certain processes of  governance are c arried o ut. Federalism and  s ubsidiarity as m odes o f 
arranging governance are interesting in prospect, but can come packaged with notions that there 
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are some ideally correct level at which certain functions of government are located. The adaptive 
approach t o de mocracy frees us  f rom t he ne ed to f ind s ome m ythical “ right” pl ace f or e ach 
function of governance. Instead, the consideration turns to seeing how different functions emerge 
in different places—both expected and unexpected—creating a web of democratic factors.  
 
8.3 NOW THAT WE HAVE THE LINKS, HOW DO WE GO ABOUT TIGHTENING 
THEM? 
Ordinarily, the term expansion in the European context is about adding new member states to the 
EU r egime. H owever, here I am m ore c oncerned w ith t he f inal t houghts on t he a daptive 
approach t o democracy: how i t can be ex panded t o particular n ew areas of r esearch and what 
final ana lysis o f de mocracy in the E U can be m ade through t his different a pproach t o 
theorization. What cases are most helpful in giving new insights to both EU studies and to global 
democratic theory? These are the spaces that can yield the most new second-order principles or 
familiar second-orders working in either familiar or different ways.  
The initial first area where I plan on using adaptive approach to democracy is the other 
institutions and practices of the EU. Democratic questions and insight would likely appear with 
adaptive tr eatments of  the C ouncil, t he C ommission, t he C ommittee of  t he R egions, t he 
European Central Bank, and the Ombudsman—and that is only the tip of the iceberg. Given that 
this pr oject s temmed from que stions a bout t he d emocratic c haracter o f t he U nion as a  w hole, 
expansion of  t he i nvestigations a cross t he E U s eems a n i deal c omplementary e ndeavor. W hat 
would be  t urned up i n such a  p rocess c an onl y be  s peculated at f rom this poi nt. G iven t he 
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Union’s democratic constituency and the language of the documents that define its institutions, I 
do not  t hink i t i s unr easonable t o expect t hat a  l arge num ber of  i nstitutions w ill ha ve s ome 
democratic second-order principles at work. That may not  make them all explicitly democratic 
on their own merit ( recall the checks in the adaptive approach), but  all told this inquiry would 
paint a more elaborate picture of just where democratic principles are being met in the EU and in 
what ways.  
In addition t o e xpansion w ithin t he E U, t he o ther m ain de ployment o f t he a daptive 
approach to democracy seems to be  taking i ts method and viewpoint out  into the global arena 
and applying i t t o other supranational and international i nstitutions. Much of  t his may involve 
taking the adaptive approach to unlikely places. Bodies such as the WTO, IMF, or international 
courts (i.e. the European Court of Human Rights) are often judged as removed from democratic 
concerns and controls. The adaptive approach i s ideally suited t o examine such institutions. It 
would allow a closer investigation of just what principles are being realized by these institutions. 
These unlikely places for democracy may be perfectly suited for the adaptive approach, with its 
ability t o break down the l evel of  ana lysis a s tep, so see i f t here ar e de mocratic pr ocesses or  
portions to the institution, even if it fails certain sets of traditional democratic qualifiers. We may 
find more democracy than we would expect through such an analysis.  
A third set of practices and institutions seems a likely candidate for the adaptive approach 
as well. The transnational organizations and movements literature presents yet another source of 
supranational a ctivity, o ne t o w hich m any hop es f or de mocracy i n t he g lobalizing w orld a re 
attached. Such organizations and institutions range from formal structures like the Trans-Atlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD) and Trans-Atlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) to cross-border social 
movements s uch as G reenpeace International and the t ransnational l and m ine cam paign. T he 
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adaptive approach seems particularly useful in these cases as a way of perhaps slowing some of 
the democratic optimism that gets heaped onto this type of institution. Once again, old notions 
about di scourse, pa rticipation, voi ce, a nd r epresentation s eem t o be  at pl ay i n d emocratic 
judgments of  t ransnational bodi es. A s t he a daptive a pproach doe s be st, i t c an i nterrogate t he 
second-order principles at work in these institutions, and question whether they are democratic in 
origin or  merely t he r emains of  s tatist not ions about c itizen involvement i n governance.  T his 
would provide a more stable theoretical foundation from which to consider such organizations.  
With these areas of future research roughed out, all that remains is the looming question 
about w hat s ort of  f inal ana lysis about  t he de mocratic ch aracter of  t he EU t hat t he ada ptive 
approach t o de mocracy can pr ovide. W hile m aking s uch a  pr onouncement w ould be  t he easy 
path, t he a daptive a pproach t o de mocracy s imply doe s not  e nable s weeping be nchmark 
judgments of  that sort. There is no de finitive ruling that says whether the EU is democratic or  
not. Rather, the adaptive approach clarified what democratic foundations and principles are being 
met, where they are being met, and how they are being met in three particular EU institutions. 
Likewise, t he adaptive approach t o de mocracy found new ar rangements and their as sociated 
second-order pr inciples by w hich t he f irst-order pr inciples of  f reedom a nd e quality a re be ing 
realized in the EU.  
This project set out to say something more about the way we think about democracy, and 
how s hifts i n pe rspective he lp our  s ubsequent e valuations of  a n i nstitution l ike t he E U. T he 
adaptive approach to democracy provides a  tool for scholars to put  their own assumptions and 
biases under increased scrutiny. The EU is not so simply a case as having too much or too little 
democracy. R ather, w e must c ontinue t o vi ew i t a s a n evolving s ystem w here de mocracy i s 
engaged at multiple levels and in multiple ways. Yet we should take heart, as the central message 
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of the adaptive approach to democracy is that the democratic future of supranational governance, 
such as the EU, is complex, multiple, and most importantly, discoverable.  
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